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ABSTRACT
Doubt, Certainty, and the Cartesian Circle
(February

1983)

Robert S. Welch, A.B., Brown University
M.A., University of Massachusetts
Ph-D., University of Massachusetts

Directed by:

Professor Fred Feldman

Ever since Arnauld and others first pointed it out in

their objections to Descartes

'

Meditations

,

philosophers

have concerned themselves with what appears to be a vicious

circle:

that the principle of clarity and distinctness

which is employed to validate God's existence is itself in
need of a guarantee which only God's existence can provide.
In general, contemporary commentators proposing solutions

to this problem can be divided into three camps:

first,

there are those who see reason as autonomous for Descartes
and the principle of clarity and distinctness as needing no

guarantee.

By 'autonomy of reason'

I

mean that the faculty

by which the Cogito and other of Descartes' first

principles are perceived is not in need of any verification
of its inability to err.

Second, there are those who see

reason as only partially autonomous for Descartes with that
part validating the proof of God's existence which in turn

vi

validates that aspect of reason which is not autonomous.
Third, there are those who see reason as non-autonomous

and who argue for distinctions in the concepts of certainty

and doubt in order to avoid the circle.
In this dissertation

present the problem by drawing

I

directly from the Meditations and the Objections and
Replies and

I

outline the strategy

with the problem.

I

I

will employ in dealing

proceed to discuss in turn each of the

aforementioned three positions, the arguments offered by
proponents of each, and the criticism of each, both my own
and those found in the literature of the problem.

Taking

the third position, the non-autonomy of reason, as my

starting point,

I

then present my own interpretation of

Descartes' strategy which,

I

argue, succeeds in circum-

venting the problem of circular reasoning and in overcoming the objections raised against others.

Vll
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INTRODUCTION
In Meditation

I

Descartes sets forth reasons which will

allow him to "doubt about all things.

1,1
.

.

and having

systematically attempted to do this, turns in Meditation II
to seek that which is indubitable and discovers that he,

Descartes, exists as a thinking being.

Using this

discovery as a basis for further investigation Descartes
concludes at the beginning of Meditation III that:
I am certain that I am a thing which
thinks; but do I not then likewise know
what is requisite to render me certain
of a truth?
Certainly in this first
knowledge there is nothing that assures
me of its truth, excepting the clear
and distinct perception of that which
I state, which would not indeed suffice
to assure me that what I say is true,
if it could ever happen that a thing
which I conceived so clearly and
distinctly could be false; and
accordingly it seems to me that already
I can establish as a general rule that
all things which I perceive very
^
clearly and very distinctly are true.

Having asserted the doctrine of clarity and distinctness Descartes immediately appears to cast doubt upon it.

X

The Philosophical Works of Descartes transl. Elizabeth
Cambridge UniverS. Haldane and G. T. R. Ross (Cambridge:
abbreviated
(hereafter
sity Press, 1931), Volumes I and II
HR I, p. 140.
as HR I and HR II).
,

^Ibid

.

,

p

.

158
IX

But when I took anything very simple and easy
in the sphere of arithmetic or geometry into
consideration, e.g. that two and three together
made five, and other things of the sort, were
not these present to my mind so clearly as to
enable me to affirm that they were true? Certainly if I judged that since such matters
could be doubted, this would not have been so
for any other reason than that it came into my
mind that perhaps a God might have endowed me
with such a nature that 1 may have been deceived
even concerning things which seemed to me most
manifest.
But every time that this preconceived opinion of the sovereign power of a
God presents itself to my thought, I am constrained to confess that it is easy to Him, if
He wishes it, to cause me to err, even in
matters in which I believe myself to have the
best evidence. And, on the other hand, always
when I direct my attention to things which I
believe myself to perceive very clearly, I am
so persuaded of their truth that I let myself
break out into words such as these: Let who
will deceive me, He can never cause me to be
nothing while I think that I am, or some day
cause it to be true to say that I have never
been, it being true now to say that I am, or
that two and three make more or less than five,
or any such thing in which I see a manifest contradiction.
And, certainly, since I have no
reason to believe that there is a God who is
a deceiver, and as I have not yet satisfied
myself that there is a God at all, the reason
for doubt which depends on this opinion alone
is very slight, and so to speak metaphysical.
But in order to be able altogether to remove
it, I must inquire whether there is a God as
soon as the occasion presents itself; and if
I find that there is a God, I must also inquire
whether He may be a deceiver; for without a
knowledge of these two truths I do not see ^
that I can ever be certain of anything.

^Ibid.

,

pp.

158-159.
x

.

I

:

shall hereafter refer to this passage as the
Circle

Passage

Descartes then proceeds to argue for the existence of
a

non-deceiving God.

Although he never explicitly employs

the doctrine of clarity and distinctness to support the

premises of his argument, its use is implicit in the
following
And we cannot say that this idea of God
is perhaps materially false and that
consequently I can derive it from naught
(i.e. that possibly it exists in me
because I am imperfect)
as I have just
said is the case with ideas of heat, cold
and other such things; for, on the contrary, as this idea is very clear and
distinct and contains within it more
objective reality than any other, there
can be none which is of itself more true,
nor any in which there can be less suspicion of falsehood.
,

4

Having demonstrated to his own satisfaction that

non-deceiving God exists, Descartes, in Meditation IV

a
,

appears to use this demonstration to guarantee the veracity
of clear and distinct perceptions.

for as often as I so restrain my
will within the limits of my knowledge
that it forms no judgment except on
matters which are clearly and distinctly
represented to it by the understanding,
I can never be deceived; for every clear
and distinct conception is without doubt
something, and hence cannot derive its
origin from what is naught, but must of
.

Ibid

.

166

.

(Italics mine)
xi

:

,

necessity have God as its author - God,
I say, who is supremely perfect, cannot
the cause of any error and consequently
we must conclude that such a conception
^
(or such a judgment) is true.
;

This guarantee is stated explicitly in Meditation V
But after I have recognized that there is
because at the same time I have
also recognized that all things depend
upon Him, and that He is not a deceiver,
an(3 from all that have inferred that what
f. perceive
clearly and distinctly cannot
fail to be true

.

a God -

.

Ever since Arnauld

.

6

.

and others

first pointed it out in

their objections to Descartes' Meditations

,

philosophers

have concerned themselves with what appears to be a vicious
circle:

that the principle of clarity and distinctness

which is employed to demonstrate the certainty of God's
existence is itself in need of

a

guarantee which only the

certainty of God's existence can provide.
In the second set of objections the following point is

made
Thirdly, since you are not yet certain
of the aforesaid existence of God, and
yet according to your statement, cannot
be certain of anything or know anything
clearly and distinctly unless previously
you know certainly and clearly that God
~

>

Ibid.

^Ibid.
7

,

P-

178

P*

184.

HR II, pp.

^Ibid.

pp.

.

(Italics mine)

79-95.
24-29.

xii

.

exists, it follows that you cannot clearly
and distinctly know that you are a thinking thing, since, according to you, that
knowledge depends on the clear knowledge
of the existence of God, the proof of
which you have not yet reached at that
point where you draw the conclusion that
you have a clear knowledge of what you
Q
9
are
.

While the accusation of circular reasoning is not explicitly stated in the foregoing passage,

out.

it is there to be drawn

Had Descartes' critics directed their attention to

questioning the clarity and distinctness of God's existence
rather than that of the Cogito

would have been more apparent.

promising

,

the question of circularity

Descartes' reply is un-

.

Thirdly, when I said that we could know
nothing with certainty unless we were
first aware that God existed I announced
in expressed terms that I referred only
to the science apprehending such conclusions <as can recur in memory without
attending further to the proofs which
led me to make them
,

.

This leads us to believe that the principle of clarity and

distinctness does not need the guarantee provided by the
certainty of an existent non-deceiving God.

But further

in the same replies Descartes also asserts:
in the case of our clearest and most
accurate judgments which, if false,
^

~*~

Q

.

.

Ibid

.

,

p

.

26

Ibid

.

,

p

.

38

.

.

xiii

.

2

.

could not be corrected by any that are
clearer, or by any other natural faculty,
I clearly affirm that we cannot
be
deceived.
For, since God is the highest
being He cannot be otherwise than the
highest good and highest truth, and hence
it is contradictory that anything should
proceed from Him that positively tends
toward falsity. But yet since there is
nothing real in us that is not given by
God (as was proved along with His existence) and we have, as well, a real
faculty of recognizing truth, and distinguishing it from falsehood (as the mere
existence in us of true and false makes
manifest)
unless this faculty tended
toward truth, at least when properly
employed (i.e. when we give assent to
none but clear and distinct perceptions,
for no other correct use of this faculty
can be imagined)
God, who has given it
to us, must justly be held to be a
deceiver
Thus you see that, after becoming
aware of the existence of God, it is
incumbent on us to imagine that he is a
deceiver if we wish to cast doubt upon
our clear and distinct perceptions; and
since we cannot imagine that He is a
deceiver, we must admit them all as true
11
and certain.
,

,

This passage appears to place the principle of clarity and

distinctness again in need of support.
Descartes' vacillation does not end here.

Later in

the same replies he reasserts the position which he main-

tamed
•

^

~^

in his initial reply to his critics.

Ibid

.

,

pp.

Ibid

.

,

p

.

40-41.
42

xiv

1

.

s

In the fourth set of objections M.
Arnauld makes a

similar point.
The only remaining scruple I have is an
uncertainty a£ to how a circula r reasoning _is to be avoided in saying
the only
secure reason we have for believing that
we clearly and distinctly perceive
is true, is the fact that God exists.
But we can be sure that God exists,
because we clearly and evidently
-onl Y
perceive that therefore prior to being
certain that God exists, we should be
certain that whatever we clearly and~
13
evidently perceive is true
;

;

n

.

Descartes

response is again unenlightening.

Finally, to prove that I have not
argued in a circle in saying, that the
only secure reason we have for believing
that what we clear ly and distinctly perceive i_s true is the fact that God
oxi s t
but that clear ly we can be sure
that God exists only becaus e we perceive
that, I may cite the explanations that I
have already given at sufficient length
in my reply to the second set of Objections, numbers 3 and 4.
There I distinguished those matters that in actual
truth we clearly perceive from those we
remember to have formerly perceived. For
first, we are sure that God exists because
we have attended to the proofs that established this fact; but afterwards it is
enough for us to remember that we have
perceived something clearly, in order to
be sure that it is true; but this would
not suffice, unless we knew that God
existed and that He did not deceive us. 4
,

;

4 ^

14

Ibid

.

,

p

Ibid

.

,

pp.

.

92

114-115.

xv

Given the unsatisfactory nature of
Descartes' replies
to his critics, a number of contemporary
Cartesian scholars
have attempted to provide interpretations
of Descartes'
enterprise that would enable him to avoid the
accusations
of circular reasoning.

in general,

these Cartesian commen-

tators can be divided into three camps.

First, there are

those who see reason as autonomous for Descartes
and the

principle of clarity and distinctness as needing no
guarantee.

By 'autonomy of reason'

I

mean that the faculty by

which the Cogito and other of Descartes' first
principles
are perceived is not in need of any verification of
its

inability to err.

Second, there are those who see reason

as only partially autonomous for Descartes with that part

validating the proof of God's existence which in turn
validates that aspect of reason which is not autonomous.
Third, there are those who see reason as non-autonomous
for Descartes and who argue for distinctions in the

concepts of certainty and doubt in order to avoid the

Cartesian Circle.
In the chapters that follow

present the strategies

I

of selected representatives from each of the three camps.

For each account including my own

I

pose questions related

to five topics treated in the Meditations

.

The first con-

cerns the range of doubt raised in Meditation
xvi

I.

For

example, what kind of beliefs and/or
what faculties does
the doubt affect?
is there a distinction in degree
or
kind between categories of beliefs, e.g.,
between doubts
about empirical beliefs and non-empirical
ones? The second
concerns the achievement of the Cogito in
Meditation II
.

For example, what does that achievement
provide us with?

What is the relationship, if any, between the
Cogito and
other first principles? Between the Cogito and
the principle of clarity and distinctness? What kind or
level
of

certainty is achieved with the Cogito ?

The third concerns

the role of the principle of clarity and distinctness
in

Meditation II and III

.

For example, what is its relation-

ship to the Cogito and other first principles?

To the

certainty which Descartes is attempting to achieve?

To the

demonstration of God's existence and non-deceiving nature?
The fourth concerns the doubt raised in the Circle Passage
in Meditation III

.

For example, what beliefs and/or

faculties are called into doubt?

What is the relationship

between this doubt and that raised in Meditation

I?

The

fifth topic concerns the arguments for the existence and

non-deceiving nature of God in Meditation III and IV
respectively.

For example, what does Descartes achieve

with these arguments?

How does he achieve it?

XVII

What role

does the Coaito and other first
principles play in these
arguments?
In the first chapter

discuss the strategies offered

I

by the proponents of the autonomy
of reason in Descartes'
enterprise.
For example, A. K. Stout and Willis
Doney each
argue that God's existence is needed
by Descartes to verify
only the memory of clear and distinct
perceptions. Merrill
Ring argues that the scope of doubt in
the Meditations

extends only to empirical knowledge claims.

I

cite Harry

Frankfurt's substantive objections to the memory
thesis and
Peter Schouls' objections, particularly ones
derived from
textual evidence, against the empirical interpretation.

I

also offer my own criticisms of Ring's interpretation.
In the second chapter

I

discuss the strategies offered

by the proponents of the partial autonomy of reason.

For

example, George Nakhnikian argues that circular reasoning
is unavoidable only if one fails to distinguish between

Descartes' considered doctrine and an aberrant view which

Descartes sometimes appears to hold.

John Morris distin-

guishes between certain technical terms which he contends

Descartes used with comparative precision and consistency.
These distinctions provide Morris with a basis for arguing
that only certain aspects of reason are ever called into
doubt.

Peter Schouls' strategy is similar to that of
xviii

Morris although the distinctions
which he draws from
Descartes' writings differ from
those which Morris draws.
I cite Schools' criticism
of Morris' interpretation
and
offer my own criticisms of each
of the three accounts.
In the third chapter I discuss
the strategies of two
proponents of the non-autonomy of reason
in Descartes'
enterprise.
Harry Frankfurt distinguishes between
doubting the truth of a proposition and
doubting the relationship between a proposition's indubitability
and

its truth.

Alan Gewirth distinguishes between two
types of certainty
and argues that the Cogito allows Descartes
to achieve the
first type which Descartes uses in turn to
achieve the
second.

I

offer criticisms of each interpretation and

point out certain features which show some promise
of

pointing to

solution to the problem of the circle.

a

In the fourth chapter

I

discuss the strategies of

two additional proponents of the non-autonomy of
reason in

Descartes' enterprise.

Anthony Kenny distinguishes between

two types of doubt and certainty and employs the distinc-

tions to develop
by Gewirth.

a

strategy quite similar to that proposed

Fred Feldman also distinguishes between two

types of doubt and certainty although the distinctions
are based on much different concepts than those of either

Gewirth or Kenny.

I

suggest difficulties which each
xix

interpretation encounters and also
point to certain
features, particularly from
Feldman's account, which will
prove helpful in developing my
own interpretation.
In the fifth chapter

I

draw upon certain features from

Gewirth's, Kenny's, and Feldman's
accounts to develop a
strategy of my own.
I distinguish between
three types of
doubt and certainty and argue that
such a distinction
allows my account to avoid the
difficulties which I have
raised for other proponents of the
non-autonomy of reason
in Descartes' enterprise.

xx

CHAPTER

I

Among the first contemporary defenders of
Descartes is
A.

K.

Stout.

In "The Basis of Knowledge in Descartes" 1

Stout defends the autonomy of reason for
Descartes and

argues that the doubt raised in the Circle
Passage early in
Meditation III concerns only the accuracy of one's
memory
of clear and distinct perceptions.

Demonstrating the exis-

tence of a non-deceiving God removes cause for that
doubt
and validates that accuracy.

Stout does not explicitly consider question

(1)

but

his response would presumably be that the doubt raised in

Medit ation

ranges over all beliefs, both empirical ones,

I

e.g., beliefs of physics, astronomy and medicine, and non-

empirical ones, e.g.

,

beliefs of mathematics and geometry.

The former are doubtful because they rely on sense perception, the latter because they presuppose that extension

exists.

".

.

.

if a corporeal world did not exist mathe-

matics would simply be an elaborate deception.

.

."

The

Stout, "The Basis of Knowledge in Descartes," Mind
330-342, 458-472
(1929), pp
(Reprinted in
Descartes
A Collection of Critical Essays ed. Willis
Doney, University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame, (1967)
References will be to the Doney text.)
pp. 169-194.
A.

K.

Vol.

38

.

.

;

2

Ibid

.

,

p.

,

176

.

1

,

,

2

spectre of an all powerful demon is raised
precisely to
cast doubt on the corporeal world in
general and extension
in particular.

While there appears to be no apparent distinction
in
kind between the doubt raised against empirical beliefs
and
that leveled against non-empirical ones for Stout, he
does

"...

point to a difference in degree.

doubtful compared with the latter.

.

the former are

." 3

Which faculties

are open to doubt on Stout's view is unclear.
the faculties of the senses are untrustworthy.

Obviously
But beyond

that Stout does not address the issue of whether any of the

mind's reasoning faculties, e.g., intuition, deduction,
etc., are being questioned in Meditation

Stout's response to question

(2)

I

.

would be that one

truth can be established in the face of the powerful demon

hypothesis.

The one truth that cannot be doubted is that

of one's own existence, for in order to be deceived one

must exist; indeed the very fact that one is deceived

demonstrates one's existence.

4

What role then does Cogito

ergo sum play in the rest of Descartes' schema for Stout?
To answer that and demonstrate what, in Stout's view,

Ibid.

P-

177.

Ibid.

P-

172.

3

Descartes achieves in Meditation II we must first look
at
what Stout's response would be to question

(3)

A straightforward interpretation such as

I

suggested

in the Introduction would point to the principle of
clarity

and distinctness as a universal test of truth being derived
f rom

Cogi to ergo sum

it were,

the general rule being reached, as

,

from the examination of

admits that Descartes

'

a

single instance.

Stout

words imply this sort of an inter-

pretation, one which in Stout's view leads inevitably to a

circular argument.
intended.

It is not, however, what Descartes

Stout argues:
he [Descartes] holds that what
perceive is self-evident and while I
am perceiving it I cannot doubt its
truth.
I may expect to find the same
general conditions present in all truths
that appear to me self-evident, and,
having found them, I may give them the
names "clearness and distinctness"; and
they may then serve me as a guide in
trying to discover self-evident propositions.
But these conditions can never
be the guarantees of the truth of the
self-evident propositions they condition.
.

.

.

I

^

Stout points to passages in Meditation V to support his

claim that Descartes did not consistently maintain that
when one clearly and distinctly perceives a proposition he
argues from its clearness and distinctness to its truth.
And even although I had not demonstrated
this [that all I know clearly is true],

~*

Ibid

.

,

p

.

171.

.

,

.

4

the nature of my mind is such that I
could not prevent myself from holding
them to be true so long as I conceive
them clearly ...

For the rest, whatever proof or
argument I avail myself of, we must
always return to the point that it is
only those things which we conceive
clearly and distinctly that have the
power of persuading me entirely.

6

7

On Stout's view then it would appear that the clarity
and

distinctness passage early in Meditation III represents
only a stage in Descartes' thought, to be superseded by

a

more adequate explanation.

What then is Stout's response to question (3)?

According to Stout the general principle of clarity and
distinctness

"

.

.

.

must be established to overcome a doubt

to which every clear and distinct perception is liable, not

when we are attending to it, but when we reflect upon the

general conditions of our knowledge." g
not,

The principle is

in Stout's view, either derivable from specific

instances of clear and distinct perceptions such as the

Cogito or the test of truth of those perceptions.
What is called into doubt in the Circle Passage is
not then the truth of specific clear and distinct percep-

g

^
g

HR I, p. 180.
Stout's translation differs slightly from
that of Haldane and Ross, but not in any significant
way

Ibid

.

,

Stout,

p

.

ojd.

183

cit

.

p.

172.

.

5

tions

i

,

.

e

.

,

the Cogito and other first
principles.

Rather it is the truth of an argument's
conclusion that one
remembers deriving clearly and distinctly
but to which one
is no longer attending.
"while I was attending
to the

proof

I

was incapable of doubting; now

doubt cannot be overthrown unless

I

I

can doubt, and my

can prove that if there

be an all-powerful Being He cannot
deceive me."

9

Rather

than the principle of clarity and distinctness
being

employed to demonstrate God's existence, it is
the reverse.
It is from the demonstration of God's
existence and nature

alone that the principle can be derived.
Does this mean that without that demonstration

specific clear and distinct perceptions may be false even
though one may be unable to doubt them while attending to
them?

Stout admits that this is a possible interpretation,

one that Descartes may have held at times; but it is one
that still leads to circularity. 10

Any demonstration of

God's existence is no more certain than any other clear
and distinct perception; whatever doubt may infect the

latter even in only an indirect way also impugns

the

former
This consequence, on Stout's view, forced Descartes,
at least at times,
9

1Q

Ibid

.

,

p.

Ibid

.

,

pp.

to reject the hypothesis that an all-

173.

174-175.

:

6

powerful deceiver could undermine the certainty
of clear
and distinct perceptions and to maintain that
the only
doubt raised by that hypothesis is directed toward
the

accuracy of one's memory of clear and distinct
perceptions.
Under this interpretation the doubt raised in the
Circle

Passage is not doubt about the truth of correctly

remembered clear and distinct perceptions no longer being

attended to, it is doubt about whether the perceptions one
recalls attending to were actually clear and distinct.
The demonstration of God's existence is needed to

overcome that doubt.

And in contrast to the previous

interpretation this does not involve circular reasoning.
The certainty of the demonstration of God's existence is

not open to doubt even when one is no longer clearly and

distinctly perceiving it.
But, one may ask, does not the demonstration of God's

existence fall prey to the doubt raised in the Circle
Passage?

Stout attempts to respond to this possibility by

distinguishing three orders of memory in Descartes'
epistemology
(a) That which is so certain as not to
depend upon the authority of God - as,
for instance, when ... an atheist may
know the equality of the angles of a
triangle to two right angles (the proof
of which involves memory in the sense
of retentiveness)
(b) That which does
not mislead, but without reference to
God would be open to speculative doubt.
.

)

)

?

7

(c) That which is actually misleading
and therefore cannot depend on God's
veracity ...

H

In an argument in which each premise is understood

separately, and the conclusion reached with only the last
step directly being attended to, the memory of previous
steps in the argument is that of reminiscence
the entire process is deduction.

(type

(b)

in a situation in

which one is directly attending to an entire argument, the
act of perceiving the entire process from premise to

conclusion is one of intuition and it involves the memory
of retentiveness

(type

(a)

.

But does the argument demonstrating God's existence
in Meditation III involve memory of type
If the latter,

type

or type

then Descartes is back in a circle.

then the circle is avoided.

(a),

(a)

(b)

If

Stout's point is:

It is true that the first or causal
proof seems to occupy the whole of the
third Meditation, and the ontological
argument the greater part of the fifth.
But the "proofs" themselves are in each
case brief and clear, if we separate
them from the preliminary matter which
clears the ground for them.

^

We are now in a position to return to question (2).

Stout's interpretation of Descartes places the Cogito in
a

much less important position than it is traditionally

^ Ibid

.

,

pp.

^Ibid

.

,

p

.

183-184
188

.

.
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placed in Descartes' epistemology.

The principle of

clarity and distinctness cannot be derived
from it without falling prey to circular reasoning.

It is true that

the Cogito is the initial principle to
overcome the doubt

raised by the evil demon hypothesis in Meditation

I

.

but

beyond that it appears to have no status for Stout
above
other first principles that are also perceived
clearly and
distinctly.

All achieve equal certainty.

None fall prey

to the doubt raised in the Circle Passage in Meditation

in

The principle of clarity and distinctness also has a
^^-^i^ished role in Stout's interpretation.

The principle

is not needed to guarantee the truth of other specific

clear and distinct perceptions or the demonstration of
God's existence.

That demonstration as well as first

principles like the Cogito are in no need of such a
guarantee.

13

In Stout's view reason,

for Descartes, must

be held as autonomous and in no need of any such guarantee.

Willis Doney also presents a well reasoned case for
the autonomy of reason in Descartes.

13

In "The Cartesian

In fact, as Stout points out (p. 174)
the doubt raised
in the Circle Passage is better met by a direct appeal
to God's veracity than by an appeal to a rule derived
from God's veracity.
This leaves the rule without any
epistemic function in the Meditations
Its presence
,

.

under Stout's interpretation becomes superfluous.

9

lrcle "

Doney distinguishes between what one
might, at
the present time, clearly and distinctly
perceive to be
true and what one might recall having
perceived clearly and
distinctly to be true. The former is in no need
of the

assurance provided by the demonstration of an
existent,

non-deceiving God on Doney

'

s

view.

But the latter, since

memory is involved, requires precisely that assurance.
This distinction allows one to clearly and distinctly

perceive that just such a God does exist which in turn

vindicates one's memory of clear and distinct perceptions.
Unlike Stout, Doney addresses question
In Meditation

I

(1)

directly.

Descartes asserts:

as I sometimes imagine that others
deceive themselves in the things which
they think they know best, how do I know
that I am not deceived every time that
I add two and three, or count the sides
of a square, or judge of things yet
simpler, if anything simpler can be
15
imagined?
.

.

.

Doney acknowledges the temptation to interpret "things yet
simpler" as referring to those beliefs which rely on
intuition.

But both examples cited refer to operations

that could take some time, e.g., adding numbers and counting sides.

14

15

Doney

'

s

point is that each involves movement of

Willis Doney, "The Cartesian Circle," Journal of the
History of Ideas Vol. 16 (1955), pp. 324-338.
HR

I,

p.

147.

6

.

10

thought during which

mistake of memory could occur.

a

In neither case is it clear that
[Descartes] was questioning a belief
based on intuition.
it seems more
likely that these beliefs were the
result of reasoning of some sort. No
doubt they could be known by intuition.
But from the references to
adding, counting, and judging it
appears that he had in mind situations
in which, as a matter of fact, these
16
beliefs were not based on intuitions.

he

^

Descartes' remarks could mean that nothing requiring

•

more than intuition could be known without knowledge of
God; and this in turn could still involve circular
reason-

ing if a demonstration of God's existence required more

than intuition.

Doney

'

claim is that even this weaker

s

position is not one which Descartes held.
Doney

's

argument against this weaker position is some-

what more complicated.

In arguing for the doubtfulness of

beliefs based on sense perception Descartes employed the
following principle:
If some beliefs resting on evidence of
certain sort turned out to be mis-

a

taken, then any belief resting on
evidence of the same sort was doubtful.

Now this principle works quite well with any beliefs only
if one cannot distinguish those instances in which one is

mistaken from those in which one is not mistaken.

1

~*~^

Doney,

ojp.

Ibid

p.

.

,

cit
331

.

,

p.

330

.

And it

.

.
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is the dream argument in Meditation

condition.

I

which provides this

If I can never ascertain with certainty
whether

am presently perceiving that
p (where p is some belief
based on my senses) or asleep and dreaming that
I am
I

perceiving that p, then every belief based on sense
perception is open to doubt.

However, this condition cannot be fulfilled, according
to Doney, when it comes to beliefs based on reason.
If at times he [Descartes] had erred,
his error could have been prevented
had he attended carefully enough to
what was going on in his mind at the
time.
He could have seen that his
conclusion was not based on a clear
and distinct perception of the demonstration, but depended, at least in
part, on memory.
Knowing that conclusions of this sort were often mistaken,
he could have withheld his consent.
The mistakes which had evoked his
doubts were of a detectable kind.
There had been no mistakes when he had
clearly and distinctly perceived the
reasons for his conclusions.
So he
could not argue, as he had about
perceptual beliefs:
sometimes mistaken, therefore always possibly

mistaken
And Doney concludes:

Thus the problem raised in the
first meditation was not one of
justifying reason, although Descartes
sometimes suggested that it was in
order to impress upon those who were
precipitous and undiscriminating in

18

Ibid

.

,

p

.

332

.
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their judgments that their certainty
was precarious.
We now have a complete response to question

doubt raised in Meditation

I

(1)

.

The

ranges over all beliefs based

on sense perception and on those beliefs which
are the con-

clusions of arguments whose steps involve memory.

Beliefs

which rely on intuition and/or deduction alone are
not
subject to that doubt.

What then of question (2)?

Unlike Stout, Doney has

very little to say about the Cogito
his article Doney asks,

".

.

.

.

As a last question in

why did Descartes think of

the Meditations as an argument proceeding from knowledge
of his own existence to knowledge of God's existence and

finally to absolute certainty in mathematics and natural

philosophy?" 20

Why was the Cogito prerequisite to

Descartes' knowledge of God's existence when the latter was
obvious, in Doney

'

s

view, on inspection of his idea of an

infinitely perfect being?

Doney

'

s

response is:

The priority of the cogito can
be easily explained.
The first proof
of God's existence was a posteriori
from the existence of the idea of an
infinite and perfect Being. Descartes
would have to know that the effect
existed in order to infer the cause.
The second [proof] was an inference

19

20

Ibid

.

,

p.

333.

Ibid

.

,

p

336

.
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from the existence of res cogitans to
21
God as the cause.
In Med j- ta tion II then we have, on
Doney

'

s

view, the cer-

tainty of reason (at least qua the faculty of
intuition)

affirmed and the Cogito established to provide a
necessary
premise in the argument for God's existence in
Meditation
ill

(and later in Meditation V as well).

Presumably for

Doney the Cogito has no epistemic status distinct from
that
of other first principles.

Its only unique feature is its

role in Descartes' methodology.
Doney'

s

position on question

(3)

is similar to Stout's.

The principle of clarity and distinctness is both pro-

visional and uncertain prior to the demonstration of God's
existence.

But Doney arrives at this position by means of

different route.

a

Whereas Stout points to textual evi-

dence to demonstrate that Descartes did not intend for the

Principle to be derived from the Cogito and other first

principles (and hence to be used as
truth)

a

general test of

Doney provides a different reason for rejecting

,

such a notion:
The answer cannot be, simply, that the
rule was an induction universal in scope
and that God's veracity was the justification of such an induction. For
Descartes believed that other universal
propositions could be known without
this guarantee:
e.g., the principle of
causation used in the first two proofs
^

~*~

Ibid

.

,

p

.

338

.

:
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of God's existence.
The answer lies
in another direction.
On Descartes'
view, although all clear and distinct
ideas were true, not all true statements
could be clearly and distinctly perceived to be so.
Some of them could not
be so perceived within the compass of a
single intuition. The rule about all
clear and distinct ideas was just such
a statement.
To know that any idea was
true, this idea had to be present to his
mind.
To know that all were true, all
of them would have had to be present at
once.
This was humanly impossible.
Therefore, an assertion about the truth
of all clear and distinct ideas was
dependent on knowledge of God's veracity. 22

With respect to question

(4)

Doney

'

s

Circle Passage also differs from Stout's.

treatment of the
When Descartes

states
But in order to be able altogether to
remove it [doubt]
I must inquire whether
there is a God.
and if I find that
there is a God, I must also inquire
whether He may be a deceiver; for without
knowledge of these two truths I do not
see that I can ever be certain of anything. 23
,

.

.

Doney maintains that Descartes was using 'certain' in

a

different sense here than he was using in the preceding

Meditations

.

The certainty achieved in Meditation II with

the Cogito and other first principles involves the impossi-

bility of doubt at the time one's perceptions are being

attended to.

22
23

Ibid

HR

.

I,

,

p.
p.

The sense of 'certain' in the above passage

33 5

159.

.
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involves the impossibility
of doubt at any time,
Any
truth could be doubted when
not being attended to
While Doney does not expand
upon this distinction
between two senses of certainty
except to note that in his
reply to the second set of
objections Descartes admitted
that even an atheist could be
certain (presumably in the
sense used in jteditation I I) of
some things, it is of some
passing interest since it foreshadows
a distinction

expanded upon later by certain
Cartesian commentators
discussed in Chapters III and IV.
Although Doney does not discuss any of
the arguments
for God s existence, it seems clear
from his account of
Descartes that his response to question
(5) would be that
the certainty achieved in Meditation
II with the Cogito
the principle of causation, and other
first principles
provides Descartes with sufficient grounds
for establishing
God's existence.
Either the arguments can be based upon
intuitions present to the mind or they require
,

proofs.

if

it is the former and they are perceived
clearly and dis-

tinctly, then Descartes is certain that God exists
and is
no deceiver.

If it is the latter and the steps in the

arguments can eventually be encompassed in one intuition,

avoiding any reliance on memory, then Descartes is equally
certain.

Once God's existence and nature are established,

memory of clear and distinct perceptions is validated.

16

While Doney and Stout differ in the arguments
and
textual evidence they offer in support of their
respective
interpretations, it is clear from their positions on
the
five questions I raise that their accounts of
Descartes do
not differ appreciably.

Each maintains that the problem

raised by Descartes in the Meditations was not one of
jus-

tifying reason.

Rather, it was one of justifying the

memory of clear and distinct perceptions.

And there are a

number of difficulties with this kind of an account, which
for brevity

s

sake

From both Doney

'

s

I

will refer to as the memory thesis.

and Stout's presentations it is clear

that some textual evidence exists for which interpretations

can be made consistent with the memory thesis.

Descartes'

responses to his critics' charges of circular reasoning
indicate that he believed memory to be involved in some
way.

But a fair amount of textual evidence exists which

indicates that the involvement of memory was, for
Descartes, something other than that which the memory

thesis suggests.

This textual evidence is pointed out by

Harry Frankfurt in "Memory and the Cartesian Circle.
If we look carefully at one of Descartes'

replies to

the second set of objections, we find him saying:

24

Harry Frankfurt, "Memory and the Cartesian Circle,
Philosophical Review Vol. 71 (1962), pp 504-511.
.

17

There are other matters that are
indeed perceived very clearly by our
intellect, when we attend sufficiently
closely to the reasons on which our
knowledge of them depends, and hence
we cannot then be in doubt about them;
but since we can forget those reasons,
and yet remember the conclusions
deduced from them, the question is
raised whether we can entertain the
same firm and immutable certainty as
to these conclusions, during the time
that we recollect that they have been
deduced from first principles that are
evident; for this remembra nce must be
assumed in order that they may be
^5
called conclusions.

Frankfurt's point is:
The accuracy of the recollection is
taken for granted, as Descartes himself
points out; if it were not taken for
granted, there would be no occasion to
doubt at all.
Descartes's problem is
not whether memory is reliable, but
whether what is recollected.
is
sufficient to establish the truth of
the conclusion in question.
What he
doubts is whether the remembered fact
that something was once proven entitles
one to be certain now of the truth of
what was then proven. God is not, then,
invoked to guarantee the reliability of
memory.
In fact, the reliability of
memory must be accepted in order to
generate the doubt God is called upon
to dispel.
.

.

In his Conversation with Burman there is further

evidence that Descartes assumed, rather than questioned,
the reliability of memory in overcoming metaphysical doubt.
25
26

HR II, pp. 42-43.

Frankfurt,

op>.

cit

(Italics mine)
.

,

p.

511.

,
.

.

.
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Burman states:
But someone will declare; after I have
demonstrated the existence of God, and
of a God who is no deceiver, I can say,
not that my intellect deceives me, with
the rectitude God has given it, but that
my memory deceives me, because I believe
that I remember something which in
reality I do not remember; memory itself
27
has failings.

Descartes replies:

Concerning memory I can say nothing:
it is up to each man to determine, by
his personal experience, whether or
not he has a good memory.
And if
he has doubts about it, he ought to
make use of notes or of some such aid. 28
And Frankfurt argues:
If Descartes had intended his proof
of the existence of a veracious God
to establish the reliability of memory,
he would surely not have responded in
this way to Burman s remarks.
He would
have pointed out that the doubts about
memory expressed by Burman had been
rendered unnecessary by the demonstration that a veracious God exists.
Burman clearly mentioned the doubt
about memory as something that had not
been dealt with by the proof of the
veracious God's existence, as if he were
calling attention to a new difficulty
not disposed of by the proof.
Descartes
implicitly agrees to this when he fails
to deny it and, instead, offers a rather
commonsensical bit of advice about the
•

'

27

Oeuvres de Descartes

Charles Adams and Paul Tannery
(Latin), Vol. IXB, p. 43 (French).
The translation is taken directly from Frankfurt, op
cit
510
p
(Paris,

1957)

VIII,

,

ed.

21

.

.

Ibid

19

use of memory.
These are hardly
the comments of a man who regards the
reliability of memory as a basic
metaphysical problem, much less as one
which he had recently solved. They
suggest vividly that Descartes attention was directed to quite different
matters in which the problem of the
reliability of memory was one of only
29
incidental concern.
.

.

.

'

,

Finally, Frankfurt points out:
Indeed, it is easy to show that
after Descartes had proven God's existence and veracity he still did not take
the reports of memory as guaranteed.
In the Principles of Philosophy
for
instance, God's existence and veracity
are demonstrated in principles XIV,
XVIII, and XXI of Part I.
in principle
XLIV of Part I, Descartes says that "it
is frequently our memory that deceives
us by leading us to believe that certain things had been satisfactorily
established by us. "30 Thus he
reaffirms the very doubt that Doney
claims had been removed by the proof
of God's existence.
Nowhere, in this
passage or in subsequent ones, does
Descartes retract or qualify this
31
warning about memory.
,

There are two additional objections that

I

would like

to raise against the memory thesis, both of which are also

mentioned by Frankfurt.

First, the memory thesis relegates

the Meditations to a rather insignificant role in both

Descartes' epistemology and his metaphysics.

3^

30
31

Ibid

HR

.

I,

,

p
p.

510
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Frankfurt,
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cit
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,

p.

507.

When

20

Descartes states in the introduction that
"in the first
Meditation I set forth the reasons for which
we may,

generally speaking, doubt about all things

.

," 32

.

the

impression given is that something more important
than the
reliability of memory is at issue.
Second, taken literally the memory thesis
commits

Descartes to the infallibility of memory at least
where
clear and distinct perceptions are concerned.
a

situation in which

I

But consider

recall only very vaguely that

clearly and distinctly perceived that

jd.

if

I

once

have

I

successfully demonstrated God's existence and nature, the

memory thesis makes it impossible for me to err in my
recollection.

Particularly in light of the textual evi-

dence offered by Frankfurt, it seems highly unlikely that

Descartes was committed to such an extreme consequence.
The temptation to reduce the scope of doubt in

Descartes' Meditations in order to allow him to avoid the

accusation of circular reasoning is

a

strong one.

Reducing

the scope of doubt to the memory of clear and distinct

perceptions is unsatisfactory for the reasons
above.

I

would now like to turn to

a

I

have given

much different

approach which shares with the memory thesis only the
autonomy of reason for Descartes.

32

HR

I,

p.

140.
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Most Cartesian commentators agree that
Descartes'
attempt to establish a foundation for
his beliefs which
would not fall prey to even the merest
of doubts was

motivated by his opposition to skepticism.

One commen-

tator, Merrill Ring in "Descartes'
Intentions," 33 offers
a novel interpretation in which
the target of Descartes'

arguments, particularly in Meditation

I

,

is not simply

the skepticism so popular in his time; it
is the principle
of empiricism upon which the arguments of
both skepticism

and scholasticism were founded.

Descartes' aim, in Ring's

view, is not to cast doubt on beliefs based on the
faculty
of reason,

it is to cast doubt on the empiricist grounds

for claiming such beliefs are either certain or uncertain.

And if the faculty of reason is not being questioned,
then the accusation of circular reasoning need not arise.

Ring's response to question

is extensive.

(1)

In

fact, virtually his entire article is devoted to discussing

the role of Meditation

I

raised in Meditation

ranges over all beliefs because,

I

in Descartes'

task.

The doubt

at the time, all his beliefs are grounded in the senses.

Descartes first proposes, "I shall.

.

.

address myself to

Merrill Ring, "Descartes' Intentions," Canadian Journal
of Philosophy Vol. Ill (1973), pp. 27-49.

.

.
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the general upheaval of all my
former opinions." 34

And

rather than examine each and every
opinion, Descartes
suggests that, "owing to the fact that
the destruction of
the foundations.
brings with it the downfall
.

.

rest of the edifice,

of the

I

shall only

.

.

.

attack those prin-

ciples upon which all my former opinions
rested." 35

And

what, asks Ring, is that foundation or
principle upon which
rest all of the opinions Descartes holds?
"All that up to
the present time

I

have accepted as most true and certain

I

have learned either from the senses or through
the
36

senses.

.

.

"

Ring argues that when Descartes states

first that he means to doubt all, this must be
understood
in light of his further comment that everything
he has to

doubt was acquired through the senses.

Ring's point is

that Descartes is not simply to be taken as providing a

technical device to avoid the otherwise impossible task of

doubting each individual belief.

Rather, he is to be

HR I, p. 144.
Ring uses the Anscombe and Geach translation Descartes
Phil osophical Writings, transl. and ed.
Elizabeth Anscombe and Peter Geach, Bobbs-Merrill Co.,
Inc., New York (1954)).
I will continue to use the
Haldane and Ross translation in my treatment of Ring's
interpretation.
The Anscombe and Geach version is a
much less literal translation.
If Ring's analysis is to
have any credence, it should fair equally well with the
Haldane and Ross version.
:

(

^5

36

Ibid.
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taken literally.

it is not all beliefs that
are to be

doubted but all and only beliefs
acquired through the
senses
Ring suggests that there are
additional reasons to
support his contention that something
other than the traditional interpretation of the scope
of doubt in Meditation
- 1S takir>9 place. He points to other Cartesian commentators recognition that something
is amiss in Meditation T
For example, L. J. Beck in The
Metaphysics of Descartes 37
transforms "all beliefs" into "most beliefs"
and "nearly
all beliefs." Anthony Kenny in Descartes
A Study of His
Philosophy
points to a number of instances in which
certain beliefs, those revealed by the light
of nature,
.

:

seem to fall outside the scope of doubt.

Kenny's conclu-

sion is that Descartes failed in the execution
of his

doubt.

Ring's conclusion is that Descartes never intended

the scope of doubt to be so extensive.

Ring also points to Descartes' responses to the

sixth set of objections as evidence in support of his
thesis.

In response to the following objection:
it does not appear altogether
certain that we exist, from the fact
.

L.

J.

Beck, The Metaphysics of Descartes A Study of the
Clarendon Press, Oxford (1965) pp. 56~6l7~

Meditations
38

.

.

;

,

Anthony Kenny, Descartes
A Study of His Philosophy,
Random House, New York (1968)
:

24

that we think.
For in order to be
sure that you think, you ought
to
know what to think, or what thinking,
is, and what your existence
is;
you do not yet know what these but since
things
are, how can you know that you
think
or exist?
39

Descartes replies
It is indeed true that no one
sur e that he knows or that he
exists , unless he knows what thought:

an
i'

b®.

.

and what existence
When,
therefore, anyone perceives that he
thinks and that it thence follows
that he exists, although he chance
never previously to have asked what
thought is, nor what existence, he
cannot nevertheless fail to have a
knowledge of each sufficient to give
40
him assurance on this score.
.

.

.

With the reference to knowledge of things prior
to the

Cogito Ring claims further support for his contention
that
the evil demon in Meditation

I

does not cast as large a

shadow of doubt as is often maintained.
Ring's position on question

(2)

4

'*'

is that the Cogito is

Descartes' first truth dealing with the existence of things.
39
40

HR II, p. 234.
Ibid., p. 241.
Descartes also makes this point in
Principles of Philosophy
Part I, X (HR I, p. 222).
:

41

.

Ring's treatment of Meditation I does not end at this
point.
He goes on to provide an account of how the evil
demon hypothesis functions on his interpretation.
It is
a very interesting account.
But it lies outside the
scope of the five questions which I raise for each interpretation.
Suffice it to say that, although he provides
some textual evidence consistent with his thesis. Ring
does not offer any which actively supports it.

25

Ring distinguishes all objects of
knowledge for Descartes
into two classes:
those that deal with things
existent
and those that deal with the
eternal truths and that have
no existence outside our thought.
Meditation I leaves us
with only the latter untainted by doubt.
Skepticism with
respect to the existence of things remains
to be defeated
and the achievement of the Cogito is
the first step in the

removal of that skepticism.
And when

When Descartes asserts:

stated that this proposition
I am is the first
and most certain which presents itself
to those who philosophise in orderly
fashion, I did not for all that deny
that we must first of all know what is
knowledge what is existen ce and what
i_s certainty
and that in order to think
we must be and such like; but becauie
these are notions of the simplest possible kind, which of themselves give us
no knowledge of anything that exists,
I do not think them worthy of being put
42
on record.
I

L think, therefore

,

,

,

,

concludes,

It is quite clear here that the primacy of

the cogito is only with respect to existence." 43
On Ring's view the Cogito

logical

temic status:

43

HR

I,

s

primacy is only methodo-

(although in a much different way than it was for

either Doney or Stout)

42

1

p.

"...

.

there were, as far as Descartes was

222.

.

Ring, op. cit

.

,

p.

The Cogito has no special epis-

48.

.

:

concerned, prior certainties which he
could legitimately
and did in fact, appeal to."^

With respect to questions
(3),

(4),

and (5), all

Ring has to say can be found in a
brief postscript to hi
interpretation
My aim in this paper has been to
tell a tale about Descartes' intentions,
about what he attempted to doubt, the
function of the demon and the status
of the cogito which is different than
that usually told.
The story does not,
of course, end here.
Among the problems which remain is that of the nature
of the divine guarantee with the associated question of circularity. While
the issues that properly arise in connection with these matters are so
numerous that it is manifestly impossible to discuss them here, it seems
desirable to finish with some remarks
on how these problems look from the
perspective of the argument just concluded.
The matter of God's guarantee
has always arisen in the context of a
belief that the doubt in the First
Meditation was intended to be universal,
that when the doubt was fully drawn,
all ideas and principles were under a
cloud of suspicion.
So the problem has
always seemed to be one of guaranteeing
the adequacy, the truth if you will,
of the principles employed and the concepts involved in proving God's existence and with that view the question
of circularity inescapably arises.
But
my tale points in a different direction.
Descartes might well construe the innate
concepts and principles to be rock-bottom
and think that what needs to be guaranteed
are not those ideas, no suspicion having
been cast upon them and no doubt about
,
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them being possible, but that the
material world will conform to them.

4 ^

Thus, we have no inkling of what
Ring's response to question (3) might be.
As to question (4) what is called
into

doubt in the Circle Passage would
presumably be beliefs
about the material world. And in
response to question (5)
Ring might maintain that the demonstration
of God's existence and benevolent nature removes that
'slightest

doubt'

about the existence of material objects.
As attractive as Ring's interpretation of
Descartes

might be on first reading, there are a number
of problems

with it, some of which are discussed by Peter Schouls
in
"The Extent of Doubt in Descartes' Meditations." 4 ^

As we

saw earlier, Ring cites a crucial passage from
Meditation
in which Descartes commits himself to,

I

"attack those

principles upon which all my former opinions rested." 4 ^
Immediately following the quotation Ring asks, "What is
tha t foundation or principle of all the opinions he

45
46

47

Ibid

.

,

pp.

48-49.

Peter Schouls, "The Extent of Doubt in Descartes'
Meditations," Canadian Journal of Philosophy Vol. Ill,
(1973).
Many of Schouls' criticisms are based in part
on his own interpretation of Descartes which will be
presented in Chapter II. Given that I am critical of his
account, however, it would be unfair to employ his
strategy to argue against Ring. Thus, I am limiting any
reliance on Schouls to textual matters only.
HR

I,

p.

144.

,

28

o

s?

As Schouls points out, Ring moves
from "those

principles

to

that principle" without comment.

Ring

offers no argument in support of his
move; yet it constitutes the very basis upon which he
initiates his inter-

pretation

.

Furthermore, there is textual evidence elsewhere
which
indicates that such a move might very well be
unwarranted.

Earlier in his Synopsis of the Six Following
Meditations

Descartes states, "In the first Meditation

I

set forth the

reasons for which we may, generally speaking, doubt
about
all things and especially about material things

”
.

.

49

.

If doubt about "all things" is to be limited to
only "all

things acquired through the senses," it is, at the very
least, odd that Descartes would need the qualifier

"especially about material things."
Schouls suggests that evidence exists elsewhere in
Descartes' writings which makes explicit the need for

validation of reason.

In Principles of Philosophy

,

a

Part

I

Descartes argues that God exists (Principle XIV and XVIII)
and that it is a contradiction to suppose that God could be
a

deceiver (Principle XXIX)

.

Principle XXX then states,

"And consequently all that we perceive clearly is true, and

48
49

.

Ring, o£. cit

HR

I,

p.

.

p.

30.

(Italics mine)

140. (Italics mine)

.

29

this delivers us from the doubts put forward
above." 50

Descartes then says in support of this
principle:
the light of nature
can never disclose to us any object
which is not true, inasmuch as it
comprehends it, that is, inasmuch as
it apprehends it clearly and distinctly.
Because we should have had reason to
think God a deceiver if He had given
us this faculty perverted, or such
that we should take the false for the
51
true (when using the faculty aright)
.

.

.

.

.

Schouls

point is that the "consequently" in Principle XXX

is there precisely because "all that we perceive
clearly is

true" is derived from preceding arguments for God's exis-

tence and non-deceiving nature.

And if clear and distinct

perceptions are not immune from doubts until such arguments
have been given, then the possibility of a malevolent

deceiver casts doubt on beliefs acquired through the
faculty of reason.
There are other problems with Ring's account.

remarks which have a bearing on questions

(4)

and

His
(5)

suggest that the doubt expressed in the Circle Passage

extends only to beliefs about the material world.

Yet it

would seem that there is more to the doubt than that.
Descartes specifically mentions mathematical propositions
involving the addition of two and three and "any such
^°

51
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p

.
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thing" as examples of those
things for whioh there exists
the slightest ’metaphysical'
doubt prior to demonstrating

God's existence.

It is difficult to see how
such proposi-

tions involve the existence of
the material world.
Furthermore, not all of the first
principles, all of which
appear to fall prey to this doubt,
involve or presuppose
the existence of material objects.

There is also the textual evidence
cited by Doney and
Stout
favor of the memory thesis.
While the thesis goes
too far in its claims, nevertheless,
particularly in his

m

replies to his critics, Descartes does
talk about the doubt
attending to clear and distinct perceptions
when one is no
longer attending to them.

memory as

a

Unless Ring views the faculty of

sensing faculty, it is difficult to see how
his

account would satisfactorily treat such textual
points.

Although part of the attractiveness of Ring's interpretation of Descartes lies in the historical setting
that
he provides for it, one still has the impression
that much

more is at stake than just attacking both skepticism and

scholasticism by arguing against the empiricist principle
upon which each is based.

The alternative provided by

Ring's interpretation is nothing more than dogmatic

rationalism.
In fact,

any interpretation of Descartes which takes

as its basic assumption the autonomy of reason will be

31

undesirable for the very same reason.

The failure of any

such approach to gain widespread
support as both an attractive interpretation of Descartes
in general and one which
successfully allows him an escape from
the charges of
circular reasoning, has prompted
a number of Cartesian

commentators to consider interpretations
in which reason is
only partially autonomous.
It is to consideration of such
interpretations that

I

shall now turn.

,

CHAPTER

1

II

In an attempt to demonstrate
that Descartes need not
Plead guilty to the charge of
circular

reasoning, George

Nakhnikian, in "The Cartesian
Circle Revisited,"
distinguishes between what he views
as Descartes' considered
doctrine and an aberrant view
that Descartes sometimes
appears to hold in the Meditations
and elsewhere.
The aberrant view is that even
the
most clearly and distinctly
intuited
propositions are not really known to
be true except by those who
know that
God exists and that He cannot be
a
deceiver.
This applies to all propositions.
.it does not exempt the
propositions, "I am conscious," "I
exist," "if i am conscious then I
2
exist, "...
.

Nakhnikian refers to

a

number of passages 3 including the

Circle Passage as evidence that Descartes
says or implies
what amounts to the aberrant view.

George Nakhnikian, "The Cartesian Circle Revisited "
American Philosophical Quarterly Vol. 4
(1967) pp. 251-255.
,

2
3

Ibid.

p.

,

251.

His method of referencing is an odd one.
Rather than
referring directly to the text he cites footnotes from
another article.
"See Leonard Miller, "Descartes, Mathematics and God, " The Philosophical Review vol 66
(1957)
pp. 451-465, n. 3-8."
The references are as follows:
(3)'
Norman Kemp Smith, Descartes' Philoso phical Writings
(London, 1952; hereafter written K.S.), p. 145”;
(4) K.S.
,

,

.

,

32

•
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In contrast to the
aberrant view is Descartes'
con-

sidered doctrine.

According to Nakhnikian there
is evidence
that Descartes held the
sore reasonable view that
some clear
and distinct perceptions
are not open to doubt, even
if the
existence of a deceiving demon
is possible.
He argues
There are places in Descartes'
Where he sa s that we can know
ertam propositions y incorrigibly
even
an
11 demon is deceiving us
about
ofv,
tZ
For example we can know
u
incorrigibly that
we, ourselves, exist.
or how can the demon deceive
me about
anything at all unless I exist.
So
that we can know incorrigibly
and without having to know that God exists
such a conditional as this:
If I am
deceived at all, then I exist.
4
.

,

Nakhnikian elucidates further the contrast
between
Descartes' considered doctrine and the
aberrant view by
pointing out certain distinctions that
Descartes makes in
his use of certain terms:

214 215, 246, 247; (5) H.R.
II, pp. 226, 248, 250-251
H.R. I, pp. 220, 231; (7) Letters to
Mersenne 15
April, 1630, 6 May, 1630, 27 May, 1630, 27
May, 1638Mesland: 2 Ma Y, 1644 Letter to Arnauld: 29 July
1648; (8) Letter to Mesland, 2 May, 1644.
pp.
(6)

•

;

'i

Nakhnikian, op. cit
2 ^1.
Nakhnikian does not indicate
p
where those places are.
Presumably they would include
selected passages from the Meditations (e.g., HR I
pp.
140, 150, 151, 152 (and perhaps 158), 160-161) and’the’
Principles of Philosophy Part I, VII and X (HR I,
pp. 221,
.

222

)

•

,

:
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Descartes uses "scire" as a
term for knowledge of theoremtechnical
s, i. e
of demonstrated conclusions.
in
application of the word, scientia this
is
contrasted with notitia or cognoscentia
(immediate apprehension of "first
principles").
Descartes also uses "scientia"
another way in which scient ia is
the
opposite of persuasio
5
.

.

As evidence of the latter
distinction Nakhnikian points to
the following assertion by Descartes:
if we lack knowledge of God
we
can pretend that they [remembered
conclusions derived from premises no
longer being attended to] are uncertain
even though we remember that they were
deduced from clear principles; because
perhaps our nature is such that we go
wrong even in the most evident matters.
Consequently even at the moment when
we deduced them from those principles,
we did not have scientific knowledge
(scientia) of them, but only a conviction
(persuasio) of them.
I distinguish the
two as follows:
there is
conviction
[persuasio] when there remains some
reason which might lead us to doubt, but
scientific knowledge [scientia] is
conviction [persuasio] based on an
argument so strong that it can never be
shaken by any stronger argument.
Nobody
can have the latter unless he also has
6
knowledge of God.
.

.

.

,

In light of these distinctions the aberrant view is

that

5
6

Ibid

.

,

p

.

252.

From a letter to Regius, May 24, 1640 (Anthony Kenny, transl.
and ed.
Descartes Philosophic al Letters, Clarendon Press,
Oxford (1970). p. 74.
,

:
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.

And this view, Nakhnikian
argues, gets Descartes in a
vicious circle, for in the
Synopsis to the Meditations
Descartes himself admits that:

“

^hisite that we know [scire]
tnat all the things which we
conceive
clearly and distinctly are true
in the
very way in which we conceive
them; and
this could not be proved previously
to
the Fourth Meditation.
'

:h

'

8

And since the first argument for
God's existence occurs
M e ditation III Descartes appears
to be saying that he
must know (scientia) that God exists
in order to know
(sc ientia
that the principle of clarity and
distinctness

m

_

,

)

is true.

But also according to the aberrant
view, no

matter how clearly and distinctly Descartes
perceives the
first principles" (and especially the premises
of the

argument for God's existence), he cannot know
them to be true unless he knows

Nakhnikian, op. cit

.

p.

,

(

scientia

)

(

scientia

)

that all his

252.

HR I, p. 140.
Haldane and Ross translate scire as "may
assured." Nakhnikian s point is that such a translation be
ignores the technical distinctions which, he is arguing
Descartes makes.
'

.
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clear and distinct perceptions
are true.
The alternative to the
aberrant view for Nakhnikian
is as follows:
Now suppose that we do not
assume the
a e
ani: view
That is, we suppose that
ff
whether or not we know that God
exists
some clearly and distinctly
perceived
propositions are, and are known to
be
true.
God is needed so that we can
deduce that all clearly and
distinctly
perceived propositions are true.
Then
it is open to Descartes to
say that the
premises from which he deduces God's
existence and veracity are clear
and
distinct propositions that are known
to be true ger se.
The system I
find in the Meditations becomes
circular
if, and only if, we add to it
the
aberrant view that no clear and distinct
intuition is known to be true except
by
those who know that God exists and
that
He is not a deceiver.
5
*

,

.

.

While Nakhnikian does not discuss the
extent of doubt
in Meditation I in his article, if
we turn to his much more
extensive treatment of Descartes in An
Introduction to

Philosophy 10
verbatim)

,

question

(1)

(from which his article is taken almost

we can determine his position with respect
to

Nakhnikian, o£. cit

.

,

pp.

254-255.

George Nakhnikian, An Introduction to Philosophy
Alfred Knopf, New York (1967)
cf particularly Parts II
and III, pp 65-241 which deal almost exclusively with
Descartes and the Meditations.
.

.

.

.

.
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m

his treatment of the dream
argument in Meditation T
Nakhnikian employs a number of
technical terms, some of
Which must be explained in order
to understand his interpretation of Descartes. The first
two are "psychological
indubit ability" and "logical
indubitability "
reference
to them he says:
.

m

In the Meditations
one finds at least
two distinguishable senses of
'indubitable'.
There is the "psychological"
sense, in which an indubitable
oroposition is one from which we are
unable to
withhold assent. There is also the
"logical" and profoundly important
sense
which a proposition is indubitable
for me only if it is one that I am
fully justified, and cannot be mistaken
believing, solely on the basis of
the evidence X have right now.
,

.

m

m

About "psychological" indubitability
Nakhnikian says:
For example, I look in a certain direction and am unable to withhold assent
from the proposition that there is a
wall in front of me.
You may easily
convince me that this proposition might
have been false.
But to believe that
the proposition might have been false
is not the same thing as to doubt it
now.
I cannot at the same time be
certain that there is a wall in front
of me and doubt that there is one
there.
That is a logical impossibility:
doubt and certainty about the same
proposition are mutually exclusive.
Yet I can grant, while still being
certain that there is a wall in front
of me, that there might not have been
one there.
What is more, while still

11

Ibid

.

,

p

.

67
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=? rtain that there is a wall in
frnn? of me, I can
front
readily grant that
that there ia
entail
entan^LTth
that there is.
Thus "n^uphnio
X
1
Ub tabilit y is incompatible'
wi?h d 2? i Ut n0t With
the beli ef
that
at what Ii am now certain
of might
Sn a S
n ° r with the admission
?that mv
my now i
believing
it to be true is
not enough to guarantee
that it is true 12
A3 an example of "logical"
indubitability Nakhnikian
suggests

™

* n i ns tance of "logical
tability [is] I am certain thatindubiI
exist.
I grant that I might
not
have existed.
if i did not exist,
then I would not be believing
that
I exist.
This is equivalent to
saying that, from my believing
that
I exist, it follows
that I exist.
In other words, my believing
that I
exist is itself the guarantee
that
I do exist.
13
‘

The distinction appears to be
that while the "psychological

indubitability of

a

belief does not guarantee that

I could
not be mistaken, the "logical"
indubitability of a belief
does

Nakhnikian proceeds to suggest that Descartes'
own
words provide some ground for thinking
that by

"logical"

indubitability he had in mind the following
definitions
that Nakhnikian suggests for the notion
of
'incorrigi-

bility
12

13

Ibid
Ibid

'

:
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.

39

(Nl)

p is incorrigible for

^

S

at t =

possible that at t S
believes attentively that
-*-

s

p, and
believes attentively
that p" entails "At t S
knows
that p"

(n) "At

(N2)

t

S

at t S believes incorrigibly
that
=
£ df
(i) At t S believes
attentively that
and
p,
(

11

)

"At t S believes attentively
that E"
entails "At t S knows that

Each definition employs another
of Nakhnikian
terms that he defines as follows:
(N3)

s

technical

at t S believes attentively
that p =
(i) At t S is paying
attention to matters

that are relevant to the truth
or
falsity of p, including attention

to

his own sensations, if they are
relevant,
(n) among them stands revealed and open
to
S evidence for
and
p,
(iii) at t S occurrently believes
that

Finally we have Nakhnikian
proposition’.
I

’

s

use of the term ’perceptual

About it he says:

shall define ’perceptual proposition’

as meaning a proposition that ascribes
to physical objects (e.g., tables and

14

15

Ibid.

,

p.

77

Ibid

,

p

75

.

.
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chairs) or to physical
phenomena (e.q
claps of thunder, flashes
of lightning'
3
fl m S
af ter f ma 9 e s) ?isua??'
tac^a?
? !
tactual, gustatory,
auditory,
tory properties or relations. or olfacThese in
E1
as bein 9 Propertied
or relations whose presence
o^relation^
in, or
S
f
ra
the ° b 3 ects or phenomena
?o
h they
L°
to whf
which
are ascribed, it is logically possible to ascertain
at
given time by looking, touching,any
tasting,
y
listening, or smelling.
16
'

'

“

'

Turning to the dream argument,
Nakhnikian s interpretation provides Descartes with
three conclusions.
The
first is that no perceptual
proposition is incorrigible for
anyone.
The second is that no one knows
incorrigibly that
he himself is not dreaming.
And the third is that no one
knows incorrigibly that any given
perceptual proposition is
true.
Nakhnikian points out that these conclusions,
•

although derived from premises consistent
with the text,
are inconsistent with Descartes’ general
aims in the Meditations that follow the first, i.e., they
are too
strong,

P ar ticularly the second and third

conclusions.^

The evil demon argument in Meditation

further.

16 Tl _

J
Ibid.

17

goes even

It is concerned with "whether or not we can
know

.

,

I

pp.

68 - 69

.

Nakhnikian suggests that by relaxing the criterion of
knowledge which he suggests for Descartes one could
derive conclusions compatible with Descartes' aims. The
consequence, however, creates problems for Descartes.
Unfortunately, an adequate account of this is beyond the
scope of this dissertation.

.
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propositions that, if they are
known at all, are not known
'from the senses or through
the senses,' e.g.,
mathematical
18
propositions .''
The conclusion of the evil
demon

argument,
on Nakhnikian's interpretation,
is that while ''There are

mathematical propositions that
are incorrigible for anyone,
e.g., 'A square has four sides.'
There are, on the other
hand, mathematical propositions
that are corrigible
for

anyone ." 19

This is, of course, Nakhnikian's
interpretation
of Descartes' considered view,
while it is clear that the
aberrant view entails that the evil
demon casts doubt on
even the most evident mathematical
propositions, Nakhnikian
offers no textual evidence from
Meditation I that supports
the aberrant view.^
On Nakhnikian's account, then, the
only propositions

which escape the doubt raised in Meditation

I

are those

mathematical propositions which are incorrigible
for anyone
Such propositions are necessarily true,
but
they do not

entail the existence of an external world.

'A

square has

four sides' does not entail that any square
objects exist

J

8

19
20

Ibid

.

,

p.

115

Ibid

.

,

p.

133.

In fact, his analysis of the evil demon argument
purports
to demonstrate the impossibility of the aberrant view
with
respect to mathematical propositions (cf. pp. 127-129).

i
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Nakhnikian terms such propositions
'hypothetical' to distin
guish them from propositions that
are 'existential',
i.e.,

that entail the existence of
something.
The achievement of Meditation II
on Nakhnikian

1

s

account is the demonstration of
incorrigible propositions
which are contingently true and which
imply the existence
of something.
Among such propositions is the Cogito
But
aside from demonstrating that at least
one incorrigible
.

contingent proposition implies the existence
of something,
what does the achievement of the Cogito
provide
for

Descartes on Nakhnikian

's

account?

One response is that the conclusion of the
Cogito

exist', is also incorrigible.

Meditation II

,

'

Descartes asserts in

;

So that after having reflected well
and carefully examined all things, we
must come to the definite conclusion
that this proposition:
I am, I exist,
is necessarily true each time that I
pronounce it, or that I mentally
conceive it.

And when criticized about the apparent deductive nature of
the achievement of the Cogito

,

Descartes responds:

He who says, 'l_ think, hence I am, or
exist
does not deduce existence from
thought by a syllogism, but, by a
simple intuition of the mind, recognizes
'

,

21

HR

I,

p.

150.
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a

lf

per se

^

* thing that is

known

22

Nakhnikian argues:
In order for me to know "by a
simple
intuition of the mind" that I exist,
it is necessary that there be
a certain entailment but an entailment,
and not an inference.
"i think"
entails "I exist." But in order to*
intuit the fact that I exist I do not
have to infer that I exist from the
fact that I think.
it is sufficient
that I believe attentively that I
exist.
it is impossible for me to
believe attentively that I exist and
not to know it.
By our definition
of attentive belief, if i believe
attentively that I exist, then I have
some evidence for the proposition "I
exist.
But if I have any evidence
at all for "I exist," then I have
conclusive evidence for it. For unless
I did exist, I could have no evidence
whatever for any proposition. Hence,
if I believe attentively that I exist,
it follows that I am fully justified,
and cannot be mistaken, in believing
that I exist.
From that, in turn, it
follows that I know incorrigibly that
23
I exist.
,

Having demonstrated the incorrigibility of

'I

exist',

Nakhnikian argues, Descartes cannot employ the hypothesis
of the evil demon

(which is raised again in the Circle

Passage in Meditation III

)

to defeat his certainty that he

HR II, p. 38.
Nakhnikian's translation "intuition of the
mind" is from the Latin version of the Meditations.
Haldane and Ross, presumably relying on the French version, translate the phrase as "act of mental vision."

Nakhnikian, An Introduction to Philosophy

,

p.

139.

,

44

exists.

Thus, Nakhnikian finds
no textual evidence
in
«Sii£ation_Il to support the aberrant
view and much reason
to reject it.
But what about the Cogito
's relationship to
other first principles?
About this Nakhnikian says:
his [Descartes'] argument
for
sayxng that "I exist" is
"indubitable"
s that, even if there
is an evil
demon and he is deceiving
me about
any things, he cannot
deceive me about
my own existence because
(and this is
e crux of Descartes'
argument) "The
evil demon is deceiving me"
entails "I
1S
assumin 9 an entaUmlnt
to Show that
I exist" is
But is there any reason why"indubitable."
this entaiiment is metaphysically ciFEIin,
if
rnis is a square" entails
"This has
our sides" is not? There is
no such
reason.
These two entailments stand
or fall together.
Either both of them
are necessarily true or neither
one of
Besides it is obvious
that both entailments are
necessarily
Descartes is simply mistaken whenever he proceeds as if
he
can explain the special status of
"I
exist" or of "I think" without knowing
beforehand that certain other propositions are necessarily true, self-evident,
and incorrigible for him.
24
•

.

,

±"

*

*

•

•

:

>

•

.

.

Thus, according to Nakhnikian, there
are no features of the
gitQ that 9 ive it an epistemic status
distinct from that
of other first principles.
But its role is not thereby

—

insignificant.

There is its contingency and the entailment

of one existent thing:

24

Ibid

.

pp.

143-144.
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:
\ the of£° 2ito propositions are
examples
propositions that provide
incorrigible knowledge of
the existence of a contingent
mental entity
U
e "® Cessit
for any assumpi'
tionsas
tions a S to the existence
of God or
material objects.
25
•

^

Before turning to Meditation
in, however, one cogent
on the role of the principle
of clarity and distinctness
is
needed.
it is obvious that for
Nakhnikian the principle is
not demonstrated until
Meditation IV
Therefore
it has

.

no function in either
Meditation IT or III. 26

Turning to question

(4)

we can readily identify
what is

called into doubt in the Circle
Passage on the aberrant
View.

It is the incorrigibility of
any and all clear and

distinct perceptions.

But what is called into doubt
on

Descartes' considered view?

Nakhnikian never explicitly

tells us.

He does, however, provide us
with some clues,
one place he says:

in

Descartes has created for himself
three major technical problems, and
he
believes that they can all be solved
if, and only if, it can be proved
that
God exists.
The three problems are:
the justification of memory, the
problem of justifying perceptual beliefs,

25
26

Ibid

.

p.

,

153.

Nakhnikian has

a number of interesting things
to say about
<cf -.PP- 97-104, 107-109, 115-118,
and else!;
f since it has
but
no function on his account in

P ln 1

wh»v
where)f
getting Descartes out of the vicious circle,
°t its role is beyond our scope.
-

,

a

discussion

.

.
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the problems posed by the
evil demon
postulate
27

Elsewhere Nakhnikian says:
The fairest and most generous
interpretation of Descartes is that God
is
needed to guarantee the truth of
some,
not all, of our clear and
distinct
perceptions.
Specifically, Descartes
thinks that God is needed to guarantee
the truth of (1) all our clear
and
distinct perceptual judgments,
(2) all
our clear and distinct perceptions
of
our own states of wakefulness,
(3) all
clear and distinct memory impressions,
and (4) all clear and distinct perceptions of [corrigible] mathematical ~~
28
propositions.
.

.

Assuming that the dream and evil demon
arguments in
Me ditation I effectively cast doubt
about perceptual beliefs
and corrigible mathematical propositions
respectively, the
Circle Passage casts doubt, then, on memory
and the principle of clarity and distinctness itself.
The just cited passages from Nakhnikian also
point to

what the demonstration of God's existence and
benevolent
nature is intended to achieve.

We have already seen how

that achievement is to be reached.

Assuming the considered

view:
it is open to Descartes to say
that the premises from which he deduces
God's existence and veracity are clear
.

27
28

.

.

Ibid

.

,

p.

167.

Ibid

.

,

p

175

.
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and distinct propositions,
which do
not need God's guarantee.
29

Now Nakhnikian is of the
opinion that neither the
causal
argument in Med itation II I
nor the ontological
argument in
Me ditation V achieves what
Descartes intends for it to
achieve.
But the failure does not
involve circular reasoning.
"The proofs of God's existence.
are riddled with
problems, but circularity need
not be one of them." 30
.

.

Nakhnikian concludes:
The system that I have attributed
to
Descartes is not circular.
It is
simply incompiete, and perhaps
uncompletable; but it is certainly not
inescapably circular.
31

Nakhnikian

's

account is an interesting one.

The tech-

nical distinctions that he argues
for may prove helpful in
considering interpretations to come,
particularly the distinction he draws between two senses of
'indubitable'.

Although the distinction is not used to
any advantage by
Nakhnikian in his interpretation, it foreshadows
distinctions made by later Cartesian commentators.
But his account
is a difficult one to assess.
By developing the thesis of

29

31

Ibid., pp.

239-240.

Nakhnikian, American Philosoph ical Quarterly,

p.

Nakhnikian, An Introduction to Philosophy

240.

,

p.

255

:
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two views each of which
Descartes held at various
ti.es (but
presumably not simultaneously)
Nakhnikian has put himself
in the position of being
able to say with respect
to any
,

textual evidence which is
inconsistent with his interpretation of Descartes' more
considered view, "Ah, but that
is

the aberrant view being
espoused."

There are some critical comments,
however, that can be
made about Nakhnikian' s account.
The first is that
Nakhnikian does not indicate in which
passages Descartes
explicitly expressed his more considered
doctrine.
1

suggested a few myself.

32

However, in each instance where

Descartes can be found making an
assertion supporting the
considered view, he follows those assertions
with ones that
33
confirm the aberrant view.
fact, -Nakhnikian points to
no instance in which Descartes
appears to hold the con-

m

sidered view without later contradicting
it (with the
aberrant view) within the same work. He as
much as admits
this
The overall impression is that Descartes
is not wholly consistent.
There is
evidence that he is not altociether
comfortable with the aberrant view.

Cf.
33

note

4

above.

For HR I, p. 140, cf. p. 140; for HR I,
pp. 150, 152, cf.
158-159; for HR I, p. 160-161, cf. p. 178; for
Principles VII and X, cf. XXX.
pp.

^

:
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but there is also evidence
”
that
aL lie
he
nevpr gave it up.
never
34
seen in this light
Nakhnikian

prets Descartes

writings in

's

a

account is not one that

manner consistent with

the text and succeeds
in allowing him out
of the circle, as
he leads us to believe
when ne
he save:
k
says -in +-k
the beginning
of his

m

article

if;

we^ssume^hat a^ertain' aberrant
art
*

°f

doctrine^

35

The textual evidence would
appear to indicate that the
aberrant view is an inescapable
part of Descartes' doctrine.
Nakhnikian gives himself away when,
prior to arguing for the
considered doctrine, he says,
"Descartes ought to have disowned the aberrant view.
," 36
Perhaps he ought tQ have
but the evidence indicates that
he did not.
Whether or not
Descartes' failure to deny what
Nakhnikian views
.

_

as an

aberrant view inevitably leads to
to be seen.

34

vicious circle remains

Nakhnikian, American Philosophi cal
Quarterly,

35_,

,

Ibid

36_.

.

.

.

,

p.

251.

,

p.

253.
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Ibid

37

a

37

.

akhnikian does offer one line of reasoning
within his
later article (cf. p. 254) to demonstrate
that, on the
aberrant view, a vicious circle is inescapable.
He does
so in criticizing an interpretation
offered by Harry
Frankfurt which I discuss in the next chapter.
At that
.

.

s

,

50

A second criticism is
that throughout Nakhnikian
more extensive treatment of
Descartes, the considered
doctrine receives minimal
textual support with respect
to
matters other than clarity and
distinctness.
Nakhnikian
does contend frequently that
his interpretation is exegetically accurate. But he develops
premises for arguments
'

without demonstrating what specific
textual evidence supports them.
For example, in providing six
premises for the
dream argument, he states parenthetically,
"i

believe, it is

needless to say, that <l)-<5) can
be attributed to Descartes
38
without qualification."
Finally, Nakhnikian admits that the
textual evidence
indicates "Descartes was not wholly
consistent."
fact,

m

I

argue that given Nakhnikian

'

s

thesis of two views, the

textual evidence indicates that Descartes
was entirely
inconsistent.
This could very well be the
case.

committing myself to this undesirable consequence,

But before
I

would

like to consider some alternative
interpretations.

On Nakhnikian

's

interpretation, those instances in

which Descartes appears to doubt certain propositions
which
time I will present Nakhnikian s argument and
explain why
I believe it fails to demonstrate the
inescapable
consequence of circular reasoning on the aberrant view.
'

38

Nakhnikian, An Introduction to Philosophy

p.

83.
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he earlier claimed were certain
are treated as aberrant.

Other Cartesian commentators also
wishing to ascribe a
limited or partial autonomy of
reason to Descartes have

devised much different strategies
to account for the
apparent inconsistencies. Among
them is John Morris.
In
39
"Cartesian Certainty"
he argues that the charge of
circularity rests on a serious misapprehension
of what Descartes
was about.
Like Nakhnikian, Morris draws attention
to certain
terms that he claims Descartes uses with
comparative precision and consistency.
in Morris' case these technical
terms are:
'eternal truth', 'common notions', and
'natural
light
'

The first reference to 'eternal truths' occurs
in a

letter to Mersenne in which Descartes first mentions
the

extent of God's omnipotence.
The mathematical truths which you call
eternal have been laid down by God and
depend on Him entirely no less than
the rest of his creatures.
Indeed to
say that these truths are independent
of God is to talk of Him as if He were
Jupiter or Saturn and to subject Him
to the Styx and the Fates.
Please do
not hesitate to assert and proclaim
everywhere that it is God who has laid
down these laws in nature just as a
king lays down laws in his kingdom.

39

John Morris,

"Cartesian Certainty," Australasian Journal
47 (1969) pp. 161-168.

of Philosophy Vol.
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There is no single one that we
cannot
understand if our mind turns to cons ider it.
They are all
in our
mmds mentibus nostris inborn
ingenitae
just as a king would imprint his
laws
on the hearts of all his
subjects if
he had enough power to do so
40
[

l

.

In order to better understand
what the term 'eternal truth'

means, Morris suggests that one must
understand what 'truth'
means to Descartes. About the latter
Descartes says:
it is a notion which is so trans—
cendentally clear that it is impossible
not to know what it means.
the
meaning of the word could certainly be
to those who do not under—
stand the language, and they could be
told that this word 'truth', in its
proper signification, denotes the conformity of the thought with the
41
object.
•

•

•

.

.

.

.

From this Morris concludes:
In its 'proper' meaning for
Descartes, then, truth is a binary
relationship between thought and
object, the relationship of conformity.
An 'eternal truth' would then be one
for which this relationship always
holds.
It would express a thought to
which objects always conform.
Descartes' 'eternal truths' might also
have been called 'universal' or

40

Letter to Mersenne, April 15, 1630 (Kenny, o£. cit., p.
11)
Morris provides his own translation.
It does not
differ in any appreciable way from that of Kenny. Morris
also suggests referring to the May 6 and May 27 letters to
Mersenne of the same year.
.

41

From the Letter to Mersenne, October 16, 1639 (Ibid.,
65-66).
The translation is Morris'.
It does not
differ appreciably from Kenny's.
pp.

,

.
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'absolute', because they are
supposed to hold in all possible
worlds, and because we cannot
conceive of their contraries.
Descartes, however, prefers to call
them 'eternal' and to derive them,
in
part, from the unchanging character
of God.

42

Among the examples that Morris suggests
are ’eternal truths
for Descartes are:
Each particle preserves its own state
until
acted upon by another.
Each particle tends to move in a straight
line.
Every collision preserves the same amount
of

motion
Every mountain must have a valley.
Two and three must equal five.

What does Descartes mean, then, when he says
that

eternal truths' were created by God?

Morris suggests:

First God has willed that nature
obey certain laws, which operate
eternally and without change. Second,
he has given us the ability to recognize the eternal truths whenever we
conceive them clearly and distinctly.
Third, God has established an exact
conformity between these conceptions
and their objects.
It is because of
this conformity that we call them
truths.
The conformity is guaranteed
by the proof that God is not a
^3
deceiver.
,

42
43

Morris, op. cit
Ibid.

.

p.

163.
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But what exactly is the nature
of this guarantee? Morris
does not state it explicitly,
but he does proceed to argue:
If God w e re a deceiver, then
conform! ty might not hold. There this
might
be a mountain which did not
have a
valley.
The objects of our mathematical
theorems might not be true. When
two
objects are 'joined with' three
objects,
the result might not be five
objects.
A square might not have four sides,
a
triangle might not have three sides.
Descartes readily admits that we cannot
imagine what such a world would be
like,
but this proves nothing about the
real
nature of our world.
if God were a
deceiver, it would be quite within his
power to make this world which behaved
in ways which violate the laws of
mathematics, logic, and Cartesian physics.
We can go even further.
in the
extreme case, although we seem to perceive an external world, everything
outside our thought could be an illusion.
Although we seem to remember the past,
God could have created us at the present
moment, complete with all our present
^
memories of a wholly fictitious past.

Although Morris does not discuss the scope of doubt
in
Meditation I, I believe we are now in a position to hazard
a guess on what his response to question

(1)

would be.

The

dream argument presumably casts doubt on beliefs based on
sense perception.

The evil demon argument casts doubt on

beliefs that are based on reason.

This doubt extends to

beliefs about mathematical propositions and may even extend
to beliefs concerning the

44

Ibid.

'eternal truths'.

it is not

:

~
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clear, however, from Morris’ account
whether doubt about
this last class of beliefs occurs
in Meditation I or in the
Circle Passage in Meditation III.

Before attempting to determine Morris'
position with
respect to question (2), it is necessary
to complete our

analysis of the two remaining technical
terms that he maintains Descartes employed.
There is, Morris claims, a general class of
objects of
knowledge which, for Descartes, are known with
certainty

prior to knowledge of God's existence and nature.
class consists of 'common notions'.

This

Morris argues:

In the Rules for the Direction of the
Mind (and later in the Principle?)
'common notions' are said to state the
invariable relations between the
objects of knowledge. They are
'common' in that they refer to more
than one idea, and serve to link these
^5
ideas together.
If we look at Rule XII,

for example, we find Descartes

saying
common notions.
are
bonds for connecting together the other
simple natures, and on whose evidence
all the inferences which we obtain by
reasoning depend. The following are
examples:
-things that are the same
as a third thing are the same as one
another.
So too:
-things which do
not bear the same relation to a third
thing, have some diversity from each
.

45
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other, etc.
As a matter of fact
these common notions can be
discerned
by the understanding.
46
unaided.
.

.

Morris concludes that in the
Rules 'common notions' "are
simply the links between our
present thoughts, functioning
somewhat like rules of inference.'' 47
the Principles a
similar analysis is provided and one
very important example
is added.
Descartes says:

m

When we apprehend that it is
impossible that anything can be formed
of n tl ing the Proposition ex
nihilo
}
nihil? fit is not to be considered as
an existing thing, or the mode of
a
thing, but as a certain eternal truth
which has its seat in our mind, and
4®
is a common notion or axiom.
f

,

If we look closely at this statement
and examine

Principles XLVIII and L as well, the term 'common
notion'
seems to be used interchangeably with the term
'eternal

truth'.

in a footnote Morris explains that the Latin

edition of the Principles does contain the words
"eternal
truths

;

revised)

but in the later French edition (which Descartes
the word "eternal" has been removed'.

He argues

thut the Haldane and Ross translation is in error here.

further evidence Morris points to the Conversation with

46

HR

I,

pp.

41-42.

47 ,,

Morris, o£. cit

48

HR

I,

pp.

.

,

238-239.

p.

165.

As

,

.
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Burman in which Descartes states,
when questioned about this
passage
the Principles that by 'eternal
truths' he means
those which are called 'common
notions'.
And Morris

m

,

claims,

It

Eternal truth' is never said to be
equivalent to 'common
notion' in any other place." 49
I

Morris concludes from all this that:
the common notions are of rather
different logical type from the
eternal truths.
The eternal truths
refer to entities which are not my
present thoughts.
They say something
like There is no mountain without a
valley'.
A mountain, whatever it is,
is not a thought.
Since God is all-'
powerful he could make a mountain
without a valley, and thus deceive us
about the truth of this principle.
But the common notions are supposed
only to state the relations between
our thoughts or concepts. We cannot
be deceived about them, because there
is no conformity between a thought and
an external object, which could be
50
falsified by the evil genius.
•

.

.

.

a

,

We might ask, however, by what faculty do we come to

know the common notions?

Morris' response is this:

we

know that the common notions are true because we recognize
the relationships between our own thoughts.

Cognoscere

,

which Morris translates as "to know by acquaintance," is
the term used to describe this recognition.

Morris, op. cit
5°

TK .,
Ibid

.

p.

165.

(cf.

note 13.)

The faculty
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with which we 'know by acquaintance’
is given
name,

'natural light’.

a

technical

Morris' claim is that "Descartes,

uses the expression 'natural light’
in the Meditations and
the Pr inciples with a technical
meaning, which he explains
as an instinct, faculty, or
disposition to recognize the
51
truth.
Morris goes on to argu©
We are never deceived about what
the natural light reveals to us,
because there is no point at which
deception can enter
No matter how
extreme Descartes makes his doubts
appear there is almost no point
anywhere in his writings where he
even counts it as possible that we
could be deceived about the natural
52
light.
.

,

With these last two technical terms,
and

'common notions'

natural light', Morris provides an interpretation
that

allows Descartes to avoid circular reasoning.
ear l^- er

'

As we saw

one example of a common notion provided in the

Principles is the principle, ex nihilo nihil fit (nothing
can come from nothing).

it is by means of this principle

that Descartes deduces his own existence from the fact
that he thinks.

Morris contends:

Ibid., p. 166.
In footnote 14 Morris refers to the
following passages to support his contention: Meditation
IH HR 1/ PP- 160-161); Principles Part I, XXX (HR I,
p. 231); Letter to Mersenne, October 16, 1639 (Kenny, op
-*
cit.
65-67)
(

,

Ibid

pp.

.

.

59

notmng comes from nothing, and
therefore

I

must exist.

53

Once the Cogito is established,
Descartes can move to
demonstrate that God exists. Morris
argues
I know directly that my
own thought
of God exists.
But this idea cannot
P er f ec t than its source, since
all its infinite perfection must
come
from somewhere, and nothing can come
from nothing.
Therefore, the source
of my idea must be God and must exist. 54
t

We are now in a position to suggest
a response for

Morris to question (2).

Until the Cogito is successfully

demonstrated, the only certainties that Descartes
has are
the common notions revealed by the natural
light.
The

Cogito establishes, for the first time, the
existence of
one thing, an entity that thinks.

exist.

Those thoughts must also

Among them is the thought of God.

This suggests

that although the Cogito has an epistemic status that
is

more certain than that of the eternal truths, it is not
first among Descartes' knowledge claims.
be reserved for the common notions.

That status must

The significance of

the Cogito on Morris' account is that it is the very first

53
54
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HR

I,

p.
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step in a series of deductions
that culminates in the proof
of an existent, benevolent God.

With respect to question (3), Morris
does not have
much to say about the principle of
clarity and distinctness.
At one point he says

... he [Descartes] wishes to show
that our clear and distinct conceptions are all true.
For this, he requires a proof,
which will show that God is not a
deceiver and that the world is
not in the hands of some evil genius,
who destroys the conformity between
our clear and distinct conceptions,
an<3 the objects to which they
refer.
,

This suggests that the principle of clarity
and distinctness plays no role in achieving certainty
prior to the

demonstration of God's existence.
suggested earlier that it is not clear from Morris'

I

account whether doubt about eternal truths is established
by the evil demon argument in Meditation

Passage in Meditation III

.

I

or in the Circle

The textual evidence would make

either alternative consistent with Morris' thesis.

Pre-

sumably the principle of clarity and distinctness is among
those principles toward which doubt is directed in the

Circle Passage.
Morris' response to question

(5)

would be that, once

it is proven that God exists and is no deceiver,

5

Ibid

.

,

p

.
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raised by the evil demon
hypothesis in Meditation I and
in
the Circle Passage is removed.
How God's existence is
proven has already been demonstrated.

I

As we have seen, once the
Cogito has been established

Descartes can eventually conclude
(using the faculty of
natural light) that his thoughts,
particularly that of God
exist.
The common notion ex nihilo nihil
fit has already
been revealed by that faculty.
By using this faculty yet
again he can now deduce that God exists.
Once His existence is demonstrated, the same common
notion and faculty
can be employed to demonstrate that God
is no deceiver.
Morris argues:

Deception is a form of error and
error is not a positive existence but
is simply nothing, a gap or a lack.
But this nothing cannot come from God,
since nothing comes from nothing, and
God is perfect being, without gaps or
lacks.
Therefore, God is not the
57
source of error.
Morris' conclusion is:

56

57

Ibid,
,

.

Ibid
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,

p.

167
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The set of principles upon which
his
proof of God depends are not at all
the same as the 'eternal truths'
of
mathematics, geometry, and physics,
which he is attempting to validate.
His proof thus does not depend on
58
what he is attempting to prove.

Descartes may succeed in avoiding circular
reasoning
on Morris' account, but, as Morris points
out, he does so
only by making a particular illegitimate move
early in the
Meditations.

The faculty of 'natural light' is applicable

only to 'common notions' which, in turn, avoid
the doubt

imposed by a deceiving demon only because they express

relationships between ideas in the mind and never refer to
something outside the mind.
a

express

a

But the principle, ex nihilo

causal principle which does not merely

relationship between ideas in the mind, but

expresses a relationship between things.
God's existence the principle expresses

between my idea of God and God Himself.

In the proof of
a

relationship
Now while my idea

of God may be solely within my mind,~^ its cause is outside

my mind.

Thus, the

'natural light' cannot provide the

CO

Ibid
59

.

,

p.

164.

Morris does not think this to be the case.
"My idea is
not considered merely as a mode of my mind, but as a
thing in its own right, which must have a cause."
(p.

167).

63

certainty that we need for this
principle, and hence for
this proof.
if Descartes gives up the
certainty, according
to Morris, he faces circularity.
if he maintains that the
certainty is still there, he retreats
to dogmatism.
Morris believes Descartes chose
the latter
move.

One might object to Morris' account
on the following
grounds.
According to Morris, Descartes cannot
be defended

from the charge of circular reasoning
by arguing for a
limited or partial autonomy of reason
without making him
into a dogmatist.
But perhaps what is at fault is not
Descartes* epistemology, but the strategy
which attributes
to him the need to exclude at least
some of his beliefs or

faculties from doubt.
for rejecting Morris'

However, there are other reasons

interpretation.

in "Cartesian

Certainty and the Natural Light" 60 Peter Schouls
suggests
one such reason.
As we have seen, it is essential for Morris to
demon-

strate that the infallibility of the faculty of 'natural
light'

is never questioned by Descartes.

asserts at one point,

In fact, Morris

"We are never deceived about what the

natural light reveals to us, because there is no point at

60

Peter Schouls, "Cartesian Certainty and the Natural
Light," Australasian Journal of Philosophy Vol. 48 (1970)
pp. 116-119.
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which deception can enter." 61

if it were otherwise,

Descartes could not escape the vicious
circle given Morris'
interpretation.
But at another point Morris
asserts that
"Descartes never - or almost never falls into this

vicious circle."

62

This qualification suggests that

a

closer look at Morris' account of
'natural light' is in
order.
As Schouls points out, Morris has
to acknowledge
one passage in which the natural light
does not escape
being doubted. Morris says:
No matter how extreme Descartes makes
his doubts appear, there is almost no
point anywhere in his writings where
he even counts it as possible that we
could be deceived about the natural
63
light.
In a footnote Morris acknowledges that "The
exception is

at Principles,

30.

I,

this passage." 6 4

I

do not have an explanation for

in the passage in question Descartes

asserts
Whence it follows that the light
of nature, or the faculty of knowledge
which God has given us, can never
disclose to us any object which is
not true, inasmuch as it comprehends
it, that is, inasmuch as it apprehends

Morris, o£. cit
6

Ibid

.

,

p

Ibid
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,

p.
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,

p.

166.

164
166.

(Italics mine)

note 15)

.
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it clearly and distinctly.
Because
we should have had reason to think
God a deceiver if He had given
us
this faculty perverted, or such
that
we should take the false for
the true
(when using the faculty aright)
65
.

Now this principle follows others
which demonstrate God's
existence and non-deceiving nature. Thus,
the opening
statement implies that the infallibility
of the faculty of
natural light is dependent on, rather than
prior to, God's
existence and nature. Furthermore, the phrase
"if He had
given us this faculty perverted" strongly
suggests the

possibility that

a

using this faculty.

deceiving God could cause us to err in
This passage casts doubt upon Morris'

account
There is at least one additional problem as well.

Morris claims that on his account the difficulty that
Descartes faces is employing the principle ex nihilo nihil
fit to demonstrate God's existence.

_

The problem is that

the principle does not meet the criteria for something to
be a common notion and thereby immune to doubt.

But on

Morris' account the principle is also employed to demon-

strate the Cogito
tion,

.

If it is inappropriate in one applica-

it would presumably be inappropriate in both.

If so,

then on Morris' account it seems that Descartes must resort

65

HR

I,

p.

231.
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to dogmatism not only to
demonstrate God's existence, but
also to demonstrate his own.
And that strikes me as

extremely counter-intuitive.

In the aforementioned critique
of Morris' account

Peter Schouls suggests that where
Morris went wrong was in
his treatment of the technical
term 'natural light'.
He

suggests that, whereas 'reason' and
'natural light' are
often used interchangeably by Descartes,

'natural light' is

never equivalent to 'intuition' as
Morris would have it.
In his article "Descartes and the
Autonomy of Reason" 66
Schouls provides a more extensive analysis
of the function
of reason in Descartes' philosophy
and he argues for some

important distinctions which, he claims, clarify
the role
of God's existence in the Meditations and
enable Descartes
to avoid the charge of circular reasoning.
In examining the functions of reason for
Descartes,

Schouls points to the role of intuition and deduction.

Early in the Rules for the Direction of the Mind
Descartes
states in Rule III:
we shall here take note of all
those mental operations by which we
are able.
to arrive at the knowledge
.

.

.

.

.

Peter Schouls, "Descartes and the Autonomy of Reason,"
Journa l of the History of Philosophy Vol. 10 (1972)
pp. 307-322.

.

67

things.
Now I admit only two,
intuition and deduction.
.

Again in Rule IV in discussing how "we
may arrive at the
knowledge of all things," he states that
"no science is
acquired except by mental intuition or
deduction." 68
And finally in Rule IX he concludes:
We have now indicated the two
operations of our understanding,
intuition and deduction, on which
a l°ne we have said we must rely in
69
the acquisition of knowledge.

Schouls concludes from this that for Descartes
neither

intuition nor deduction alone is identical with
reason.
But together they "express the essence of reason." 70

it is

also important to note, claims Schouls, that 'deduction'
for Descartes is something other than Aristotelian
deduction.

To support this contention he points to Descartes'

rejection of syllogistic reasoning as a method for discovering truth.

Descartes states:
the syllogistic forms are of no
aid in perceiving the truth about
objects, it will be for the reader's
profit to reject them altogether and
to conceive that all knowledge whatsoever, other than that which consists
in the simple and naked intuition of
.

.

67
68
69
70
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single independent objects
is a
matter of the comparison
of two things
or more, with each other.
71
The distinction between
intuition and deduction is
also well documented in
Descartes' writings.
In the Rules
he asserts:

intuition
is more certain
than deduction
H ®£ ce now we are in a
position to
0
aise
the question as to why we
have,
besides intuition, given this
supplementary method of knowing, viz.
knowing
eduction.
y
we distinguish this
mental intuition from deduction
by the
fact that into the conception
of the
latter there enters a certain
movement
or succession, into that of
the former
there does not.
But the first
principles themselves are given by
intuition alone, while, on the contrary
the remote conclusions are furnished
only by deduction.
72
•

•

•

.

.

.

•

.

.

.

.

Thus,

intuition and deduction can be distinguished
by
three criteria:
certainty (one is more certain),

time

(one is immediate,

ment)

the other involves duration and move-

and their objects

,

(one gives first principles,

the

other remote conclusions)
Up to this point Schouls has provided
a rather tradi-

tional interpretation of Cartesian reason.

He goes on,

however, to argue that a distinction can be made
for

Descartes between two kinds of intuition.
71

72
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The kind of intuition
described
so far I will call intuition,
There
is another kind of intuition
.

which I
W1 1 a11 intuiti °n
Intuition-i and
2
i
-f
intuition^ have in common that
the act
° f 1 tU:Lt;LOn occurs
instantaneously
^
^
and hence excludes successive
movement
and memory.
They differ in that whereas the object of intuitioni
is simple
and hence not subject to
division or
analysis, the object of intuition?
is
compound and can be divided or
analysed.
Intuition 2 therefore is more closely
related to deduction than is intuition-,
In fact, whereas intuition-,
is in no
way dependent on deduction, intuition-,
can occur only after deduction has
taken place.
73
-

.

Schouls cites certain passages in which
he claims Descartes
refers to mtuition
Descartes says at one point:
2
.

those propositions.
which
are immediately deduced from first
principles are known now by intuition,
now by deduction, i.e. in a way that
differs according to our point of view.
But the first principles are given by
74
intuition alone.
.

.

.

.

.

.

.

And Schouls argues:
Since the first principles cannot be
derived through deduction, that is,
are simple, the intuition through
which we know them is intuitioni.
Propositions which are in any way
deduced from what is simple cannot
themselves be simple.
They will vary
in complexity, depending on how far
they are removed from the simples
from which they are ultimately

^Schouls
74
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derived.

it is possible,

especially
deduct i°ns, to come to see
the different steps involved
in the
deductive process in a single
glance.
When propositions are
"immediately
derived from first principles"
deductive process involves one the
step
only.
Hence in such an instance it
will not be difficult to grasp
entire deductive process in a the
single
intuition.
Intuition then has as
object something compound, that
is
it is intuition
75
2
'

*

Descartes says in Rule VII:

deduction frequently involves
such a long series of transitions
from
ground to consequent that when we
come
to the conclusion we have
difficulty
in recalling the whole of the
route by
which we arrived at it.
To remedy
this I would run them over from time
to time, keeping the imagination
moving
continuously in such a way that while
it is intuitively perceiving each
fact
it simultaneously passes on to the
next; and this I would do until I had
learned to pass from the first to the
last so quickly that no stage in the
process was left to the care of the
memory but I seemed to have the whole
in intuition before me at the same
time.
•

.

.

.

.

,

,

And Schouls contends,

7^

"'The whole' thus held in a single

intuitive grasp is, again, compound, and intuition
is

mtuition2
.

.

"

77
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The distinction, Schouls
contends, is not brought into
sharp focus in the Rules because
Descartes is not concerned
here with metaphysical doubt.
Throughout the Rules
Descartes considers both kinds of
intuition infallible.
But
In the M editations
when metaphysical doubt is
introduced,
there is no indication that it
affects intuition^, and many
indications that it does not. Therefore,
let us now turn to
Schouls' treatment of the Meditations
particularly his
account of the alleged circle.
,

,

In response to question

(1)

Schouls maintains that

Descartes has no difficulty rejecting
sense experience for
he realizes (presumably through the
dream argument) that

the

senses sometimes deceive him and, therefore,
that what is
derived from the senses is dubitable. The
main reason for
the rejection of the physical sciences by
Descartes is

traditionally thought to be that they involve
observation
and experimentation.
This, claims Schouls, is
not the

major reason that the sciences fail to withstand the
metaphysical doubt to which they are subjected in Meditation
(presumably through the evil genius hypothesis).

Descartes' position is that
observation and experimentation play
no role in the construction of any of
the sciences.
Moreover, if man's
understanding were more powerful,
better trained, less beset with
prejudices, man would be able to
deduce all of the sciences from his
.

.

.

I

He argues:

.

.

72

irs-t principles.
The point is,
rather, that deduction is
necessary
to gain scientific knowledge
and that,
even though for a well-trained
scientist much of a particular
science
may eventually fall within a
single
intuitive grasp, the object of
such
intuition will always be composite. 78

take Schouls to be referring here
to intuition;, which, on
his account, will require the
demonstration that God exists
order for certainty to be achieved.
I

m

But what about mathematical
propositions?

At one

point Schouls contends that mathematics
"differs from the
other sciences in that its subject
matter is simple." 79
This suggests that mathematical
propositions are known by
intuition^ and ought to be immune to doubt.
However,
Schouls also maintains that when the evil
genius is introduced in Meditation I:
the doubt is possible because
mathematics is the science which manipulates^ [the objects of mathematics] by
relating them and drawing inferences
from them.
Deduction, composition, or
demonstration is as essential to mathe89
matics as it is to any other science.
.

.

.

On Schouls' view, then, when

the sides of a square,

78

80

add two and three or count

am involved in a process from which

Ibid., pp. 317, 318.
(cf.
HR
306, and HR II, p. 375.)

299,
79

I

I
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either deduce or intuit the
propositions 'two and three
are five’ or 'a square has four
sides’.
If i deduce them,
they are not immune to doubt.
But even if I intuit them,
the object of my intuition is
not simple.
Thus, my intuition is intuition., and subject
to doubt.
In Meditation T
doubt arises about beliefs based
on reason as well as about
beliefs based on sense perception,
but for reasons that are
very different from those traditionally
attributed
I

to

Descartes
What then of the Cogito?
to that of Morris.

Schouls' position is similar

While the Cogito has no epistemic status

prior to that of other first principles
perceived by means
of intuition^, its significance lies in
the fact that it

provides Descartes with an example of an entity
whose existence is demonstrated solely by means of intuition^.
And
this result provides Descartes with a starting
point from

which he can proceed to validate intuition
2

and deduction.

Schouls says:
It would be a mistake to conclude
at this point that, since none of the
objects of intuition^ are susceptible
to metaphysical doubt, the Cogito is
not in some sense unique.
Descartes places all objects of intuitioni beyond the grasp of the evil
genius but, because the reductio ad
absurdum of universal skepticism
necessarily involves making one of
them, the Cogito explicit, the Cogito
alone becomes the natural point of
departure for the validation of deduction and intuition 2
Of all objects
.

,

•

.

1

.

tU t ni
ifc is the Co< ito
al»ne
?
ih i iK
there 1S no distinction
tSJ and5 what it is an idea of. between
idea
Hence
the C ogito is the first
certainty involv-„,
mg
'

existence.

.

81

.

Before turning to an examination
of just how the
achievement of the Cogito provides
Descartes with a basis
for successfully demonstrating
God’s existence, some comment
on how the principle of clarity
and distinctness fits into
Schouls schema is called for.
Schouls' position with
respect to question (3) should be fairly
clear, although he
makes little mention of the principle
in his article.
in
passing he says at one point:
'

God [becomes] the guarantor of
the truth of a certain class of complex
ideas, namely of those that are clear
82
and distinct.
.

.

.

Given his distinction between two kinds of
intuition,

I

take Schouls to be suggesting that the principle
of clarity

and distinctness ranges over both intuition
1

(and perhaps deduction as well).

2

with the former no doubt

arises, but not so with the latter.

truth is required.

and intuition

A guarantee of their

Knowledge of an existent, benevolent

God provides this guarantee.

Thus,

for Schouls,

the

principle itself plays no role in Meditation II or III in

8

82
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demonstrating God's existent
xistence oror

m„
,•

uachieving
metaphysical

certainty
With respect to question
(4), oddly enough Schouls does
not discuss the Circle Passage,
since he states quite
explicitly that metaphysical doubt
is raised in Meditation I
by the evil genius hypothesis,
it is not clear on Schouls'
account why the doubt is resurrected
again in Meditation
0ne P ossi bility might be that
Descartes was warning
the reader that the achievement of
the Cogito in Meditation
Was lnsuff icient to achieve metaphysical
certainty with
respect to complex clear and distinct
perceptions.

—

•

—

if so,

the Circle Passage becomes a stylistic
device serving a

methodological purpose only.
We now come to question

(5).

C ogito to the existence of God?

How do we get from the

Schouls argues:

In a sense, it can be said that
in the Cogito we are conscious of God
rather than of ourselves for, as
Descartes puts it, "I have in me the
notion of the infinite earlier than
the finite-to wit, the notion of God
before that of myself" (HR 1, 166).
The important point to note, however,
is that nothing follows from the idea

the infinite unless we introduce
the causal principle, unless we agree
that "it is manifest by the natural
light that there must at least be as
much reality in the efficient and
total cause as in its effect" (HR 1,
162).
And the causal principle is one
of the propositions which is intelligible per se (HR 2, 54)
which cannot
be derived and hence is an object of
intuition
Thus we cannot get to
.

76

God-the-guarantor-of -reason unless
we presuppose the validity
of intui-

tion^

83

And what does the demonstration
of God's existence provide?
For Schouls we gain the certainty
of intuition
and deduc2
tion and all the beliefs gained by
means of each which were
cast into doubt back in Meditation I
.

Schouls concludes:
Our way of gaining knowledge of what
is complex stands in need of validation.
This validation introduces the talk
about God.
But I have argued that such
validation is possible only if intuition-i
x
is autonomous.
I have argued that there is much
evidence in Descartes' writings that he
held reason to be [partially] autonomous.
If reason is autonomous, the "Circle"
84
does not exist.
.

.

While

I

.

find the distinction between two kinds of

intuition both interesting and plausible, its use in

getting Descartes out of the circle

I

find questionable.

There are also two additional problems that
Schouls' account.

For example,

mathematics in Meditation

I

I

I

find with

find Schouls' treatment of

dubious.

There are instances in

the Meditations where Descartes gives at least the appear-

ance of placing mathematical propositions on the same level

83
84

Ibid.

Ibid
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,
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321,

322.
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aS

the coaito and other first
principles.

For example, in

the Circle Passage Descartes
states:

Let who will deceive me. He
can never
cause me to be nothing while
I think
that I am, or some day cause
it to be
true to say that I have never
been, it
being true now to say that I am,
or
that two and three make more
or less
SS
than five.
85
.

.

In this passage Descartes seems
to be putting at least one

mathematical proposition on the same
epistemic basis as the
Co^ito.
Now, if the Cogito does not fall
prey to the doubt
of the evil genius, then neither
should the mathematical
proposition.
And if the latter does, then so should
the
former.

Quite frankly

I

do not find Schouls' argument for

placing mathematical propositionswithin the
class of objects
of intuition^ convincing.
The problem just discussed points to a
second objection

which

I

have to Schouls' presentation.

I

find the absence

of any discussion or treatment of the
Circle Passage dis-

appointing.

Here is one place where Descartes at least

appears to be casting doubt on even the most evident

propositions, including the Cogi to

.

At the very least it

would have been helpful in assessing Schouls' account
to see
a careful

explanation of how Descartes' assertions in that

passage can be interpreted in a manner consistent with

85

HR

I,

p.

159.

78

Schouls

'

schema.

Neither of the two objections
just given poses insurmountable problems for Schouls.
I believe the following
one
does.

The most telling problem has
to do with the move
which Schouls has Descartes making
from the Cogito to the
demonstration of God's existence. The
only way in which the
conclusion that God exists can be certain
is
if it is

achieved through intuitio^

.

Yet the objects of intuition

are supposed to be simple on Schouls'
account.

Schouls has

failed to provide sufficient evidence to
demonstrate that

mtuition
exists.

1

can be used to conclude that a non-deceiving
God

And

I

don't believe he can consistently do so.

While Descartes steadfastly maintains that
the Cogito is
86
not a deduction,
he does state explicitly in various

places that the existence of God is something which
he has
proven by means of an argument or proof:
In the third Meditation it seems
to me that I have explained at sufficient length the principle argument of
which I make use in order to prove the
87
existence of God.

Schouls may be correct in arguing that the causal principle

which Descartes employs to prove that God exists is known
P er se,

86

87

that is, through intuition^

HR II, p.

HR

I,

p.

38.

141.

It remains to be

79

demonstrated that the application
of that principle does
not involve a need for
intuition^ In fact, the textual
evidence indicates that Descartes
considered the demonstration of God's existence in
Meditation III to

be in the form

Of an argument.

Arguments have premises and
conclusions.

Even if Descartes is able to
attend to the entire argument
a single perception, on
Schouls' interpretation
Descartes- intuition is intuition,,,
not intuition^

m

Circular reasoning does not appear
to have been circumvented
by Descartes on Schouls'
interpretation.

have presented three distinct
attempts to interpret
Descartes, all of which share a common
perspective.
Each
sees Descartes' only escape from
circular reasoning lying in
the direction of a partial autonomy
of reason.
I have
attempted to demonstrate that none of the three
proves
I

satisfactory.

in the next two chapters

I

will consider

certain Cartesian commentators who argue for
the non-

autonomy of reason in Descartes' philosophy.

.

CHAPTER

1

in

Among the first contemporary
Cartesian commentators to
suggest that Descartes' primary
goal in the Meditations is
the defense of reason, that is,
that no aspect of reason is
autonomous, is Harry Frankfurt.
in "Descartes' Validation
of Reason"
Frankfurt distinguishes between
doubting the
truth of a proposition and doubting
the relationship
between a proposition's indubitability
and its truth.
His

contention is that many Cartesian commentators
equate the
two in Descartes' writings and some
are thereby

led to con-

clude that Descartes was guilty of
circular reasoning.
Since his article is concerned solely with
matters relating
to questions (4) and (5), in order to
determine his position on questions (1), (2), and (3) we must
turn to his
more extensive treatment of Descartes in
Demons
and Madmen

— ons 2
.

.

.

Dreamers

The Defense of Reason in Descartes's Medita-

:

.

ln which he also develops his position with
respect

to Meditations

1

,

I

and II.

Harry Frankfurt, "Descartes' Validation of Reason,"
American Philosophical Quarterly Vol. 2 (1965) pp. 149156

2

Harry Frankfurt, Demons
of Reason in Descartes
Inc. New York (1970).

'

,

s

Dr eam e r s and Madmen;
The Defense
Meditations Bobbs-MerrTTl Co.
,

80

:

81

Frankfurt argues that from
the very start Descartes
appears to be making a distinction
between doubting those
beliefs that may be false and
doubting those beliefs that
are uncertain.
Descartes states near the
beginning of
Meditation I
re ason already persuades
me that
ought no less carefully to
withhold
my assent from matters which
are not
entirely certain and indubitable
than
from those which appear to me
manifestly
to be false, if i am able to
find in
each one some reason to doubt,
this will
suffic e to justify my rejecting
the
whole.
3
*

1
I

-

On the basis of this Frankfurt
suggests:

As the First Meditation gets under
way, then, Descartes's concern
apparently
shifts from considerations of truth
and
falsity to those of certainty and

doubt

.

.

.

in [the early passages of the
First Meditation] Descartes is concerned
mainly with the distinction between the
certain and the doubtful.
it is in terms
of this distinction, rather than in
terms
of the distinction between true and
false,
that he undertakes to decide what to
4
believe.
•

•

•

Frankfurt's position on question

(1)

is this:

HR I, p. 145.
Kenny provides his own translation.
I will
refer to his only in the event any difference between
his
and that of Haldane and Ross point to something fundamental in Kenny's interpretation.

Frankfurt, Demons

,

Dreamers and Madmen

,

pp.

25,

26.

s

,

82

06803 63 ends the First
Meditation
Hnnhf
doubting all propositions
concerning
perceptuai objects and, indeed,
skeptical
SX1Stence of the material
world?

^

The dream argument accomplishes
some of this for Descartes
Frankfurt argues:
Tlle
°f the dream argument
is that even if Descartes
makes the

most generous assumptions and
supposes
that he is a normal perceiver who
obtains sensory data under conditions
favorable in every respect discover
able
he cannot be certain
—Y- the sense
that the sensory data he obtains
will
be veridical.
Even when it is attempted
under the most suitable conditions
that
hhe senses can select discrimination
between veridical and non-veridical data
y.ith the senses alone remains uncertain.
,

,

^

The dream argument by itself, however,
gives us neither
doubt about all propositions concerning
perceptual objects
nor doubt about the existence of the
material world. That

uncertainty remains to be demonstrated by the evil
demon
argument.
Frankfurt claims:
his [Descartes’] observation that
the distinction between wakefulness
and dreaming is uncertain did not affect
beliefs in the reality of various simple
.

.

.

and universal things- "corporeal nature
in general and its extension, the shape
of extended things, ..." and so on.
The dream argument also left intact
the supposition that there is a material
.

Ibid

.

Ibid

.

,

.

P-

15.

P-

42.

.

.
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hS conclusion Descartes
drew
frn^hfrom his consideration of
dreams was

merely that we cannot distinguish
with
ce rtainty between real
material objects
and those that are dreamed

7

The hypothesis of an evil
demon is introduced to cast
doubt
on those very beliefs that
escaped the doubt raised by the
dream argument.
Descartes states:

Nevertheless

I

have long had

fixed
in my mind the belief that
an all powerful God existed by whom I have
been
UCh aS 1 am
But how do 1 know
t
that He has not brought it to
pass that
here is no earth, no heaven, no
extended
body, no magnitude, no place,
and that
nevertheiess (I possess the perceptions
of all these things and that)
they seem
to me to exist just exactly as
I now see 0
*

them?

8

And Frankfurt concludes that "[This]
passage about an omnipotent deity.
raises for the first time the possibility
that there are no material objects at
all." 9
.

.

But what about the truths of mathematics?

On the one

hand Descartes states:

whether I am
nnd three together
and the square can
four sides, and it
ble that truths ^o
.

7
8
9

Ibid.

HR

I,

,
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.

.

awake or asleep, two
always form five,
never have more than
does not seem possiclear and apparen t

69

147.

Frankfurt, Demons

,

Dreamers and Madmen

,

p.

69.
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can be suspected of any falsity
(or
uncertainty)
10

Thxs passage seems to place clear
and distinct perceptions
at least beyond the doubts
raised by the dream argument.
On the other hand, Descartes
concludes his introduction of
the omnipotent deceiver (quoted
on the previous page) by
asserting:
And, besides, as I sometimes
imagine
that others deceive themselves in
the
things which they think they know best
how do I know that I am not deceived
every time that I add two and three,
or count the sides of a square, or
judge
of things yet simpler, if anything
11
simpler can be imagined?
'

In this passage it appears that Descartes
is suggesting

that the omnipotent deceiver hypothesis
casts doubt on

those mathematical propositions that escaped
the doubt of
the dream argument by being perceived clearly
and

distinctly
Frankfurt

s

very misleading.

contention is that the appearances are
First, with respect to the passage that

appears to place clearly and distinctly perceived mathe-

matical propositions beyond the doubt raised by the dream
argument, Frankfurt argues that the phrase which Haldane
and Ross translate as "clear and apparent" does not

1

°HR

11

I,

Ibid

p.

147.

:

85

indicate that Descartes was
referring to clear and distinct perceptions.
The Latin phrase is perspicuae

veritates

which Frankfurt suggests may
be translated as
'clear truths'.
Frankfurt contends that Descartes
generally
uses the adjective clarus when
speaking of clear and distinct perception.
The French translation uses
apparent
rather than clair.
Frankfurt hypothesizes that Haldane
and Ross attempt to play it safe
by offering a translation
that combines both the Latin adjective
and the French.
,

The

result is a most misleading translation.

Frankfurt also points to two passages
that support his
interpretation.
The first is in the Conversation with
Burman in which Descartes contends that
in Meditation I he
is considering someone who is only
beginning to philoso-

phize and who attends only to those things with
which he is
acquainted that is, through the senses. 12 The
second is
,

from Descartes' replies to the seventh set of
objections
in which he states
I said at the end of Meditation I
that everything which I had not yet comprehended with sufficient clearness could
13
be doubted by us
.

.

.

Conversat ion with Burman (cf. translation by Frankfurt.
Demons Dreamers and Madmen p. 62.)
,

HR II, p. 266.

,

86

Frankfurt concludes that the
passage "hardly leaves any
room for doubt that nothing
discussed in the First Meditation is taken to be clearly
and distinctly perceived." 14
But if it is not the
self-evident nature of mathematical propositions that is
being doubted, precisely what
is being doubted with respect
to such propositions?
Frankfurt's response is similar to
that of Merrill Ring whose
account was discussed in Chapter
I.
it is that Descartes
conducts his discussion of mathematical
propositions from
the point of view of naive
empiricism, inadequacies
of

which he is attempting to expose.
Thus

/

although Descartes ends Meditation

I

doubting

all propositions concerning perceptual
objects and the

existence of the external world and
mathematical propositions based on am empiricist principle,
this accomplishment
should not be construed as establishing
that no sensory
beliefs or mathematical propositions can be
certain.

Frankfurt's account it is that:
The critique is designed to show, at
the most, that no such beliefs can
reasonably be regarded as certain by
someone who has no resources other
than those provided by common sense.
But even if the senses cannot themselves provide a foundation for the
sciences, it is another question
entirely whether certainty in sensory

14

Frankfurt, Demons

,

Dreamers and Madmen

,

p.

64.
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[anci ma th em at i cal
matters can reasonably
be attained once a sound
philosophical
foundation for knowledge has been
con]

structed.

15

Turning to question (2), Frankfurt
claims that among
the achievements of the Cpgito
is the establishment of
his existence as something which
is inferred rather than
self-evident to him.
This is consistent with two of Frankfurt's general claims:
one, that Descartes is attempting
to validate reason rather than
assuming that some aspect of
it, and therefore some propositions,
are beyond the need of
any justification; and two, that Descartes
is concerned at
this point in his enterprise with demonstrating,
not the

truth of certain propositions, but the
indubitability of
those propositions.
Thus, the purpose of the inference in
the case of the Cogito is not to prove that
sum is true,

but to establish that his existence is certain
or indubi-

table in a rather unusual sense.

And Frankfurt proceeds to

distinguish between certain senses of indubitability.
Although [Descartes] does not assert
that sum is indubitable in the descriptive sense of the term- according to
which what is indubitable is what cannot in fact be doubted by anyonethere are other senses of indubitability
as well.
In particular there are normative senses, according to which what is
indubitable is what there is no reason
to doubt or what there can be no reason

15
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to doubt.
Descartes's intention.
is, as a matter of
fact, to assert that
sum is indubitable in a
normative sense. 16
If I understand Frankfurt's
explanation,

the descriptive

sense of 'indubitable' can
be defined as follows:

£ is indubitable =

df for any person, S, £
cannot be doubted by s.

Unfortunately, Frankfurt does not
explain in what sense
proposition cannot be doubted, nor
does he provide any
examples of propositions that are
indubitable in the
descriptive sense. 17

a

Frankfurt elucidates the peculiar
certainty of sum by
contrasting it with the indubitability
(presumably normative)

of various other types of statements.

He describes

three..

The first consists of logically
contingent statements which, when they are true, may
be known with certainty.
As examples he suggests statements
about the sensory

content of experience such as

'S

feels a pain'.

The belief

that a pain is occuring may be regarded
as beyond S's
doubt.
But in instances when S does not feel a
pain, it is
quite reasonable for S to doubt 'S feels a
pain'.
Frank-

1

Ibid

.

,

p.

103.

Given the comparison he makes between the indubitability
of sum and that of necessary truths shortly thereafter,
there is some reason to believe that he had the latter' in
mind as examples of statements which are descriptively
indubitable

.
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furt concludes that statements
about the sensory content
of
experience can be indubitable on
some occasions and dubitable on others.

The second type consists of
empirical statements for
Which a person may have sufficient
evidence on a given
occasion to render such a statement
indubitable, while the
absence of such evidence on other
occasions would make it
reasonable for the statement to be
doubted.
The third type consists of statements
that are rendered true by the act of asserting
them.
As an example

Frankfurt suggests

'I

am making a statement'.

He argues:

Because of their self-confirming character, statements of this sort cannot
be
falsely.
Nevertheless there are
occasions when they can reasonably be
doubted or when they can be known to be
false.
When I am not making a statement,
I may know that I am not.
There may be
circumstances in which I am simply not
sure whether what I am doing constitutes making a statement, and in those
circumstances I can reasonably doubt
18
whether I am doing so.

Frankfurt's conclusion is that in each of the three
types
of statements just considered there are certain
conditions

under which such statements can be considered indubitable.
There are also certain conditions under which such state-

ments can be considered dubitable.

18

Ibid

.

,

p.
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But such is not the

90

case for sum.

Frankfurt's contention is that
for Descartes
it is logicaily impossible
for there to be an occasion
on
Which a person considers the
statement sum and on which the
statement is false. The indubitability
of sum is thereby
different from that of the types
of statements
just con-

sidered.

Frankfurt summarizes the distinction
as follows:
The certainty of beliefs concerning
content of consciousness is, as it the
were
contingent upon the occurrence of those*
contents.
But the certainty of sum is
not contingent in this way, sinceT
person can never be aware that he does
not exist.

19

There is an additional achievement of
the Cogito
While the uniqueness of the indubitability
of sum distinguishes it from the other contingent statements
discussed
above, that uniqueness does not distinguish
it from certain
other statements such as logically necessary
truths.
They
share this uniqueness in that it is contradictory
.

to

suppose that someone considers them while they are
false or
that someone believes them falsely.
What distinguishes sum
from logically necessary truths is that the latter are:

entirely formal in content and
involve no assertion of existence;
sum, on the other hand, is a synthetic
and logically contingent statement in
which the existence of something is
.

19
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asserted.
This renders it of greater
relevance to Descartes's
20
inquiry.
Thus, on Frankfurt's account
the Cpgito has no epistemic
status above that of other
first principles,
its uniqueness lies both in its demonstration
of at least one existent entity and in its role
in establishing a rule
of
evidence for Descartes more
reliable than those of sensory
evidence which were rendered dubious
in Meditation T
The
rule of evidence that Descartes
develops is, of course, the
principle of clarity and distinctness.
.

Turning to question (3), it is
important to understand
that on Frankfurt's account the
principle of clarity and
distinctness is not derived from the
paradigmatic indubitability of sum. According to Frankfurt
it is the move
from sum to sum res cogitans that
provides Descartes with
the principle.
It is as a result of this move
that

Descartes states,

''From this time

I

begin to know what

I

am with a little more clearness and
distinctness than

before

.

.

How is this increase achieved?

.

maintains
Descartes achieves it by arranging a
precise coincidence between what he
ascribes to himself and the character
that he recognizes as necessarily

20
21
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belonging to an object whose
existence
can be rendered indubitable by
the
cogito argument.
22
Frankfurt suggests that perceiving

a

proposition clearly

and distinctly is a matter of
recognizing it as 'necessarily true', not in the sense that
its denial would be

self-contradictory, but in the sense that
no coherent
grounds for denying the proposition are
consistent with the
perceiver's basis for believing it. And
Frankfurt concludes
:

When a person perceives something
clearly and distinctly, his basis for
believing it is so complete that no
additional evidence could strengthen
it.
Since there is nothing further
that he must consider, there is no
reasonable basis for him to withhold
assent or to doubt.
His clear and distinct perception consists in the recognition that this is the case.
We are now in a position to suggest a response
to

question (3).

The principle of clarity and distinctness

provides Descartes with a rule of evidence for determining

which propositions are indubitable.

But is the principle

Frankfurt, Demons Dreamers and Madmen p. 123.
Frankfurt develops this part of his thesis far more extensively than my brief account of him would indicate.
But the
important question for our purposes is not how or
whether Descartes succeeds in achieving the principle of
clarity and distinctness, it is how that principle (presumed achieved) assists him in achieving metaphysical
certainty
,

2

Ibid.

,

p.

124

,

.
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itself an acceptable rule of evidence,
that is, is it true?
This question brings us to the Circle
Passage and the metaphysical doubt raised within.

Frankfurt's position on question

(

4

)

is that the doubt

raised in the Circle Passage is doubt
about whether a proposition's indubitability established by
the clarity and
,

distinctness with which it was perceived, is
compatible
with its being false. To put it another
way, the doubt is
about whether what is clearly and distinctly
perceived is
true
Descartes' metaphysical doubt is
precisely a doubt whether being false
is compatible with being indubitable.
His position is that as long as the
demon remains a possibility, we must
acknowledge that what we intuit may be
false.
But he also holds that we cannot doubt the truth of what we intuit
while we are perceiving it clearly and
24
distinctly.
.

.

.

Frankfurt points to a number of passages to provide textual
evidence for his interpretation.

With respect to clear and

distinct perceptions Descartes asserts in

a

letter to

Regius
[That the truth of axioms which are
clearly and distinctly conceived is
self-evident] is true, during the
time they are clearly and distinctly

24

Frankfurt, American Philosop hical Quarterly, p. 150.
similar distinction is made by Kenny wtiose account I
discuss in the following chapter.

A
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conceived; because our mind is
of
such a nature that it cannot
help
assenting to what it clearly
conceives
But.
if we lack knQW _
ledge of God, we can pretend
that
they are uncertain even
though we
remember that they were deduced
from
clear principles; because
perhaps
our nature is such that we
go wrong
25
g-ven ln the most evident matters.
.

.

Elsewhere Descartes warns:
before a man knows that God
exists, he has an opportunity of
doubting everything (viz. everything
of which
he does not have a clear
perception
present in his mind, as I have a
number
of times set forth)
26
•

.

.

.

.

.

These passages together with the Circle
Passage, Frankfurt
claims, seem to be clear enough statements
that Descartes
is concerned with the possibility
that even what is indubitable may be false.
Although nowhere does Frankfurt

explicitly state it in such terms, it appears
that he is
attributing to Descartes the need to demonstrate,

that is,

to remove the slightest doubt about,

the veracity of the

following principle:
(FI)

For any proposition p, that
p is
indubitable for S at t entails
that jd is true.

Frankfurt's position on question

25

Letter to Regius, May 24, 1640.
pp.

26

73,

7 4 .)

HR II, p. 333.

(5)

(cf.

is that the role

Kenny, -*
op. cit

.

95

Of the arguments for God's
existence and non-deceiving
nature is to remove once and
for all any remaining
reason
for doubting the relationship
between the indubitability

and the truth of all clear and
distinct perceptions.
But
precisely how is this to be achieved?
We may recall that
Arnauld's point was:
the only secure reason we have
for believing that what we
clearly
distinctly perceive is true, is the and
fact that God exists.
But we can be sure that God
exists, only because we clearly and
evidently perceive that; therefore
prior to being certain that God exists
we should be certain that whatever
we
clearly and evidently perceive is true.^
.

.

.

Frankfurt's contention is that if to be
certain of something is to be unable to doubt it, then
on his account God's
existence can be certain for Descartes without
his knowing
yet whether his clear and distinct
perceptions
are true.

Frankfurt argues:
For if we perceive that God's existence
follows from premises that are at the
same time also clearly and distinctly
perceived then while these perceptions
occur we will be unable to doubt that
God exists even if we do not know that
whatever is clearly and distinctly
28
perceived is true.
,

27
28
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But what about situations
in which someone is not
attending to such arguments?
At first glance it would
seem that God's existence and
the veracity of clear and

distinct perceptions are no longer
certain.

Frankfurt

acknowledges that Descartes wants
to maintain that once it
has been demonstrated that God
exists. He is no deceiver,
and all clear and distinct
perceptions are true, one need
not continue to clearly and distinctly
attend to such

demonstrations in order to retain the divine
guarantee that
indubitability entails truth. Frankfurt
suggests a close
examination of Descartes' position on this
matter reveals
what has been achieved.
in Meditation V Descartes
asserts:

But after I have recognized that
there is a God.
and that He is not
a deceiver, and from that have
inferred
that what I perceive clearly and distinctly cannot fail to be true- although
I no longer pay attention to the
reasons
for which I have judged this to be true,
provided that I recollect having clearly
and distinctly perceived it, no contrary
reason can be brought forward which could
ever cause me to doubt of its truth; and
thus I have a true and certain knowledge „
29
of it.
.

.

And Frankfurt argues;

Notice what he [Descartes] claims to
be the case when he recollects having
perceived that God guarantees the truth
of what is clearly and distinctly perceived.
He claims that then "no contrary reason can be brought forward

29

HR

I,

p.

184.
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that could drive me to doubt."
He
does not assert that when
he recollects
aving perceived that his
principle of
evidence is true he cannot then
experidoubts as to its truth.
g££
he deny what is in any case
surely not
^eniable
that he can always state that
he doubts it.
His point is rather that
any such statement will be
logically
capricious:
he cannot, Descartes claims,
^ ave 3 reason for the doubt.
30

NofUH

But the question still remains:

why is it unreasonable to

doubt God’s existence and all that
follows from it when
someone is no longer attending to the
arguments that demonstrate it, while such doubt is not
unreasonable in previous
instances of clear and distinct perceptions?

Frankfurt's response is that with respect
to all other
clear and distinct perceptions there
exists one and only
one reason for ever doubting them and
even that reason is
only a slight one, a mere possibility.
Once that reason
has been removed, Descartes no longer has
any reason to
doubt.
in other words, Descartes has demonstrated
that

reason provides no basis for suspecting that what
is

perceived by means of reason may be false.

Frankfurt's

contention is that:
When reason is used in the most impeccable manner, the conclusion to which
it leads excludes the possibility that
there is an omnipotent demon; indeed,
it excludes the possibility that man's

30
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being derives from a source
that is in
any way defective in
power or in perX
Descartes
to
fhow
tb^ reason providesundertaken
how that
no basis for
snd distinctly

pgsfMdr^

-

31

Once the sole remaining reason
for metaphysical doubt has
been removed, any remaining
doubt is without basis, or in

Frankfurt's words "utterly capricious."
This interpretation enables
Frankfurt to put Descartes'
entire enterprise into a particular
perspective. As we
have seen in discussions of other
interpretations, Descartes is concerned with the problem
of skepticism.
Frankfurt's view the classical gambit
of the skeptic

m

is to

demonstrate that the use of reason leads
inevitably to the
conclusion that reason is unreliable.
In other words, the
skeptic offers a reductio ad absurdum by
assuming the

reliability of reason and using this assumption
to demonstrate that there are very good, strong
reasons to doubt
that reliability.
Descartes' task is to demonstrate
that

the use of reason can provide us with a
demonstration that
no reason exists for us to doubt that
reliability.
For

Frankfurt what is essential in Meditation III is not
just
the demonstration that a benign God exists, but,
more

importantly, the demonstration that reason gives us such
results.
31
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It is evident that Descartes's
argument does not suffer from
the
commonly charged circularity.
Metaphysical doubt concerns the truth
of
what is clearly and distinctly
perceived, and the removal of this
doubt
is effected without assuming
that
what is clearly and distinctly
perceived is true.
it is removed simply
oy the knowledge that a certain
demonstration has been successfully accomplished.
This knowledge is, of course,
that certain things have been
clearly
and distinctly perceived.
But that the
truth of these things be supposed is
not required, and so the question
is
not begged.
All that is relevant to
the removal of metaphysical doubt
is
that the skeptic's reductio be discovered not to materialize and this
discovery can be made and recalled
without anything clearly and distinctly
32
perceived being supposed to be true.

If we return to principle

(FI),

on Frankfurt's inter-

pretation Descartes has succeeded, not in proving
the truth
of (FI)
but in removing all grounds for doubting
(FI)
,

.

Frankfurt points out, Descartes admits:
What is it to us, though perchance
some one feigns that that, of the
truth of which we are so firmly
persuaded, appears false to God or
to an Angel, and hence is, absolutely
speaking, false? What heed do we pay
to that absolute falsity, when we by
no means believe that it exists or
even suspect its existence? We have
assumed a conviction so strong that
nothing can remove it, and this

32
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*

persuasion is clearly the same
as
perfect certitude.
33
One point should be made before
turning to an assessment of Frankfurt's account.
Frankfurt mentions that a

distinction exists between two senses
of indubitability a
descriptive and a normative sense.
There is another distinction implicit in his account.
And this distinction ha
a corresponding one with respect
to doubt.
The doubt of
M editation I is doubt about whether
one's beliefs are
certain.
The doubt of Meditation III is doubt
about the
relationship between certainty and truth.
Thus, the indub
itability achieved in Meditation II with
the Cogito
,

,

sum,

sum res cogitans, and other first principles
is distinct

from the certainty achieved by the demonstration
that a

non-deceiving God exists.
I

Part of the distinction, which

am suggesting is implicit in Frankfurt's account,
is

accurate, as

I

hope to demonstrate in discussing Feldman's

account later in Chapter IV.
inaccurate, as

I

Part of the distinction is

hope to show in discussing the accounts

of Gewirth and Kenny shortly.

I

mention the distinction

because it has a bearing on a criticism of Frankfurt's

account offered by Nakhnikian in his article that
cussed in the preceeding chapter. 34
33
34

dis-

Nakhnikian contends

HR II, p. 41.
Cf.

I

Chapter II, particularly note 37.
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that Frankfurt is mistaken in
assuming, that in successfully demonstrating the removal
of reasons to doubt the

veracity of clear and distinct
perceptions, Descartes has
avoided circular reasoning.
Nakhnikian claims that there
are two necessary conditions
for a successful demonstration
(i)

There exists

a

relevant valid deductive

argument and
(ii)

Nakhnikian'

The premises of this argument are
true.

contention is that one knows with metaphysical
certainty that a demonstration exists only
if he knows with
metaphysical certainty that conditions (i) and
(ii) are
s

satisfied
If Frankfurt's position is that the
normative indubi-

tability of the premises of the argument for God's

existence provides Descartes with metaphysical certainty
of
the conclusion, then Nakhnikian's criticism is a
valid one.
And,
a

in fact,

there is some reason to believe that this is

position which Frankfurt holds.

If metaphysical doubt is

doubt about the veracity of clear and distinct perceptions
and the normative indubitability of the conclusion that God

exists removes that doubt, thereby providing us with meta-

physical certainty that He exists and that all one's clear
and distinct perceptions are true, then Frankfurt's inter-

pretation is open to Nakhnikian's criticism.
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But Frankfurt

position need not be
interpreted in
this way.
Consistent with his account,
metaphysical doubt
could be defined in terms of
the existence of one
proposition, that a malevolent
omnipotent deity exists, the
possibility of which casts doubt
on the veracity of all
clear and distinct perceptions.
Metaphysical certainty,
in turn, could be defined
in terms of the normative
indubitabllity that such a proposition
is false.
'

s

Thus, the

normative indubitability that God
exists and is no deceiver
makes it indubitable, in the
appropriate normative sense,
for Descartes that the proposition,
a malevolent omnipotent
deity exists, is false. As a
result all normatively
indubitable propositions, that is, all
clearly and distinct
ly perceived propositions, become
metaphysically certain.
None of this is worked out by Frankfurt,
nor do I intend to
do so at this point.
Interpretations yet to be considered,
particularly Feldman's, examine this kind
of an approach in
considerable detail. My point is simply that
Frankfurt’s
account need not fail in allowing Descartes
to avoid circular reasoning for the reasons Nakhnikian
suggests.
There
is, however, one presupposition of
Nakhnikian' s criticism
which does bear on Frankfurt's account, an
evaluation of

which

I

shall now consider.

.
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As

indicated prior to considering
Nakhnikian's
criticism, Frankfurt ends his
account by suggesting that
Descartes was less concerned with
whether clear and distinct perceptions are true than
with whether any reasons
exist for believing otherwise.
The last passage I quoted
from Descartes' replies to the
second set of objections is
interpreted by Frankfurt as committing
Descartes
I

to a

coherence, rather than a correspondence,
theory of truth.
With respect to that passage Frankfurt
contends:

Descartes evidently recognizes that
his
position entails that from our knowing
something with perfect certitude it
does not follow that it is, "speaking
absolutely," true.
What he suggests is that if something that is perfectly certain may be
absolutely false, then the notions of
absolute truth and absolute falsity are
irrelevant to the purposes of inquiry.
His account makes it clear that the
notion of truth that is relevant is a
35
notion of coherence.
.

.

But Frankfurt is mistaken in attributing a
coherence theory
of truth to Descartes.

Ignoring for the moment the passage

Frankfurt, Demons Dreame rs and Madmen, p. 179. When
Nakhnikian argues that conditions (i) and (ii) must be
known with metaphysical certainty, I take him to be using
'know'
the sense that 'S knows that p' entails that
p
is true.
Frankfurt may have been of the opinion that his
postscript attributing a coherence theory of truth to
Descartes circumvents Nakhnikian's criticism, although he
does not explicitly say so.
But he would be mistaken.
Nakhnikian is correct even on a coherence theory of
truth
,

m

)
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he cites, there is at least one
statement made by Descartes
elsewhere that appears to contradict

explicitly Frankfurt's

interpretation.

As was pointed out in the
discussion of

Morris' account in the preceeding
chapter, Descartes states
in a letter to Mersenne:
the word truth in the strict
sense, denotes the conformity of
thought
Wi th its object and that when it
is
attributed to things outside thought,
it means only that they can be
the
36
objects of true thoughts.
•

.

.

,

.

.

It seems quite evident that in this
passage Descartes is

committed to a correspondence, rather than a
coherence,
theory of truth.
The textual evidence just cited indicates
that Frank-

furt's explanation of the passage from the replies
is
incorrect.

But then, what might Descartes be suggesting?

One possible explanation is that Descartes is
considering
the position of someone who,

for the purposes of dis-

cussion, pretends that clear and distinct perceptions
are
false.

And Descartes' response is that one need not pay

any attention to such pretension since we have no reason
to

even suspect it to be the case.
There is one additional criticism

Frankfurt's account.

,

.

wish to make of

He defines the normative indubita-

Letter to Mersenne, October 16, 1639.
cit
pp. 65-66
.

I

(cf.

Kenny, op

.
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bility achieved in MeditationJI
in terms of ’'what there
is
no reason to doubt or what
there can be no reason to
37
doubt."
He claims later that to
perceive a proposition
clearly and distinctly is to
perceive that
"there is no

reasonable basis for him to
withhold assent or to doubt." 38
But metaphysical certainty is
also explicated in terms of
such a basis.
The argument for a benevolent
God that
exists (which establishes metaphysical
certainty) demonstrates that "reason provides no
basis for doubting." 39
i

agree with Frankfurt that the
certainty achieved in Medita
° n 11 has an e Pistemic
component.
But his failure to
distinguish adequately between the doubt
achieved in Medi-

—

tation^ (which the certainty

in Meditation II overcomes)

and the doubt raised in Meditation
III makes the corresponding distinction between normative
indubitability and

metaphysical certainty unclear.
Consider a particular proposition that is
clearly and
distinctly perceived by Descartes prior to his
demonstration that a benevolent God exists.
According to Frankfurt's analysis, to perceive a proposition clearly
and

distinctly is to perceive that there is no reasonable
basis

37 ^
Cf.
38

39

page 87 this chapter,

Cf.

page 92 this chapter,

Cf.

page 98 this chapter.
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to doubt the proposition.

if no reason exists to
doubt it.

then the proposition is
normatively indubitable for
Descartes.
But the hypothesis of a
deceitful deity does
provide a reason for doubting
the proposition.
why then
does the proposition remain
normatively indubitable while
metaphysically uncertain? On the
other hand, if the
hypothesis of a deceitful deity does
not provide a reason
to doubt the proposition in
question, why isn't the proposition metaphysically as well as
normatively indubitable?
The lack of clarity concerning the
distinction between
doubt removed by normative indubitability
and that removed
by metaphysical certainty makes
it appear that either some
clearly and distinctly perceived
propositions are meta-

physically certain prior to the demonstration
of God's
existence (since there exists no reason to

doubt them) or,

even while attending to such propositions
clearly and

distinctly, we can be aware of a reason to doubt
them and,
hence, they are not indubitable even in the
normative
sense

Either alternative is undesirable.

The former would

commit Descartes to a partial autonomy of reason and
as
such would be inconsistent with Frankfurt's overall
inter-

pretation.

And, as

I

demonstrated in Chapter II, it is

inconsistent with the textual evidence.

The latter alter-

native would prevent Frankfurt's interpretation from
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allowing Descartes out of
the circle.
For the reasons

I

Frankfurt has provided

have just given
a

I

do not believe

satisfactory interpretation of

Descartes.

However, the distinction that
he argues for
between the indubitability
achieved in Meditation IT and
the certainty achieved in
Meditation III is instructive.
It points to an approach
to Descartes that, I shall
argue
later, succeeds in freeing him
from apparent circular
reasoning.
I would now like to turn
to a consideration of
another account of Descartes that
makes explicit a distinc
tion between two types of certainty
in the Meditations
.

Perhaps the first Cartesian commentator
to make an
explicit distinction between two types
of certainty in the
M editations is Alan Gewirth.
in "The Cartesian Circle" 40
and "The Cartesian Circle Revisited" 41
Gewirth develops an
account of Descartes' enterprise in terms
of this distinction which he claims allows Descartes to
avoid the accusation of circular reasoning.
And in order to understand

Gewirth's position with respect to questions

40

41

(1),

(2),

and

Alan Gewirth, "The Cartesian Circle," Philosophical
Review Vo 1. 4 (1941), pp. 368-395.
Alan Gewirth, "The Cartesian Circle Revisited," Journal
of Philosophy Vol. 67 (1970), pp. 668-685.
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(3),

it is necessary to begin
with an explanation of
what

Gewirth means with respect to
one type of certainty.
Gewirth sometimes terms one
type of certainty 'intuitional' certainty, other times
'psychological' certainty. 42
I shall use the latter.
About this type of certainty
Gewirth has the following to say:
Intuitional certainty consists in
the
s immediate and unfailing
assent
to, or the belief in the
truth of,
whatever it intuits or directly perceives clearly and distinctly:
"I am
of such a nature that so long
as I
very clearly and distinctly perceive
something I cannot refrain from believing it to be true" (HR I, p.
183).
Descartes emphasizes, however, that
this intuitional certainty is a fact
only about the mind's reaction to a
perception and is not of itself a
sufficient guarantee of the perception's
truth; hence he insists that even
intuitional certainties are not the
same as metaphysical certainty, since
they leave open a possible reason for
metaphysical doubt and hence reguire
43
guarantee by God.

mmd

,

Since the notion of psychological certainty
appears to be

intimately .connected with the notions of clarity
and distinctness, in order to determine precisely what
Gewirth

In his initial article, Gewirth uses the term
'psychological'.
in his later article he uses 'intuitional'.
In a response to certain criticism made by Kenny,
Gewirth
again uses the term 'psychological'.
Thus, all textual
evidence points to the two terms as being interchangeable
for Gewirth.

Gewirth, Journal of Philosophy
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672.
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means by psychological certainty

,

some light should be
shed

on what he takes the notions
of clarity and distinctness
to
be.
About the latter he says:

Clearness and distinctness are
internal
qualities,
that they characterize
p rceptive acts and ideas in
relation
to one another.
To put it briefly, an
idea and a perceptive act
are clear and
distinct when the mind in
perceiving
ea
a ware of the idea's
contents
nd logical relations, and
when it attributes to the idea that and only
that which
is justified by those
contents and
relations.
44

m

^

Gewirth appears to be suggesting,
among other things, that
the relationship between
psychological certainty and
c ar ity
-*-

and distinctness is this:
(Gl)

A proposition
£ is psychologically certain
for S at t if and only if s clearly
and

distinctly perceives that
£ at

t.

But what then is the relationship, if
any, between either
clarity and distinctness or psychological
certainty and
truth? Gewirth continues:
Truth, on the other hand, is an external
quality, since it consists in a relation
of "conformity" between an idea or
thought and an extra-ideational thing or
object.
From this it follows not only
that clearness and distinctness are not
the same as truth but also that the mind
can ascertain whether its perceptions are
clear and distinct without ascertaining
45
whether they are true.
44

45
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Given that the mind can
ascertain whether its perceptions are clear and distinct
without ascertaining whether
they are true, one might be
led to believe that
Gewirth is
claiming that the psychological
certainty of a proposition
doesn't involve any certainty
of the truth of that proposition.
This is precisely the point
that Kenny makes in
his criticism of Gewirth 's
account. 46 But to do so would
be wrong.
Gewirth wishes to make a distinction
between the
certainty of the truth of a proposition
and the truth of
that proposition.
Psychological certainty involves the
former but not the latter.
Gewirth, in a rejoinder to
Kenny, asserts, "Kenny is right in
pointing out that psycho
logical certainty as well as metaphysical
certainty con47
cerns truth.
,”
But this should not be construed
as an
admission by Gewirth that Kenny is correct
and he (Gewirth)
.

was wrong, for in his second article he
asserts:

Moreover
the mind cannot have
present clear and distinct perceptions,
or intuitions, without irresistibly
believing them to be true (intuitional
48
certainty) ...
.

.

.
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Ill

Each of the passages from
Gewirth's account concerning psychological certainty
and clarity and distinctness
respectively makes it quite clear
that at the time of a
Clear and distinct perception
it is impossible to doubt
the
veracity of that perception.
Indubitability then
is a

crucial notion in Gewirth's
interpretation of Descartes.
This notion has at least two
possible interpretations, one
epistemic, the other psychological.
As we saw in the
discussion of Frankfurt's account the
epistemic notion
involves a lack of reasons for doubting.
This may be what Gewirth has in mind
when he discusses
metaphysical certainty and doubt because,
as we shall see
shortly, he continually stresses
Descartes' reasons for
doubting.
But I don't believe that this is what
he had in
mind for psychological certainty for two
reasons.
First,

.

he never mentions reasons when discussing
psychological

certainty.

Second, he clearly views Descartes as
maintain-

ing that clarity and distinctness involves
the inability to
refrain from believing.
But an epistemic interpretation of

indubitability does not presuppose any such inability
to
refrain from believing.

One can withhold assent without

reasons being required.

Furthermore, one might not be able

to bring oneself to doubt the truth of a proposition
even

though there is sufficient evidence evident to him to

warrant his doubting the truth of said proposition.
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Psychological indubitability

,

however, refers precisely
to

the state of a person's
mind in which no doubt can
manifest
Itself, in other words, an
inability to doubt.
Hence,

psychological indubitability appears
to be what Gewirth has
in mind.

What then of the relationship
between indubitability
and clarity and distinctness?
Quite clearly it cannot be
one of equivalence since there
could be a number of propositions whose truth someone could
be unable to doubt without having the requisite clear and
distinct percpetions.
For example, a parent might be
unable to doubt a child's
honesty and yet have no clear and
distinct perception that
the child is honest.
In fact, there may even be evidence
to the contrary which is evident
to the parent who is
unwilling to acknowledge that evidence.
Clearly, however,
indubitability is a necessary condition for
clarity and
distinctness. Gewirth argues:
When

a

clear and distinct perception,

in the sense thus far indicated, is
actually present to the mind, when, in
other words, an idea is being intuited,

and not merely remembered, such intuition arouses in the mind an utter conviction that the idea is true.

This suggests that the relationship between clarity and

distinctness and indubitability is as follows:

49
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(G2)

A proposition
E is clearly and distinctly
perceived by s at t only if
R is indubi .
table for S at t (i.e., s
is unable to
refrain from believing that
at t)

£

Conditions

(Gl)
(G3)

and (G2) by substitution
give us:
A proposition
£ is psychologically certain
for s at t only if
£ i s indubitable for s
at t.

Is there a type of doubt in
Gewirth's account which

corresponds to psychological certainty?

The only mention

of doubt that is distinguished
from his notion of metaphysical doubt occurs within the context
of a discussion
about other interpretations of Descartes.
Gewirth states:

This kind of doubt, which Descartes
himself calls "metaphysical," is of a
different order from the operational
and conceptual doubts discussed above.
Both these kinds of doubts are strictly
confined to internal considerations,
that is, to the mind's operations on
its own ideas or perceptions and to the
conceptual characteristics of the propositions that result from those operations.
But the metaphysical doubt, which bears
on truth, is concerned with external
50
considerations.
.

.

According to Gewirth, operational doubt is directed
toward
instances in which the mind performs operations that
are
not intuitions, i.e., not genuine, immediate
clear and

distinct perceptions.

50

An example of one such operation

Gewirth, Journal of Philosophy Vol. 67, pp. 675-676.

.
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would be memory.

Conceptual doubt is directed
toward those
necessary connections that the
mind intuits as holding
between simple natures.
Mathematical propositions are
examples of those things that
are subject to conceptual
doubt.
At first glance either of
these would seem to make an
ideal candidate for a type of
doubt corresponding to psychological certainty.
But to suggest this would
be to misread
Gewirth entirely.
First, both conceptual doubt
and operational doubt are examples of
interpretations of metaphysical doubt that Gewirth is explicitly
rejecting.
Second, a
notion of psychological doubt would
have no role in his

interpretation of the Meditations
case we must now turn to

position on question

a

.

To see why this is the

consideration of Gewirth 's

(1)

In the earlier of his two articles
Gewirth divides

Descartes' enterprise in the Meditations into
four main
parts:
(1) the universal doubt with which
Descartes'

enterprise begins;

(2)

the intuition of the Cogito

,

and the

inferring therefrom of the general rule of clarity
and
distinctness;

(3)

the renewal of the universal doubt

the Circle Passage); and

(4)

(in

the series of clear and dis-

tinct perceptions, the conclusion of which is the
clear and

distinct perception of the existence and veracity of

:
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God.

NOW the doubt which arises
just prior to the argument for an existent veracious
God is obviously metaphysical doubt.
Since Gewirth states that the
doubt raised
therein is a "renewal of the
universal doubt,"
the

sal doubt'

raised in Meditation

I

'univer

must be metaphysical in

nature.

And from his statements it is
apparent that this
doubt is intended to extend to all
propositions including
mathematical ones. He contends, however,
that the entire
procedure in Meditation I does not
involve doubting
any

clear and distinct perceptions.

Were it otherwise, he

contends
the mathematical propositions
impugned [later in Meditation III
could not be doubted! for logically
they are clear and distinct, and were
the mind attending to them directly it
would be psychologically compelled to
^2
assent to them as true.
•

.

.

!

And in support of this Gewirth cites Descartes
his reply to the seventh set of objections.

Meditation
I

I

supposed that

clearly perceived." 53

establish

a

I

53

.

,

p

.

notion of psychological doubt.

380

.

HR II, p. 266.

"in the first

Thus, Gewirth does not need to

Gewirth, Philosophical Review
Ibid

remarks in

was not attending to whatever

one doubt, the metaphysical one, suffices.

52

'

,

p.

379.

One and only

.

:
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Gewirth

'

position on question

s

(2)

is that the Coqito

is the initial first principle
with which Descartes

achieves psychological certainty.

He states:

the cogito rests more exclusively
upon a psychological basis than
does
any other intuition, since it
expresses
simply that the thinker's thinking
implies his existing. Hence,
the
cogito becomes the principle and
the
most cogent proposition of metaphysics;
in an exposition following the
order of
intuitively perceived certainties, the
g-°9 itQ is th e presupposition of every
Y 54
other cognition.
•

•

•

.

.

.

What the Cogito accomplishes is explained
by Gewirth as
follows
The cogito is not the major premise of
an argument of which the general rule
is the conclusion, but it is simply
the instance which leads the mind
explicitly to hit upon or discover the
55
rule in that context.

The rule in question is, of course, the principle
of

clarity and distinctness.
(3)

And this brings us to question

.

Gewirth'

s

response to question

(3)

is that:

The rule, then, is.
the general
expression of what has been experienced
in the particular instance of the
cogito
that clear and distinct perceptions are so coercive in their effect
upon the mind that the mind cannot help
assenting to them as true at the time
.

.

:

Gewirth, Philosophical Review
55 T

,
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,
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that it has such perceptions.
The
metaphysical proof of the truth
clear and distinct perceptions, of
through the existence of God,
still
remains to be attained.
56
For Gewirth, then, clarity
and distinctness provides

Descartes with psychological certainty.

But it does not

provide him with metaphysical certainty.

That remains to

be achieved by demonstrating
that God exists and is no

deceiver.

And this, explains Gewirth, is why
Descartes

claims not to have established the
truth of that principle
until Meditation IV
.

In order to determine Gewirth 's
position with respect

to questions

(4)

and

(5),

we must now turn to his explica-

tion of metaphysical doubt and certainty.

earlier

m

As we saw

his explication of psychological certainty,
he

contrasted it with metaphysical certainty.

To reiterate:

intuitional certainty.
is
not of itself a sufficient guarantee
of a perception's truth; hence, he
[Descartes] insists that even intuitional certainties are not the same as
57
metaphysical certainty.
.

.

.

.

.

.

.

About metaphysical doubt Gewirth asserts:

metaphysical doubt concerns only
the truth of clear and distinct perceptions.
.

.

.

.

56
57
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It must be emphasized that
the
metaphysical doubt concerns only
whether clear and distinct
perceptions

are true.

*

.

58

.

One plausible interpretation
of the distinction that

Gewirth is attempting to make
between metaphysical certainty and psychological certainty
is that while we are
clearly and distinctly perceiving
a particular proposition
we are unable to doubt (in the
psychological
sense)

truth of that proposition (given
condition
still doubt

(in the epistemic sense,

(G2)

)

,

the

we can

i.e., we can still

have reason for doubting) the truth of
the proposition that
we clearly and distinctly perceived.
in other words,

psychological certainty entails psychological
indubitability about a particular proposition, but it
does not

entail epistemic indubitability about the
relationship

between the clarity and distinctness of that
proposition
and its truth.

This distinction suggests that the follow-

ing conditions are implicit in Gewirth'
(G5)

s

account:

A proposition £ is metaphysically doubtful
for S at t if and only if (i) jo is not

psychologically certain for S at t, or
(ii) it is possible that (p> is clearly
and distinctly perceived by S at t and

£ is false)

58
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.
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(G6)

A proposition
£ is metaphysically certain
for S at t if and only if (i)
£ i s psychologically certain for S at t, and
(ii)

is not possible that

it

£ is clearly and
distinctly perceived by S at t and
£ is
(

false)

will comment on the notion of
possibility in (ii) later.)
Gewirth's response to question (4) is
now apparent.
The hypothesis of a deceiving God that
is raised in the
(I

Circle Passage casts doubt on the veracity
of clear and
distinct perceptions. He argues:

Descartes s hypothesis of a deceiving
God, which.
is his only reason for
doubting that clear and distinct perceptions are true, is and is set forth as
.

a

reason

.

59

.

At this point we might be tempted to conclude
that

Gewirth's response to question

(5)

is that the psycho-

logical certainty of the premises and hence the conclusions of the arguments demonstrating that God exists and
is
no deceiver removes that reason for metaphysical doubt
and

thus provides metaphysical certainty that all our clear and

distinct perceptions are true.

But if we recall Nakhni—

kian's point with regard to Frankfurt's account discussed

earlier in this chapter, this response won't do.

Gewirth is aware of this.

59
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He warns:

And

,
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the very nature of Descartes's
metaphysical problem requires a
passage
from psychological to metaphysical
certainty;
requires, that is to say,
that the conclusion be more
certain
than its premises, not in the
sense of
having greater psychological
certainty,
but in the sense of having a
metaphysical certainty which they initially
lack.
since in the course of the
metaphysical argument even intuitions
are declared subject to metaphysical
doubt, any conclusion achieved by
their means, even if its matter be
metaphysical certainty, will be
similarly dubitable. The mind will
s till, so to speak, be only
psychologically certain of its metaphysical
_
60
certainty.
.

.

.

•

.

.

.

.

How then does Gewirth propose to circumvent
this

problem?

To determine that we must return to his
response

to question

(4).

He contends that the hypothesis of a

deceiving God is Descartes' only reason for metaphysical
doubt.

He argues further:

We must now ask about the status
of the reason on which Descartes's
metaphysical doubt rests. Obviously,
he does not set it forth as true, let
alone as necessarily true.
He calls
it a "valid and meditated reason."
But what is the criterion of this
validity? It is that the hypothesis
of a deceiving God may be clear and
distinct.
For there are no other
criteria of validity available to

Descartes.

60
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Based on this contention Gewirth’s
response to question
is as follows:

(5)

Descartes's metaphysical argument
proceeds to show, by the use of clear
and distinct perceptions, that
the
hypothesis of a deceiving God on which
the metaphysical doubt rests is
not
clear and distinct.
The proposition
that is perceived to be clear and
distinct is rather that, since God is
supremely perfect, he is not a deceiver,
that is, he is veracious.
62
But how does this response get us to
the truth of clear and

distinct perceptions?

Gewirth acknowledges that his account

thus far leaves such a question unanswered.

He admits:

But what has this to do with
truth? Are we to say that "God is not
a deceiver" is true?
If we do say this,
then how can this truth be derived from*
the proposition's clearness and distinctness without begging the question? if
we do not say that it is true, then how
does it help to prove that clear and
63
distinct perceptions are true?

His response is:
In answer to these questions, it
must be kept in mind that the proposition "God is a deceiver" (GD) is a
validating reason for "Clear and distinct perceptions are not true" — (CT
only insofar as GD purports to be clear
and distinct.
Hence, if one can show
(by using clear and distinct perceptions)
that GD is not clear and distinct, but
that what is clear and distinct is
rather - (GD)
then one has removed the
(

,

62

63
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only validating reason for - (CT)
Thereby too one has validated~CT,
that is, that clear and distinct perceptions are true, for since one has
removed the only reason for doubting
or rejecting it, it is now completely
7
64
indubitable.
This suggests that we can attribute the
following definition
to Gewirth's account:
(G7)

p is

a

validating reason for

doubt that
that
by

S

(jo

cr

is true

(

i

)

at t to

S

it is possible

is clearly and distinctly perceived

at t)

,

and

(

ii

)

£ provides

with

S

sufficient evidence to believe at

t

that

2 is false.
(I

will comment on the notion of possibility in

(i)

later.)

The account given thus far indicates that while condi-

tions

(G5

)

and (G6) are consistent with Gewirth's account,

they do not adequately capture his intentions.

Neither

incorporates the notion of a validating reason which,

according to Gewirth, Descartes employs in attempting to
achieve epistemic indubitability about the relationship

between the clear and distinct perception of
and its truth.
I

But by employing definition

a

proposition

(G7)

believe

can provide a more accurate interpretation of what Gewirth

intends metaphysical doubt and certainty to mean.
the following definition:

64
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(G8)

is metaphysically doubtful
for S at
=
(i) £ is not Psychologically
df
certain

£

for S at t, or
(ii)

by

S

is clearly and distinctly
perceived

£

at t and

reason for

(E£)

S at

(£ is a

validating

to doubt that
£ is true)
(G9) £ is metaphysically certain
for S at t =
ci f
1
£ 1S psychologically certain for
/
'

*

t

*

\

'

S

at t, and
-(E£)

(ii)
S

Definitions
Gewirth

's

(G8)

at t

(£ is a

validating reason for
to doubt that
£ is true)

and (G9) can be used to demonstrate how

account avoids the difficulty suggested by

Nakhnikian and acknowledged by Gewirth.

The psychological

certainty of the premises and hence the conclusions
of the
arguments for God's existence and non-deceiving nature do
not give us metaphysical certainty of either the conclu-

sions or the veracity of clear and distinct perceptions

directly.

Rather, the psychological certainty of the

conclusions removes the only validating reason for metaphysical doubt.
fulfilled.

Thus, condition

(ii)

of definition

(G9)

is

As a result all psychologically certain proposi-

tions, that is, all propositions which are clearly and

distinctly perceived, become metaphysically certain.
Thus, Gewirth'

s

position on question

similar from that of Frankfurt.

(5)

is not dis-

On Frankfurt's account

what Descartes has succeeded in demonstrating is that we
have no reason to doubt that our clear and distinct percep-

.

124

tions are true.

On Gewirth's account what
Descartes has

succeeded in demonstrating is that
we have no
doubt our clear and distinct
perceptions.

reason to

-good

Does Gewirth's
account, therefore, fall prey to
the same criticisms that I
offered against Frankfurt's account?
To determine this I
shall now turn to an assessment of
Gewirth's interpretation
of Descartes' enterprise in the
Meditations
.

One criticism of Frankfurt was that he
was mistaken in

attributing

a

coherence theory of truth to Descartes.

Gewirth's account succumb to the same criticism.
not.

I

Does

think

We may recall that Gewirth states:

Truth.
is an external quality,
since it consists in a relation of
"conformity" between an idea or
thought and an extra-ideational
65
thing or object.
.

.

Thus, Gewirth explicitly acknowledges that Descartes
sub-

scribes to a correspondence theory of truth.
But there remains the question of how 'possibility' in

clause

(i)

of definition

(G7)

is to be interpreted.

interpretation is logical possibility.

One

On this interpreta-

tion the logical possibility of the proposition

'GD is

clearly and distinctly perceived' makes that proposition

a

validating reason for Descartes to doubt the veracity of his

65
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dear

and distinct perceptions.

^

fay

^^

ar an d (Jistinct
perceptions are metaphysically
doubtful
once he has demonstrated
the logical impossibility
of 'gd is
clearly and distinctly
perceived', Descartes has
removed the
one validating reason
for metaphysical doubt
and by definition (G9, he has achieved
the metaphysical certainty
that
his clear and distinct
perceptions are true. But
how is
Descartes to demonstrate the
logical impossibility of
'GD is
clearly and distinctly
perceived'.
Gewirth would have to
maintain that it is entailed
by the contingent
proposition
'-(GD) is clearly and
distinctly perceived'. This
interpretation would also give the
contingent proposition 'GD
is not
Clearly and distinctly perceived'
the status of a necessary
truth.
Thus, if possibility in clause
(i) is interpreted
as
logical possibility, (G7) is
seriously flawed.

A second interpretation of
possibility in clause (i) is
eprstemic.
This is suggested by Gewirth 's
emphasis on reasons for doubting for Descartes.
Since metaphysical doubt
is doubt with reasons, perhaps
the possibility
is meta-

physical in nature.
(G10)

Consider the following:

£ is
^

£

df

for
(Gil)

a metaphysical possibility
for S at

£ is

at t.

S

a

at t =
S at

not metaphysically certain

metaphysical impossibility for S
is metaphysically certain for
df

t

On this interpretation the metaphysical
possibility of 'GD

.
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^

15 ClSarly

diStlnct

^

Perceived' makes that
propositlon
a vaiidating reason
for Descartes to doubt
the veracity of
hlS ° lear and distinct
Perceptions. And by definition
(G8)
his clear and distinct
perceptions are metaphysically
doubtful.
once Descartes has demonstrated
the metaphysical
impossibility of ’GD is clearly
and distinctly perceived’,
he has removed the one
validating reason for
metaphysical
doubt and by definition (G9)
he has achieved the
metaphysical certainty that his
clear and distinct perceptions
are
true.
But how is Descartes to
demonstrate the metaphysical
possibility of GD is clearly and
distinctly perceived’?
According to definition (Gil) he
must demonstrate the meta
physical certainty of 'GD is not
clearly and distinctly
perceived'.
But this puts Descartes in the
position of
having to make a particular
proposition metaphysically cer
tain by clearly and distinctly
perceiving it in order to
make metaphysically certain that his
clear and distinct

perceptions are true.

This is clearly circular; metaphysi-

cal possibility will not provide a
satisfactory interpretation of possibility in clause (i)
of definition (G7)
A third alternative is to interpret the
possibility as
psychological.
This interpretation is suggested by Gewirth
himself when he asserts:
the "valid and meditated reasons"
upon which the [metaphysical] doubt is
based are
regarded not as meta.

.

.

.

.

.

s

.
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physically certain or true, but
as
psychologically cogent because
possibly clear and distinct.
.

On the basis of this
(G12)

(G13)

I

p is

a

at

=

£ is

a

.

suggest the following:

psychological possibility for
df BE is not a psychological
impossibility for S at t

S

psychological impossibility for
=
s at
is a psychological
£f
certainty for S at t.

i

On this interpretation the
psychological possibility of 'GD
is clearly and distinctly perceived'
makes that proposition

validating reason for Descartes to doubt
the veracity of
his clear and distinct perceptions.
By definition
a

(G8)

his

clear and distinct perceptions are
metaphysically doubtful.
Once Descartes has demonstrated the psychological
impossibility of 'GD is clearly and distinctly perceived',
he has

removed the one validating reason for metaphysical
doubt
and by definition (G9) he has achieved the
metaphysical

certainty that his clear and distinct perceptions are
veracious.

How is the psychological impossibility of 'GD

is clearly and distinctly perceived'

strating that

— (GD)

i

achieved?

By demon-

clearly and distinctly perceived

Descartes has demonstrated that 'GD is not clearly and

distinctly perceived' is psychologically certain.

66
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definition (G13) we obtain that
'GD is clearly and
distinctly perceived' is a psychological
impossibility for Descartes.
The circularity encountered with
a metaphysical
interpretation of possibility in
definition (G7) is avoided
with a psychological interpretation.
But is definition
I

(G7)

thereby free of other problems?

think not.

procedure

Let us recall Gewirth's account
of Descartes'
(with the notion of psychological
possibility in

mind)
GD is a validating reason for - (CT)
only if it's psychologically possible

that 'GD is clear and distinct'.
Hence
^ one can show that GD is not
clear
and distinct but that what is clear
and distinct is - (GD)
then GD is no
longer a validating reason for - (CT)
,

But how does Descartes show that GD is not
clear and dis-

tinct?

person

He cannot do so in a straightforward manner.
S

is not attending to a proposition
£,

not clear and distinct.

if a

then £ is

Descartes must demonstrate it by

proving that its negation is clear and distinct.

What

I

am

suggesting is that the following condition can be attributed
to Descartes:
(G14

)

A proposition £ is clearly and distinctly
perceived by S at t only if -£ is not

clearly and distinctly perceived by
at t

S

129

The latter part of Gewirth

'

s

explanation of Descartes' pro-

cedure is consistent with (G14).

That is, we can interpret

one can show that GD is not clear
and distinct but
that what is clear and distinct
is - (GD)
as meaning
"one can show that GD is not clear
and distinct by showing
that what is clear and distinct is (GD) "
But Gewirth s
notion of a validating reason unnecessarily
complicates the
matter.
By proving that - (GD) is clear and
distinct,
.

.

.

.

.

1

Descartes is demonstrating that GD is not
clear and distinct.
But given definition (G7) what Descartes
ends up demonstrating is that 'GD is not clear and distinct'
is psychologically certain.
But given condition (Gl) Descartes can
succeed in demonstrating this if and only if he
demonstrates
that

'GD is

distinctly.

not clear and distinct' is perceived clearly
and

And the need to clearly and distinctly per-

ceive the lack of clarity and distinctness of

a

proposition

is an unnecessary complication.

Where did Gewirth go astray?

Anthony Kenny in "The

Cartesian Circle and The Eternal Truths" 67 suggests that
Gewirth

'

s

notion of a validating reason is not supported by

textual evidence.

Granted that Descartes does state near

the close of Meditation

67

Kenny, o£. cit

.

I

that:

.

-
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there is nothing in all that
I
ormerly believed to be true,
of which
i cannot
some measure doubt,
for reasons which are very
powerful
and maturely considered [validae
68
rationes
‘

•

1

m

l

—

.

Kenny contends that 'validae'
does not mean 'valid' in any
technical sense but merely 'strong'.
He points to Descartes' comment in his replies
to the seventh set of objections, "For we may well enough
be compelled to doubt
by

arguments that are in themselves
doubtful.
support his contention that for
Descartes

— lida

While

a

.," 69 to

reason can be

In the Circle Passage Descartes
also

"...

asserts,

.

the reason for doubt.

.

.

is very slight,

and so to speak metaphysical." 70
In his rejoinder to Kenny, Gewirth
cites two additional

passages

m

support of his interpretation of the notion
of

validating reason.

In the first,

a letter to Buitendijck,

Descartes asserts:
one may pretend that God is a
deceiver - even the true God, but such
that he is not known sufficiently
clearly to oneself or to the other
persons for whose sake one forms this
hypothesis
.

68

69
70
71

HR

I,

pp.

.

.

147-148.

HR II, p. 277.
HR

I,

p.

159.

Letter to Buitendijck, 1643.
(cf. Kenny, op. cit.
p.
145.)
The translation quoted is Gewirth's.
It does not
differ appreciably from that provided by Kenny.
,

a

^
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Gewirth claims that Descartes
is obviously suggesting
that
the hypothesis is thought
to be possibly clear and
distinct
at this point.
But the only way the passage
can be
inter-

preted consistent with Gewirth
's claim is to attribute
the
clause "such that he is not
known sufficiently clearly"
as
referring to the pretension of God
as a deceiver and to
translate "not known sufficiently
clearly" as "possibly
clear and distinct." On the other
hand, if we read the
passage as attributing the clause
to the true God, all we
are committed to is the pretension
of a deceiving God in
the absence of a clear and distinct
perception to the
contrary.

On this reading there is nothing
to suggest that

the pretension must be possibly clear
and distinct.

The second passage to which Gewirth
points occurs in
discourse °n Method in which Descartes states:
in trying to discover the error
or uncertainty of the propositions which
I examined, not by feeble
conjectures,
but by clear and assured reasonings.
.

•

.

.

.

Gewirth maintains that by "clear and assured
reasonings"
Descartes is referring to tentatively or possibly
clear and
perceptions, the hypothesis of

being one such possibility.
this passage.

a

deceiving God

Now there are two ways to read

One is that by clear and assured reasoning

Descartes is not referring to clear and distinct percep72

HR

I,

p.

99.
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tions.

If so,

then Gewirth is mistaken in
suggesting that
this passage supports his
interpretation of the notion
of
a validating reason.
On the other hand, if by
clear and
assured reasoning Descartes
does mean clear and distinct
perceptions, then it is not their
possibility which makes
them validating reasons but
their actuality.
On this

interpretation Descartes is asserting
that the reasons for
uncertainty are clear and distinct,
not possibly clear and
distinct. This interpretation
suggests that if Descartes
has the notion of a validating
reason in mind, its explication is not captured by (G7), but by
the following:
(G7)

£ is

validating reason for S at t to
doubt that £ is true =
(i) £ i s
clearly and distinctly perceived by S
a

at
and (ii) £ provides S with sufficient
evidence to believe at t that
£ is false.
t,

On this interpretation of the notion
of a validating reason
it is not the existence of such a reason
which causes meta-

physical doubt, it is the possibility that such
exists.

a

reason

How this possibility is to be explicated
remains

to be seen.

Feldman suggests one alternative which will be

examined in the next chapter.
Chapter V.

I

will suggest another in

My point here is that such an interpretation is

consistent with Descartes' description of metaphysical
doubt in the Circle Passage.

It may not be consistent with

his description of doubt near the close of Meditation

I.
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AS we have seen, Gewirth
interprets that doubt
as metaPhysical doubt.
In this I believe he
is mistaken.
As I
intend to demonstrate in
Chapter V, Descartes is
not concerned with metaphysical
doubt until the Circle
Passage in
Med itation III
The doubt raised in Medltatlon
,
T

^

something other than metaphysical
doubt.
Gewirth's failure
to realize that there
exists a type of doubt
corresponding
to psychological certainty
leads him to conclude that
metaphysical doubt is raised in Meditation
I
And

that conclusion, in turn, leads him to
develop a notion of validating reason which, I have argued,
is confused, unnecessarily
.

complicated, and lacking in textual
support.

Would an account of Descartes'
enterprise which
includes a notion of psychological
doubt provide an interpretation adequate to circumvent circular
reasoning? To
determine this I will consider next one
such account, that

offered by Anthony Kenny.

CHAPTER

IV

The first Cartesian
commentator to distinguish
between
two types of doubt which
correspond to two types of
certainty in the Med itations is
Anthony Kenny. These distinctions are made in both the
aforementioned article,
"The

Cartesian Circle and Eternal
Truths," in which he comments
on Gewirth's account, and in
his earlier and more
extensive
treatment of Descartes' philosophy
in Descartes
A study
1
of His P hilosophy
Because the terms he employs to
distinguish between the two types of
doubt and certainty not
only differ from book to article
but also are not at all
well defined, it will prove helpful
to provide a more
explicit explication of the terms before
attempting to
determine Kenny's position on the five
questions that I
raise for each interpretation of Descartes.
:

.

In his commentary on Gewirth's
account,

Kenny distin-

guishes between psychological doubt and
psychological certainty on the one hand and metaphysical
doubt and metaphysical certainty on the other.
Interestingly enough he
attributes both distinctions to Gewirth. Kenny
states:

1

Anthony Kenny, Descartes
A Study of His PhilosoDhv.
Random House, New York (1968).
:

134

.

s
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He

[Gewirth]

distinguished between
gical doubt ^hich is
contrasted
ith ?i°
the certainty of clear
and distinct
perception) and metaphysical
doubt
(which concerns the truth
of what is
clearly and distinctly perceived)
h

:

.

But

have argued in the preceeding
chapter that not only
does Gewirth fail to identify
any type of doubt corresponding to psychological certainty,
such a doubt would play
no role in his explanation
of Descartes' purpose in
the
I

M editations

,

for on Gewirth

'

account it is metaphysical

s

doubt that is raised from the very
start in Meditation
Kenny is apparently reading something
into Gewirth

T

.

'

account which is not there.

Kenny goes on to say:

I agree with Gewirth that
the
type of doubt that Descartes says is
possible concerning clear and distinct
perceptions is a different type of
doubt from that which he says is
3
impossible.
.

.

This suggests that principles

(Gl),

(G2)

,

attributed to Gewirth also hold for Kenny.

They are:

(Kl)

£

(K2)

perceives that £ at t.
£ is clearly and distinctly perceived
by S at t only if £ is indubitable for

is psychologically certain for S at
t
if and only if s clearly and distinctly

S

at t

(i.e.,

S

is unable to refrain

from believing that £ at

Kenny, Journal of Philosophy

^Ibid

and (G3) which

,

p.

686.

t)

I

::
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(K3)

E is psychologically certain for s at
t only if
£ is indubitable for S at t

What then are we to suggest
as sufficient and
necessary conditions for
psychological doubt? Kenny's
comments
are not altogether helpful,
at one point in his
article he
states

Psychological doubt and metaphysical
doubt are not, strictly, doubt
about
the same proposition.
The propositions
Descartes is psychologically certain
about at the beginning of the
Third
Meditation are the particular propositions he clearly and distinctly
perceives.
What Descartes is metaphysically doubtful about is the general
proposition, that whatever he intuits
most evidently is true.
This general
doubt may cast doubt on the particular
propositions; but the doubt it casts
is only a second-order, implicit
4
doubt.
.

.

This suggests that psychological
doubt is doubt about
specific propositions. But it tells us
little else.
in
his more extensive treatment of Descartes
Kenny mentions in
passing
Once something has been shown to me
by natural light, Descartes says, I
cannot doubt it; but another person
who sees less clearly may doubt the
very same proposition.

5

This suggests that we might interpret psychological
doubt
in terms of the negation of psychological
certainty:

4

Ibid., pp. 687-688.

~*Kenny,

Descartes

,

p.

179.

,
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(K4)

£ is psychologically doubtful for S at
t if and only if
R i s not clearly and
distinctly perceived by

Principle

S at t.

(K4)

allows a proposition to be
psychologically
doubtful for a person in two
ways:
one, when the proposition is not being attended to;
and two, when it is being
attended to but not clearly and
distinctly.

Turning to the notions of
metaphysical doubt and certainty, one discovers that, aside
from the quoted passage
referring to metaphysical doubt as
a second-order
doubt,

Kenny does not have anything more
specific to say about
such doubt in his article.
if we refer to his earlier
work
we discover that there exists no
mention of psychological
doubt or certainty, only metaphysical
doubt, metaphysical
certainty, and something called Cartesian
certainty.
About
the first two, Kenny at one point asserts:
notice that the [Circle] passage
suggests a distinction between a firstorder doubt and a second-order doubt.
this second— order doubt is the metaphysical doubt that cannot be removed
except by proving the existence of a
6
veracious God.
.

.

.

*

•

•

This passage makes it clear that the metaphysical
doubt

discussed in his later article is precisely the metaphysical doubt being articulated here.

tainty Kenny has this to say:
6

Ibid.

pp.

183,

184.

About Cartesian cer-

.
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It is not enough,

for Cartesian cershould here and now
11
111917 make a true
th^h
the best possible grounds. judgment on
necessary also that I should it is
be in such
a possiticn that I
will never hereafter
reason to withdraw that
7
judgment.
At this point one might
be tempted to conclude
that Kenny
has three types of certainty
in mind:
psychological, metaphysical, and Cartesian.
But to do so would be to
misinterpret Kenny entirely.
the passage just quoted
referring to Cartesian certainty,
Kenny continues:

ainty, that

I

^

m

Whenever I clearly and distinctly
perceive something, I cannot help
judging
that it is so, and this will
be a true
judgment made on the best possible
grounds.
But until I have proved the
er C y ° f God 1 cannot be
sure that
r
u
I
shall
not hereafter withdraw this
judgment under the influence of the
metaphysical suspicion of the omnipotent
deceiver.
if what I have clearly and
distinctly perceived was a demonstrated
conclusion, I may later doubt it while
explicitly thinking of it.
if it was
not a conclusion but an [indubitable]
axiom, I shall never change my mind
about it while it is actually before
my mind, but I can doubt it indirectly
by doubting whatever seems most evident
to me.
While the possibility of even
this second-order doubt remains, I can®
not be said to be certain.

^

'

The latter part of this passage which
stipulates what is

necessary for Cartesian certainty makes it quite
clear that

7
g

Ibid

.

Ibid

.

,

p.

192

(Italics mine)

-

.
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the certainty in question
is being contrasted with
the
second-order doubt which Kenny
has repeatedly termed
metaphysical doubt. Thus, it is
equally clear that Cartesian

certainty is nothing more and
nothing less than metaphysical certainty.
Before attempting to provide
any formal interpretations of what either metaphysical
doubt or certainty mean
for Kenny, it will prove helpful
to examine some
of the

comments he provides to distinguish
between metaphysical
certainty and psychological certainty.
In contrasting the
lack of certainty raised in the
Circle Passage in Medita on 111 with the indubitability
achieved for certain
axioms in Meditation II Kenny asserts:

—

,

In the passages we considered
earlier in which Descartes spoke of
certain axioms as being indubitable,
we must take him to have been speaking
of the possibility of first-order doubt.
For his examples in the Third Meditation make clear that no axioms are
immune to second-order doubt.
Firstorder indubitability is not considered
by Descartes as being, by itself, a
guarantee of truth; still less does he
use "indubitable" as equivalent to
"true." The second-order doubt is
precisely the question whe ther fTrstorder indubitabilit y is compatible
wit h falsehood
God's truthfulness
resolves the second-order doubt by
showing that what is indubitable is
.

9

true.

9

Ibid

.

,

p.

184

(Italics mine)

.
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Now if we take the notion
of first-order doubt
and corresponding indubitability to be
referring to psychological
doubt and certainty respectively,
and second-order doubt
and corresponding certainty
to be referring to
metaphysical
doubt and certainty respectively,
then Kenny's account thus
far sounds very much like
Gewirth's.
That is, we might be
tempted to suggest that principles
(G5) and <G6> hold for
Kenny's account as well as for
Gewirth's:
(K5)

£ is metaphysically doubtful for
if and only if

(

i

£

)

S

at t

is not psychologically

certain for S at t, or (ii) it is
possible
that (£ is clearly and distinctly
perceived
by S at t and
is
false)
£
(K6)

£ is metaphysically certain for
and only if

certain for

(i)

S

is

£

at t,

S

at t if

psychologically
and (ii) it is not

possible that (£ is clearly and distinctly
perceived by S at t and
£ is false).
But Kenny argues otherwise.

"I

think, however, that

Gewirth's account of the contrast between
psychological and
metaphysical certainty is misleading." 10 How is it
misleading? Kenny suggests:
But it is misleading to contrast metaphysical certainty with psychological
certainty by saying that metaphysical
certainty concerns truth
For psychological certainty also concerns truth:
.

10

Kenny, Journal of Philosophy

,

p.

686.

.

.
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e
a n -° f soraetfl ing is
to be
certain thati it
is true.

^

Now

,
11

have already argued in
the previous chapter
that
Kenny is mistaken in
attributing such a position
to Gewirth.
However, the distinction
between psychological
certainty
and metaphysical doubt,
i.e., between first-order
indubitability and second-order
doubt, which Kenny offers
in contrast to Gewirth, suggests
that principles (K5) and
(K6)
fail to capture Kenny's
intentions.
I

In a passage quoted earlier
Kenny suggests that "What
Descartes is metaphysically
doubtful about is the general

proposition, that whatever he
intuits most evidently is
true.
This suggestion is also made
in Kenny's earlier
work
notice that the [Circle] passage
suggests a distinction between a
firstorder doubt and a second-order doubt
Take the proposition "What's done
cannot be undone."
if i explicitly think
of this proposition, Descartes
says,
I cannot at that moment
doubt it, that
is, I cannot help judging that
it is
true.
However, though I cannot doubt
this proposition while my mind's eye
is on it, I can, as it were, turn
away
from it and doubt it in a roundabout
manner.
I can refer to it under some
general heading, such as "what seems to
me most obvious"; and I can raise the
whole question whether everything that
seems to me most obvious may not in
fact be false.
I cannot, while
®^plicitly thinking of it, believe
.

11

Ibid

.

,

p.

.

687

.

:
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it to be false or even
suspend
judgment about its truth.
But until
I know that I was
made by a veracious
^od, I can wonder whether
my whole
tUal faCUltY may not be
radically deceptive - including
that
feature of it that is its
inability
to entertain first-order
doubt about
axioms of this kind.
The axioms are thus’

r

.

genericany doubtful while severally
indubitable.

While in doubt about the
nature 1 do
know whether
the light of nature is a
true light or a
aise light.
This second-order doubt is
the metaphysical doubt that
cannot be
removed except by proving the
existence
of a veracious God.
12

^

'

On the basis of this passage

suggest the following inter

I

pretation of metaphysical doubt for
Kenny:
(K8)

p is metaphysically doubtful for
if and only if

S at

£ i s psychologically
doubtful for S at t, or (ii)
£ is clearly
and distinctly perceived by s at
t and S
is not psychologically certain
that all
his clear and distinct perceptions
are
true

(1)

Is principle

(K8)

consistent with other textual evi-

dence in Kenny's account?

In his later article Kenny

asserts
Descartes can entertain the thought
(1) For some jd, I clearly and distinctly
perceive that £, but not £.
but he cannot entertain any thought that
would be an existential instantiation of
He can also entertain the thought
(2) For some jd, I clearly and distinctly
.

12

t

(i)

Kenny, Descartes

,

pp.

183-184.
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anf ,

P erceiv ed that £, but not
p.

instantiationro^U) ?

Srtain existent ial

13

in order to determine
how Kenny's comments
here apply to

Principle

<K8)

must introduce the notions
of psychological possibility and
impossibility in precisely
the same
manner as I did for my
explication of Gewirth's
account.
(K12)

(K13)

I

£ is

a

psychological possibility for
=
at
df '£ is not a Psychological
impossibility for S at t.

s

£ is

a psychological
impossibility for
S at 11 =
a Psychological
df “E

certainty for

S

at t.

If Descartes can entertain
the propositions expressed
by

and

(1)

(2)

in the passage just quoted,

psychological possibility for him.
i

.

e

.

then each is a

Thus, their negations,

,

U') For all £, if i clearly and
distinctly
perceive that £ then £.
(2') For all
£ if i clearly and distinctly
perceived that £, then p.
,

,

are psychologically doubtful for
Descartes.

And this is

precisely the state of affairs expressed
by condition (ii)
of principle (K8).
Thus, I contend that principle
(K8)
captures Kenny's concept of what
metaphysical doubt means
for Descartes.

Kenny, Journal of Philosophy

,

p.

689.

.
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Given our success with
metaphysical doubt for Kenny,
we might be tempted to
propose that metaphysical
certainty
be interpreted in terms of
the negation of metaphysical
doubt, that is,
(K9
)

£ ls metaphysically certain for S at t
if and only if (i)
£ is psychologically
certain for S at t, and (ii s is
psychologically certain that all his
clear and
distinct perceptions are true.
)

In essence then, principle

(K9)

metaphysically certain about

a

states that a person is

particular proposition pro-

vided that he is psychologically
certain about both the
proposition and the veracity of all his
clear and distinct
perceptions
Does
not.

(K9

)

meet Kenny's needs?

Unfortunately, it does

The metaphysical certainty achieved at a
given time

is dependent upon the psychological
certainty at that time

that all one's clear and distinct perceptions
are true.
But suppose one is not attending to the general
proposition.
is,

According to principle

(K4)

the general proposition

therefore, psychologically doubtful, that is, it is
not

psychologically certain.

Hence, by principle

longer has metaphysical certainty.

(K8)

one no

And we may recall that

to support my argument for equating metaphysical certainty

with Cartesian certainty,

I

noted that Kenny maintains:

.

.
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It is not enough, for Cartesian
certainty that I should here and now
unhesitatingly make a true judgment
on the best possible grounds.
it is
necessary also that I should be in
such a position that I will never
hereafter have a reason to withdraw
that judgment.
What Descartes seeks, then, is
a state of mind that is in a
certain
14
sense immutable.
,

.

.

This suggests Kenny is maintaining
that the following condition must hold for metaphysical certainty:
(K14
)

£ is metaphysically certain for

S

at

only if -(Et
t
is later than t
and £ is psychologically doubtful for
t

S

1

(

)

at t'

*

)

But according to principle

(K4)

a

proposition is psycho-

logically doubtful when it is not being attended to.

Principles

(K4)

and (K14) do not give us that immutable

state which Kenny contends Descartes is seeking.

Kenny himself does not provide a clue as to how this

immutable state is to be achieved.

Having made the claim,

he proceeds with an analysis of Descartes'

shall examine when discussing question

task which we

(5)

But nothing in

the analysis or in the textual evidence he provides points
to how the immutable state is to be achieved.

14

Kenny, Descartes

,

p.

192.

.
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In "Anthony Kenny and the
Cartesian Circle" 15 p red

Feldman and Arnold Levison take
Kenny to task on this
point.
They contend:
If this interpretation of
Kenny's
is correct, then according
to him the
goal of Descartes' speculation
concerning the veracity of God was
solely to
make it the case that he should
never
again have reason to change his mind
about what he had once intuited.

Feldman and Levison argue that it is
implausible to attribute such an unrealistic goal to
Descartes.
They offer
three reasons why the proof of a veracious
deity will fail
to provide the immutable state stipulated
by Kenny.
The
first involves a situation in which Descartes
intuits that
two and three are five after proving God's
existence.

Later he forgets the proof but recalls the
intuition.
Doubts that he now has about God's nature should
defeat the
metaphysical certainty of his intuition. The second
in-

volves a situation in which Descartes intuits

a

complex

mathematical proposition after proving God's existence.
Later he forgets that he had the intuition but he correctly

recalls the proof.

On the basis of other evidence he may

very well come to doubt the truth of the mathematical

Fred Feldman and Arnold Levison, "Anthony Kenny and the
Cartesian Circle," Journal of the History of Philosophy
Vol 9 (1971), pp. 491-496.
.

16

Ibid.

,

p.

496

'

147

proposition.

Thus, he should no longer
be metaphysically

certain about it.

The third involves a situation
in which
he comes to doubt one of the
premises in the first argument
for God's existence and he
decides to use the ontological
argument in its place.
Feldman and Levison conclude:

Possibilities such as these are
so obvious that Descartes
could hardly
v<
™ lssed them.
So it seems unlikely
,f 7
that he brought in the veracious
deity
to show that he will never
have reason
to change his mind about what
he has

once intuited."

17

In a rejoinder, Kenny acknowledges
the points raised

by Feldman and Levison.

Feldman and Levison are correct

in thinking that on my view the
goal

of Descartes'

speculation about God's
truthfulness is to make it the case
that he should never again have reason
to change his mind about what he has
once
intuited.
I think that Feldman and Levison
are correct in saying that even the
proof of a veracious deity is not sufficient to establish an immutable state
18
of certainty.
.

.

But, Kenny argues.
It does not seem to me to follow that
Descartes was not trying to do so. As
he says in both the Second and Sixth
replies (HR II, pp. 39, 245)
no one

can have

17
18

'

immutable and certain knowledge

Ibid.

Anthony Kenny, "A Reply by Anthony Kenny," Journal of the
History of Philosophy Vol 9 (1971), pp. 497-498, p. 497.
.

,

.
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unless he first acknowledges
that he
has been created by a God
who has no
intention to deceive.
19

Kenny suggests that to
such objections Descartes
could have
responded that either the
proof of a veracious deity
was a
necessary but not a sufficient
condition for immutable certainty or the situations in
question are not aood reasons
to doubt because they rely
to some extent on
forgetfulness.
Kenny maintains that neither
response will suffice to make
Descartes epistemology an adequate
response to skepticism.
However, it is not, he contends,
a circular account.
But Kenny need not commit
himself or Descartes to the
position he does.
There exists an interpretation
of what
Descartes intends by an immutable
state of mind that
'

is

consistent with the rest of Kenny's
account.

The two tex-

tual references made by Kenny both
concern the atheistic
geometer.
in the latter Descartes asserts:
As to the Atheist's knowledge,
it is easy to prove that it is not
immutable and certain.
For, as I have
already in a former place said, in
proportion to the impotence assigned
to the author of his being, the
greater
b e hl s reason for doubting whether
he may not be of such an imperfect
nature as to be deceived in matters
20
which appear most evident to him.
.

.

The former place referred to is the other textual
reference
19
20

Ibid.

pp.

497-498

hr II, P- 245.

(Italics mine)
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made by Kenny where Descarte
s asserts:
atheist can know clearly
tho^H
that the
three angles of a triangle
are equal to two right
angles, I do
1
affirm that on the
Sne hand,
one
hand' such knowledge on
his part
cannot constitute true science,
because
no knowiedge that can be
rendered doubtful should be called science.
21
'

And here there is no mention
of immutable states of
mind.
However, there does exist at
the beginning of his remarks
on this point certain comments
about memory.

Descartes

states
inirciy, when I said that we
could
know nothing with certainty
unless we
were first aware that God existed,
announced in express terms that i' I
referred only to the science apprehending
such conclusions as can recur in
memory
without attending further to the
proofs
which led me to make them.
22

We may recall that there is textual
evidence to suggest that Descartes' responses to his
critics' charges of

circularity, particularly Arnauld

'

s

,

have something to do

with memory, which led some Cartesian
commentators to conclude that Descartes was defending the
veracity
of memory.

We have seen in Chapter

I

that the memory thesis fails both

as an adequately full account of Descartes'
enterprise and
as a means of allowing him to escape circular
reasoning.

21

22

Ibid., p.

39.

Ibid

38

.

,

p

.
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Nonetheless, his responses point to
something going on
which involves memory.
if in the above passage we
interpret Descartes to be maintaining
that the reason the
atheist does not have true knowledge
is that he has no
guarantee that his recollections of
clear and distinct perceptions are certain, we might reasonably
conclude that
Descartes is suggesting that metaphysical
certainty also

guarantees the veracity of correctly remembered
clear and
distinct perceptions.
This in turn suggests, consistent
with Descartes' remarks on the matter and
with the remainder of Kenny's account, that the demonstration
that a

veracious God exists provides us not only with
metaphysical
certainty that all our clear and distinct perceptions
are
true w hen we are attending to them, but also with
meta-

physical certainty that they are psychologically certain
even when we are only (correctly) remembering that
they

were clearly and distinctly perceived.

Thus, metaphysical

certainty entails that all our clear and distinct perceptions are veracious.

It also entails that correctly

remembered clear and distinct perceptions are not psychologically doubtful even though they are no longer being

attended to clearly and distinctly.

This,

how Kenny should have interpreted Descartes

immutable state of mind.

I

'

contend, is

notion of an

Consistent with my explication

of the rest of Kenny's account,

I

offer the following in an

.

)

'
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attempt to draw out a feature
of Kenny's notion of
Cartesian certainty:
(K15)

£ is metaphysically certain for
*

(Et')

(

t

is later than t,

S

and

at t
s

correctly remembers at t' that
£ was
clearly and distinctly perceived
by s
at t, and £ is not psychologically
doubtful for S at t
'

.

None of the three situations described
by Feldman and
Levison cause problems for Kenny's
account as I have suggested it can be explicated.
In the first situation condition (ii) of principle (K9) is not
met and hence Descartes
is no longer metaphysically certain.
in the second situation condition (i) in (K9) is falsified
and hence Descartes
is no longer metaphysically certain.
in the
third, the

first argument for God's existence no longer
provides the

necessary psychological certainty required by
condition
(ii)

of

(K9).

Descartes is therefore no longer meta-

physically certain on the basis of that argument.
We are now in a position to apply the distinctions

ou tli ne(3 thus far for Kenny's account to the questions
that
I

have raised for each interpretation of Descartes being

considered
We saw in considering Gewirth's account that he has no

reason to develop a notion of psychological doubt since, on
his account, it is metaphysical doubt that is raised from
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the very start in
Meditation,!

Kenny explicitly acknowledges

As we have also
seen

.

notion of psychological
doubt in his account,
although he mistakenly
attributes a
similar notion to Gewirth.
We might conclude
from this
that the type of doubt
being raised in Meditation t
is
primarily psychological rather
than strictly metaphysical
2
on Kenny’s view. 3
Unfortunately we
a

^

,

Kenny's response to question

(

1

)

^

i S;

So far
1 have followed
Gewirth
in ^taking Descartes to be
expressing
fundamentally the same doubt in
Third Meditation as in the First.the 24
'

.

,

Since the doubt raised in
Meditation III is quite obviously
metaphysical, according to Kenny,
Descartes is raising
metaphysical doubt in Meditation I
.

In his earlier work Kenny
outlines several steps in

Descartes' program of doubt.

First, Descartes casts doubt

on the veracity of the senses
initially by demonstrating
that they sometimes mislead us.
But since we cannot conclude that it is possible that they
always do so from the

23

It is important to note that in any
account in which one
type of certainty is employed to achieve
a
doubt which corresponds to the first entailssecond, the
the doubt
which corresponds to the second but not
vice-versa
Thus
if in Meditation I a proposition,
is psychologically
£
doubtful, it is also metaphysically doubtful.
tion is, therefore, is the doubt in Meditatio The quesn
marily psychological or solely metaphysical in I prinature?
,

24

Kenny, J ourna 1 of Philosophy

,

p.

6

91.

'
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area™

ardent

which

,

according to Kenny> leads

^

#

skepticism.
dre m ar 9 ument calls in
doubt
an particular
n^^
?
all
sense beliefs and the
S
n
° f COmposite tangible
b^
but it ?o
leaves intact the claim. objects,
there are some other objects that
more
simple and more universal which
are
real and true."
25
C

l

It is the hypothesis of an
omnipotent deceiver which

completes the attack on the senses.

But what additional

beliefs does the hypothesis cast
doubt upon? Kenny mentions in passing the possible
deception involved in understanding simple natures of extension,
size, and place and
in the performance of the simplest
arithmetical operations.
But he does not elaborate further.
To determine
the range

of beliefs over which the omnipotent
deceiver hypothesis

casts doubt we must refer to his later
article in which he
contrasts his view with that of Frankfurt.
We may recall that Frankfurt argues
that the mathe-

matical propositions upon which doubt is cast
in MeditaPaon 1 are not clearly and distinctly perceived.
He offers
three reasons in support of his view.
First, Haldane and
Ross provide a very misleading translation by
combining the

clear

25

truths of the Latin edition with the 'apparent'

Kenny, Descartes

,

p.

32.
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truths of the French
translation to reach 'clear
and
apparent' truths.
Second, in his Conversation
with Burman
Descartes remarks that in
Meditation I he was considering
someone who was just beginning
to philosophize.
Third, in
his replies to the seventh
set of objections Descartes
states that at the end of
Meditation I he had said that
everything could be doubted
which had not been perceived
with sufficient clearness.

Kenny does not respond to the
first point.
with
regard to the second, he claims
that Descartes was referring to philosophical axioms
rather than to simple truths
of
arithmetic.
In response to the third, Kenny
claims
that

Descartes' remarks do not refer to
the entire First Meditation, only to a specific passage
within Meditation T
He
contends that there are several passages
that explicitly
contradict Frankfurt's contention and he
quotes two. The
first is in Meditation V where Descartes
asserts:
.

the nature of my mind is such that
could not prevent myself from holding
them [certain geometric truths] to be
true so long as I conceive them clearly;
and I recollect that even when I was
still strongly attached to the objects
of sense, I counted as the most certain
those truths which I conceived clearly
as regards figures, numbers, and the
other matters which pertain to arithmetic
.

I

.

.
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and geometry, and, in
general,
pure and abstract mathematics. to 26
The second is at the end
of the repl res to the
sixth set
of objections where
Descartes says:

before I had liberated myself
ro - the prejudices of the
senses, I
rightly perceived that two and
three
make five, that if equals be
taken
from equals the remainders are
equal '27
and many similar things.
.

.

.

.

Kenny argues:
We know from the Second Replies
that
some truths are so simple that
they
cannot be thought of without being
doubted [sic]
Since these are so
simple that they cannot be thought
of
without being clearly and distinctly
perceived.
it follows that they
are perceived clearly and distinctly
by all normal adults.
28
.

.

.

.

.

,

Thus, if the mathematical propositions
doubted in Medita-

tion^

are of the sort that are so simple that
they cannot
be thought of without being clearly
and distinctly perceived, then the doubt that is raised
against them can be

nothing less than metaphysical doubt, given
principles
and

(K8)

which

I

(K4)

have attributed to Kenny.

Turning to question (2), Kenny's position is
that the
indubitability of the Cogito is achieved in the following

HR I, p. 180.
Kenny offers his own translation.
It does
not differ appreciably from that of Haldane and Ross.
27
28

HR II, p.

257.

Kenny, Journal of Philosophy

,

p.

692.

,:

,

.
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manner
Do ubt jn g is one kind of
thought; and
hought is defined precisely
as "whatever takes place within
ourselves so
“at we are conscious of it, in so far
as it is an object of our
consciousness
Therefore, "if i doubt I know that
I
° abt
follows for Descartes, from
the
1 1 1 ° n he has
9 iven °f thought, of
S
?
^
which doubting is a species or
mode.
Descartes therefore makes it true
by
definition that if i think, I know
that I think.
it is here that the
indubitability of the premise of
"
29
cogito ergo sum " is to be found.

"

,

.

The structure of the Cogito is as
follows;

At any moment when Descartes is
engaged
in a conscious activity - say, when
he
is thinking, doubting, willing, or
sensing - the proposition " cogito " is true.
Because thought is by definition known
to its agent, the proposition is not
true, but also indubitable to
Descartes; for what is known cannot
be doubted (HR II, p. 276).
The premise
cogito " in conjunction with the presupposition that it is impossible for
that which is thinking to be nonexistent
the conclusion "sum".
Since the
premise is indubitable and the conclusion follows by the light of nature,
30
the conclusion too is indubitable.
#

But we might ask of Kenny,

"in what sense is the Cogito

indubitable, psychologically or metaphysically?"

Although

the textual evidence offered thus far points to the
former,

surprisingly enough it is the latter which Kenny has in
29
30

Kenny
Ibid

.

Descartes
,

p

.

51

P-

49.
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mind.

He argues:

The propositions never
called into
in Descart es' system
are
?hofhh
those that report the
contents of
the mmd, those that
express the
mind s consciousness of
its own
thoughts and ideas.
Thus, the
premise "co^j^" and the
presence
of the idea of God are
not challenged
by the second-order doubt.
^
31
Thus,

coaito is the first proposition
for which Descartes
achieves metaphysical certainty.
Sum, on the other hand,
is only psychologically
certain because it is derived
by

using the axiom 'to think, one
must exist’ which on Kenny's
view is open to second-order doubt.
What else does the Cogito achieve
for Descartes?
Kenny suggests three things:
The cogito provided Descartes with
three things.
First, it established
as certain his own existence.
Second, it suggested to him a
general criterion for truth and
certainty.
Third, it enabled Descartes to
discover his own nature.
I think,
therefore I am.
But what am I? a
32
thinking thing.
.

.

The second achievement of the Cogito leads
us to

question

Kenny's position with respect to the role

(3).

which the principle of clarity and distinctness
plays in
Descartes' enterprise is ambiguous.
There is textual
31 T

32

Ibid^

.

,

pp.

Ibid

.

,

p

.

•

.

185-186.
63

.
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evidence that points to the
principle as establishing
the
psychological certainty of certain
propositions, among
Which would be that God
exists and is no deceiver.
At
one point Kenny states:
Clear and distinct perception."
an
expression he [Descartes] uses
frequently
Y
cannot be regarded as a synonym
intuition" since the conclusionsfor
of
deductions may be clearly and
distinctly
Y
perceived no less than self-evident
truths.

'

33

And at other points Kenny asserts:
•

•

;

anything can be doubted unless it

is clearly and distinctly
perceived.

.

34
.

all clear and distinct perception
not lust intuition, leads to a
certainty
that excludes simultaneous doubt.
.

.

.

Presumably the doubt being referred to
is psychological
doubt and the certainty, metaphysical
certainty.

But there is also textual evidence that
suggests that
the principle of clarity and distinctness
plays no role in

establishing the existence of God.

in one passage, parts

of which have been quoted earlier, Kenny
indicates that the

propositions never called into metaphysical doubt
are those
that report the contents of the mind.
Among those proposi-

33_,

34

35

Ibid^

.

,

p.

175.

Ibid

.

,

p

181

Ibid
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.
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tions are coaito and the
presence of the idea of
God.
And
it is the existence of the
idea of God that
establishes the
existence of God.
This passage suggests
that it is the
metaphysical certainty of certain
propositions that enables
Descartes to be psychologically
certain that God
is no

deceiver

Additional textual evidence seems to
support this interpretation.
Consider the following comments
by Kenny in
various places:
intuition is said to be produced
"by the light of reason alone."
37
*

*

*

Once something has been shown to me
by
natural light, Descartes says, I cannot
doubt it; but another person who sees
less clearly may doubt the very same
38
proposition.

There are, however, some axioms that no
one can doubt at any stage of his life. 39
There is then, a class of specially
indubitable axioms.
smaller than the
class of axioms that can be shown by
natural light to anybody at any stage. 40
.

36
37
38

39

Ibid., PP
Ibid.
,

.

185

P-

176

P-

179.

P-

180.

,
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These remarks suggest that
one aspect of reason
is not open
to even metaphysical
doubt.
One additional passage
seems
to support this
suggestion.

Descartes does not offer the
tY 0f
?° d 35 a 9 round for acceptIn
,
ing the truth
of an intuition.
it is
not because even the
veracity of God
wo.il not suffice to
show that the
intuition may not be, absolutely
speakina
beca e the sir"P le intuition 9
bv itseif provides both
by
and logically the best psychologically
grounds for
rUth
Thus there is no
circle.
I
Deduction
is called into question, and deduction is
vindicated by
intuition.
The truth of particular
1
3 iS n0V r Called in
question,
onlv
lythe universal? trustworthiness
of
intuition, and in vindicating
this
universai trustworthiness only
individual
intuitions are utilized.
There is no
sing e faculty, or single
exercise of a
acuity, that is vindicated by
its own
J
•

•

•

a

^

r

cilcl^V^

:

'

'

^

use.

4i

Is Kenny,

after all, a proponent of the
partial autonomy of reason for Descartes?
in spite of the textual
evidence that suggests so, I don't
believe that is what
Kenny has in mind.
Rather, his response to question
(3)
is that Descartes' efforts in
Meditation II have provided
him with the basis for determining which
of his perceptions
are indubitable.
That basis is the clarity and distinctness with which specific propositions are
perceived.
The

principle of clarity and distinctness then
indicates which

41

Ibid

.

,

pp.

194-195.
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specific propositions are
psychologically certain for
Descartes.
We should recall that
Kenny does not indicate
any place in the Meditations
or elsewhere where
Descartes
raises psychological doubt
about specific propositions.
This is why he claims that
the veracity of intuition
is
never called into question.
Thus, no single faculty
or
exercise of faculty is called
into question.
That is not
to say that intuition is
thereby in no need of any
justification.
For it is the use of intuition
with respect
to

specific propositions such as the
Cogito (and the existence
of the idea of God) that
demonstrates, to use Kenny's
words,

"that simple intuition by itself
provides both

psychologically and logically the best
grounds for accepting its truth." But given that
the principle of clarity
and distinctness extends to deduction,
deduction
and the

universal trustworthiness of intuition is
what is called
into question.
And this brings us to question (4).
In my explication of the distinction
that Kenny makes

between psychological doubt and metaphysical
doubt we
already saw his response to question (4).
The doubt raised
in the Circle Passage is a first-order
doubt about only the

general proposition that 'whatever

I

clearly and distinctly

perceive is true' and that first-order doubt casts secondorder doubt only on specific clearly and distinctly
per-

ceived propositions.

I

suggested that principle

(K8)
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captures Kenny's intentions.

Kenny'S response to part of
question
evident from my earlier
discussion

(5)

is

also

of hls distinction

between psychological certainty
and metaphysical
certainty.
The demonstration that a
non-deceiving God exists
removes
the only reason Descartes
has for psychologically
doubting
the general proposition
that 'whatever I clearly
and distinctly perceive is true'.
The demonstration makes
the

general proposition psychologically
certain for Descartes.
All second-order doubt with
respect to specific propositions clearly and distinctly
perceived is removed. Condition (ii) of principle (K9) is met.
Given principle (Kl)
any proposition that is clearly
and distinctly perceived
by Descartes is psychologically
certain
,

for him.

whenever condition

(i)

of

<K9)

Thus,

is met with respect to a

particular proposition, that proposition
is metaphysically
certain for Descartes.
The demonstration that a non-deceiving
God exists

also guarantees the psychological certainty
of correctly

remembered clear and distinct perceptions.
time,

I

if,

at a later

correctly remember clearly and distinctly
perceiv-

ing that p, given principle

(K15)
,

cally certain for me.

£ remains psychologi-

Thus, situations in which Descartes

is not attending to propositions clearly and
distinctly do

not defeat either the psychological or metaphysical
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certainty of those
propositions for hi*. He
has achieved
mmutable state of mind that
I contend Kenny
should
have attributed to
Descartes.
But how is all Of this
to be achieved?
Quite simply/
each of the steps in the
arguments for God's
existence and
non-deceiving nature can be
perceived clearly and
distinctly.
Thus, given principle
(Kl), each is
psychologically
certain for Descartes.
He also perceives clearly
and distinctly the logical relationship
between the premises and
their respective conclusions.
The relationship in each
argument, then, is also
psychologically certain
for

Descartes.

Thus, the conclusions that
follow from their

respective premises are also
psychologically certain for
Descartes.
These conclusipns are employed,
in turn,
to

demonstrate that whatever he clearly
and distinctly perceives is true. And this general
proposition is thereby

psychologically certain for him.

Since it was the psycho-

logical dubitability of this general
proposition which cast
second-order, metaphysical doubt on
particular clearly and
distinctly perceived propositions, once
it has been demonstrated that this general proposition is
psychologically
certain for Descartes, it is no longer
psychologically

doubtful for him.

Thus, it can no longer cast second-order

doubt on particular propositions.

Thus, all propositions

which are psychologically certain for Descartes
become

:
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metaphysically certain for him.

Kenny conclude s

It is by now clear why
is no circle in Descartes's there

argument
he clear and distinct
perceptions
used
the proof of God's
existence
are perceptions of
particular propositions, such as that ideas
cannot be
ore ^r^ct than their
archetypes
R I, p. 163).
The veracity of God
is used to establish not
any particular clear and distinct
perception, Sut
the general proposition
that whatever
Sarly and dlstinctl perceive
y
is
true
42

m

(

Kenny also contends:

Provided that in the proofs for
the
existence of God no appeal is
made to
remembered perceptions, there is
no
circularity i n establishing the
reliability of remembered perceptions
by
appeal to the veracity of God,
and
Descartes is careful to insist that
his proofs of God's existence
do not
depend on memory in this way.
43
In his earlier work Kenny
proceeds to demonstrate that

although no circularity is involved
with his interpretation
of Descartes' enterprise, there
are other problems
for

Descartes, among them the lack of

a

criterion for distin-

guishing genuinely clear and distinct
perceptions from
apparent ones.
I do not intend to discuss

these problems.

My task here is to determine whether
Kenny's account, as I
have presented it, is reasonably consistent
with the text

Kenny, Journal of Philosophy
Kenny, Descartes, p. 189.

,
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and succeeds in allowing
Descartes to avoid
circular
reasoning as Kenny contends.

Before considering what
tion to Kenny's account

x

take to be a serious
objec-

would like to raise three
points.
The first is that Kenny
argues that the doubt
raised in
M editation I is metaphysical
in nature.
doing so he
places himself in opposition
to Frankfurt,
since his
position with respect to question
(1) does
I

m

not have any

bearing on the success or failure
of his account in
enabling Descartes to avoid
circular reasoning, I shall
reserve comment until chapter V
where

I

present my own

interpretation of Descartes' enterprise.
But it is worth
noting that Kenny's explicit
mention of psychological doubt
is unnecessary.

since such doubt does not play
a pivotal
role in his interpretation of
Descartes' enterprise,
his

account, like Gewirth's, could have
been explicated solely
in terms of psychological certainty,
clarity and distinctness, and metaphysical doubt and
certainty.
The second is that Kenny does not
provide a satisfac-

tory explanation of why certain
propositions such as
cogito escape second-order, metaphysical
doubt.
Given the
nature of metaphysical doubt on Kenny's
account, as I have

explicated it, every proposition that is clearly
and distinctly perceived should be open to such doubt.
If
the

.

:

.
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proposition coaito is a mender
of the set of all
clearly
and distinctly perceived
propositions, then according
to
principle (K8) it should also
be metaphysically
doubtful
for Descartes until he is
psychologically certain that
God
exists and is no deceiver.
Principle
<K8]

Kenny

is not at fault.

interpretation of metaphysical
doubt is inconsistent with his position on the
epistemic status of the
Coqito
s

.

Finally, as

noted earlier in presenting
the distinction between first-order and
second-order doubt, Kenny
suggests that Descartes found certain
propositions genetically doubtful while severally
indubitable. The suggestion
is very misleading.
Propositions may be severally indubitable in a first-order way, but they
are also severally
dubitable in a second-order way. To
see this we need only
to consider principle (K8)
It provides sufficient
I

and

necessary conditions for second-order
doubt; and those conditions are articulated with respect to
specific propositions
This last point is made by Fred Feldman
and Arnold

Levison in the aforementioned article criticizing
Kenny's
account as it is presented in his earlier work.

it leads

them to suggest that Kenny, in response, might
say that his

explanation of second-order doubt was defective.
contend

They

.

.
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What he [Kenny] should
have said ahonf
second-order doubt was not
that if °f
Ut Way ° f doul=ting
particuLr°f
lar intuitions, but that
it is a susn that some intuition
p
might be false. Thus, to or other
say that
Descartes had second-order
doubt about
nS
in this sense would
be

--

to

ff

'

sayf

'

Descartes suspects (Ep) (he
intuits
& £ is false)
Kenny might then £
claim that (a) is
consistent with:
(b) -(E£)
(Descartes intuits p
& he suspects that
p is
(a)
_

false)

.

Then Kenny might claim that
Descartes'
0r gi
1 P er P lexi ty was just
that (a)
i
i?f
and (b) were true of him.
That is, he
suspected that some of his intuitions
might be false, but there wasn't
any
one
particular, such that he suspected that it was false.
44

m

Although Kenny does not explicitly
acknowledge this sugges
tion in his later article, there
is some textual evidence
to suggest that he agrees with
Feldman and Levison thus
far.
Kenny asserts:
Consider the proposition "I cannot doubt what I clearly and distinctly
perceive." On Descartes's view, this
is true if it means
(3)

For all £, if i clearly and distinctly
perceive that £, then I cannot doubt
that £

It is false if it means
(4)

44

I

cannot doubt that (for all £, if

Feldman and Levison, o£. cit., p. 494.
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I c l earl y and
distinctly ^perceive
e ive
that £ then
45
£
,

.

)

Substituting 'intuits £' for
'clearly and distinctly
perceive that £', notice
the virtual equivalence
of
3
and
(b) from the two
passages just quoted on the
one hand, and
(a) and the negation
of
,

)

on the other.

(4)

Now Feldman and Levison
argue that this interpretation
of Descartes is open to
objection for at least two
reasons.
First, it is not supported
by textual evidence.
In the
Circle Passage they claim that
Descartes is explicitly
speaking of doubting the
proposition that two and three
together make five.
Thus, they conclude that (b)
is not
true of Descartes.
And if b is not true, then
neither is
Kenny's (3).
Feldman and Levison also argue:
<

)

Secondly, if Descartes does suspect that some of his intuitions
are
false, then, even if there is
none in
particular at which he can point his
finger, still he cannot trust any
of
them.
For on this interpretation he
suspects that some intuition or other
might be false, but he doesn't know
which ones.
Therefore, each one of
his intuitions is tainted by this
46
second-order doubt.
take Feldman and Levison to be
suggesting that although
Descartes is unable to entertain any
instantiation of (a),
I

nevertheless each of his clear and distinct
perceptions is
Kenny, Journal of Philosophy

Feldman and Levison,

op>.

,

p.

cit., p.

689.
494.

,
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open to doubt, albeit of
a second-order
nature.
conclude
us

i1:

seems that Descartes

did
11 in question the
truth of indivilti0n ?' contrar y to Kenny's
S en Y 1S ri< ht that
?
Descartes
S
did
?
id not doubt
them when he was expliY en er aining them but neverthelesi he
h
a
J
less
doubted
them.
if
only way that metaphysical this is thp
doubt is
understood,
-I

-i

,

They

eSL

'

Kenny's arguments fail

47

In "A Reply by Anthony
Kenny" 48 Kenny acknowledges

their point that second-order
doubt could be doubt about
specific propositions, but he
claims that Descartes in
fact
raises only the generic doubt.
He contends that the
Circle
Passage supports rather than
refutes his claim, because

Descartes explicitly says he
judged afterwards that it
was
possible to doubt and the doubt
is directed toward the
generic description of "what seemed
most obvious."
Now even if we grant Kenny his
interpretation of the
Circle Passage, he has not succeeded
in demonstrating that
Feldman and Levison are wrong in
contending that Kenny's
account is not supported by Cartesian
text.
We may recall
that Kenny contends that metaphysical
doubt is raised in
Meditation I
And in arguing against Frankfurt's
position,
.

he claims that clearly and distinctly
perceived proposi-

47
48

Ibid

.

Kenny
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tions are called into
doubt in th at Meditation
One
reason for the claim is
that some mathematical
proposition s
are so simple that they
cannot be thought of
without being
clearly and distinctly
perceived, among them
the proposition that two and three
make five.
But in Meditation I
Descartes states:

how do I know that I am
not
SVery time that 1 add two
fnd ih
and
three, or count the sides
of a
square, or judge of things
yet
1 ^ Snythin
9 sim P ld r can be
imagined?
4J
•

.

.

e

Here Descartes is raising
doubt about specific
proposition.
Given that Kenny maintains
that metaphysical doubt
is
raised in Med itation I he
cannot consistently maintain
that such doubt is not raised
by Descartes against
specific
propositions.
,

With respect to Feldman and
Levison's second reason
for rejecting (b)
and therefore Kenny's
(3), Kenny gives
no direct response.
However, in his later article
he
addresses the issue tangentially.
As we saw earlier, Kenny
contends

Descartes can entertain the thought
(1) For some p>, I clearly and
distinctly
perceive that £, but not p.
but he cannot entertain any thought
that would be an existential instantiati on of (1)
50
.

49
50
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Note the equivalence of

With respect to

(a)

(1)

and Feldman and
Levison's

(

a)

.

interpreted Feldman and
Levison to
be suggesting that although
Descartes is unable to
entertain any existential
instantiation of ,a)
(and therefore
Kenny's 1 )), nevertheless
each clearly and distinctly
perceived proposition is open to
a second-order doubt
With regard to (1), (and
therefore (a)), Kenny argues
Is there an inconsistency
in
accepting 1 while rejecting
every
possible instantiation of it?
there is; but given the human Perhaps
condiion it is a harmless and
necessary
inconsistency.
Every one of us, I
imagine, would wish to subscribe
to
I

,

(

(

)

For some £, I believe that
p, but
—
not jo.
Yet
acce P t an Y instantiation of
would involve one in a version of this
Moore's
paradox.
The inconsistency to which the
doubting Descartes is committed is
no
worse than that of anyone who believes
that some of his beliefs are false.
(5)

?

take Kenny to be suggesting that,
in response to Feldman
and Levison's point, Descartes'
inability to entertain
I

existential instantiations of
fic propositions.

(1)

blocks doubt about speci-

His analogy to belief

I

take to be an

attempt to demonstrate the reasonableness of
his inter-

pretation of Descartes.
Kenny himself admits to

But the analogy is misleading.
a

distinction for Descartes between

beliefs and clear and distinct perceptions.
51
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,
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JUO t;iLion tnat some
of my

beliefs are false without that
admission affecting my
conviction with respect to specific
beliefs is that ray belief
claims do not carry the force
of conviction that
clear and
distinct perceptions do. A more
appropriate analogy would
be between clear and distinct
perceptions and knowledge
claims.

When Descartes entertains the
proposition

expressed by Kenny's

(1)

it is tantamount to
entertaining

the proposition that:
(5')

Now if

(Ep>)

(Descartes claims to know that
p,
and -£)

suspect that some of my knowledge
claims are
false, even though I don’t know which
ones, it
i

puts all my

specific knowledge claims in doubt.
to clear and distinct perceptions,

Similarly with respect
if Descartes suspects

that some of his clear and distinct
perceptions are faulty,
that suspicion makes each such perception
questionable.
The impact of this on Kenny's account is
serious.

may recall that Kenny claims there is no
circle in
Descartes' arguments because the clear and distinct
per-

ceptions employed in the proofs of God's veracity are
52

Kenny, Descartes

,

p.
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perceptions of specific propositions
and the veracity of
God is used to establish
the veracity

of not any specific

proposition but the general
proposition that whatever
is
clearly and distinctly perceived
is true.
But my contention is that the only coherent
explication of Kenny's
interpretation that is consistent
with the Cartesian text
commits Descartes to doubting
specific clear and distinct
perceptions. And if I am correct,
it is no longer

clear
that on Kenny's account there
is no circle in Descartes'
arguments

While

suggested earlier that Kenny's
account could
be salvaged from the untenable
position which he insists on
maintaining with respect to the immutability
of Cartesian
certainty, I see no similar escape from
the second predicament which Feldman and Levison raise
for his interpretation
of second-order, metaphysical doubt.
Thus, I would now
like to turn to a more promising account
which makes a much
different distinction between types of doubt
and certainty
in Descartes' epistemology.

In

I

Epistemic Appraisal and the Cartesian Circle"'^

Fred Feldman distinguishes between terms of
'practical'

Fred Feldman, "Epistemic Appraisal and the Cartesian
Circle," Philosophical Studies Vol. 27 (1975) pp. 37 - 55

.
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epistemic appraisal which
include ’practical
knowledge’
practical certainty’ and
’practical doubt’,

and terms of

metaphysical’ epistemic appraisal
which include 'metaphysical knowledge’, 'metaphysical

certainty’ and ’meta-

physical doubt’.

m

order to determine Feldman’s
position
with respect to each of the
five questions that I
have
raised for each account of
Descartes’ enterprise, it
is
necessary to first provide a
careful account of these
distinctions which he makes.

Pointing to a passage in which
Descartes asserts:
But we must note the distinction
sized by me in various passages, emphabetween
the practical activities of
our life
and an enquiry into truth; for,
when it
is a case of regulating our
life, it
would assuredly be stupid not to*
trust
the senses, and those sceptics
were
rid i c ulous who so neglected human
a f airs that they had to be
preserved
by their friends from tumbling down
precipices.
it was for this reason that
somewhere I announced that no one in
his
sound mind seriously doubted about
such
matters; but when we raise an enquiry
into what is the surest knowledge
which
the human mind can obtain, it is
clearly
unreasonable to refuse to treat them as
doubtful, nay even to reject them as
false, so as to allow us to become aware
that certain other things, which cannot
be thus rejected, are for this very
reason more certain, and in actual
54
truth better known by us.

54
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Feldman contends that the
distinction Descartes
makes
between practical activities
and an enquiry into
truth
suggests that certain
propositions are sufficiently
certain for practical
activities but insufficiently
certain
for an enquiry into
truth.
The certainty in the
former
case Feldman calls practical
certainty:
P ro P osition is sufficiently
certain^
certain
to be accepted for
practical
iS " bey ° n ^ P rac tical
oubt
Another way to put this would
Y that
iS "Poetically certain".
55

do^^oth U
.

But propositions that are
practically certain may not
be
sufficiently certain for the
kind of enquiry which Descartes is prepared to undertake
in the Meditations
Feldman suggests:
.

sucn propositions are open
to
metaphysical doubt". They are
metaphysically uncertain". Descartes
suggests that when we notice that
some
propositions are thus open to metaphysical doubt, we may become aware
that some
others are "more certain" and
"better
known".
These propositions, I believe
may be described as being
"metaphysically
ThSY are " beyond metaphysical
doubt"?
56
*

'

*

^

.

'

These distinctions allow Feldman to
provide an explanation of Descartes' response to his
critics’ claim that an

55
56
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atheist can know that the
three angles of a
triangle are
equal to two right angles
without knowing that
God exists
We may recall that Descartes’
response was:
ath eist can
that the three angles of know clearly
a
S
equal to two right angles trianqle
I dn nrn- a
I merely affirm that,
on the other hand 7 '
led9e ° n hlS Part cannot
cSnstitute°t Ue sclence because
no knowf
?^d
c n be rendered
doubtful
f
should be called
science.
Since he is
U
e
an Atheist he cannot
be
sure ?b^
that h'
he is not deceived in the
hings that seem most evident
to him
as has been sufficiently
57
shown.
'

'

'

Equating true science with metaphysical
knowledge, Feldman
contends
Descartes' view about the atheistic
geometer seems to be this. The
atheistic geometer does have practical
knownd hence the Practical certainty,
f
of the fact that the angles of
a triangle
are equal to two right angles.
Perhaps
his certainty derives from the fact
that
he has intuited this fact about
triangles
clearly and distinctly. However, the
atheistic geometer does not know very
much about God's nature. From his
point
of view, though he doesn't believe
it,
there might be a deceptive God.
if he
should gain some reason to believe that
there is such a God, then the justification for his belief in the geometric
fact would be undermined.
Hence, although
his justification is not in fact undermined in this way, it is not as secure
as it might be.
The atheistic geometer,
therefore, does not have metaphysical
certainty, or metaphysical knowledge,

57
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fact that the angles
of a
are equal to two
right angles. 58

tfi^i
riangle

Feldman proceeds to offer
otter an anai
analysis of the terms
of
practical epistemic
appraisal.
th fundamental concept
of
practical? epistemic
appraisal is
Pt
practical cer?aSy
A??ho
Although
! will not offer
a
term 1 can sa y a f ewdefinition
things
that may serve to make
its meaning
clearer.
To say that a proposition
£/ is a practical certainty
for a
person, S, at a time, t,
is to sav
roughly, that S is justified
in
£ at u~' ° r that S has th e
epistemic right" to believe
p at t
t ha t
£ is either self-evidSnt o?'
adequately evidenced for S at
59
t.
‘

’

'

Feldman makes three points
about practical certainty.
First, it is a purely
epistemic concept and not a
psychological one.
in this his account is
clearly to be contrasted with those of Frankfurt,
Gewirth, and Kenny.
x have
some comments to make on this
point later. The second
point is that practical certainty
requires no greater
degree of certainty than does
ordinary knowledge.
"Anyone
who knows anything (m the
ordinary sense of 'knows') has

practical certainty with respect to
whatever it is he
knows.
Third, propositions that are
practically certain

58
59

60
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for a person need have no
practical value for that

person
Feldman then introduces some
related concepts.
(1)

is a practical possibility
for S
at - =
“£ is not a

£

Practical cer-

df

tainty for
(2)

£ is

a

=

S

at t.

practical impossibility for S
df ~£ is a Practical certainty

at for S at t.
(3)

£ is

practical uncertainty for s
at — =
as not a practical cer3f £
tainty for S at t.
a

,

Feldman also intends for the following
entailments to hold
(1

)

£ is
at t

practical certainty for S
only if £ is a practical possia

bility for
(2')

£ is

S at t.

practical impossibility for S
at t only if
£ is a practical uncertainty for s at t.
a

Thus,

these concepts fall into the traditional
square of
opposition

Practical
Certainty

Practical
Impossibility

contraries
c

o

.

n.

t

,

t

c

o

r

r

a

,

d lc

t

o

o

r

r

i

i

e

e

Practical
subcontraries
Possibility

s

s

Practical
Uncertainty

.

,

,
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Feldman contends:
The concept of practical
doubt
can be related rather
neatly to the
concept of practical certainty?
?o
a
r ° P0Siti0n iS
ract
"P
ically
dSubtfu?”
oubtful for
fn
a person at a time
is
iS then practicall
uny
certain for
or him.
To say that it is
Y
CtlCal doubt " for him is
P
to
say thft yt 13 practlcall
y certain for
him

h

61

Feldman also puts special
emphasis on definition
He asserts:

(1

The concept of practical
i
bility, defined in (1), will possiplay an
important role in my argument.
i belie ve that this concept is a
fairly
familiar one, often called
"epistemic
possibility". we make use of this
concept frequently.
We might say, for example, of a suspect in an as
yet unsolved murder case, that he might
be
guilty
This is not to say either that
it is logically possible, or
that it
causally possible that he is guilty is
Fo
rmer is utterly uninteresting
J the ?°
and
latter is something that we may
be
no position to affirm.
Rather
it is to say that "for all we
know" he
is guilty.
We are not certain that he
is not guilty.
in my terminoloay, we
could say that it is a practical
possibility for us that he is guilty.
62
,

.

.

m

Feldman concludes his analysis of the
terms of practical epistemic appraisal by considering
two principles:

^
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If

(4)

E is

a practical certainty
for S

at t, and
E entails a then a is a
practical certainty for s
at t.
If £ is a practical
,

(5)

certainty'for

s

at t, and the proposition
that £
entails a is a practical
certainty
for S at t, and S infers
£ from £
at t, then
£ is a practical certainty
for S at t.
He rejects

(4

.

)

The problem with

(4) is that it makes
practical certainty of everything
entailed by a practical certainty,
even
if S fails to see the entailment.
From
this it follows that every
necessary
truth is practically certain for
anyone
who is practically certain of
anything.
This seems implausible.
63

a

Feldman contends that

contained

m

(5)

captures Descartes’ intentions

the following passages.

in Rule III Descartes

asserts

knowing by deduction, by which
we understand all necessary inference
from other facts that are known with
64
certainty.
.

.

.

In Rule VII he asserts:
if I have first found out by
separate mental operations what the
relation is between the magnitudes A
and B, then what between B and C, ~
between £ and D, and finally between
•

63
64

•

.

Ibid.
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— an<3 E that does not
seeinq what

^
H between

,

en-b^-M

FiHd
—

__
65

And in Rule XI

them, it is useful to
run t-ho™
a continuous and
uninterruptJS

ST'USSf'r"
f
ce rSin?

ac^of"

"S!

9 .°“. kn ° wied9e
66

Feldman argues:

Descartes apparently means
to suggest
9
that a person gams
"knowledge by deSeVeral =onditlS„r
arlfu^in^
1
° r ° ne
he mu st have
"cerfai'n
a
certain iknowledge"
of the premises
For another, he must make
a "necessary
Y
inference" from these premises
?o?he
conclusion.
in this connection,
Desr
a
S
S eral references to
what
he calls
cans "aa continuous
co t
and uninterrunb^d
movement of thought” from the
c^ar and
perception of the premises to
?
ft!
the Ciear and distinct
perception of
the conclusion.
67

“

'

And principle

(5)

is what Feldman proposes
for the transfer

of practical certainty.

Feldman next provides an analysis
of the terms of
metaphysical epistemic appraisal.
He states:

65 xu
6
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The fundamental concept here is "p is
a metaphysical certainty for S at t".
Roughly, to say that a proposition~is
a metaphysical certainty for a person
is to say that it is absolutely certain
for him - beyond even the most hyperbolic doubt.
Not even the "very least
ground of suspicion" can be found
against it. A proposition is a metaphysical certainty for a person at a
time only if he is then "maximally
justified" in believing it.
The requirements for metaphysical certainty
are thus of the same kind as, but considerably more stringent than, the
68
requirements for practical certainty.

Feldman makes two points about metaphysical certainty.
First,

it is a purely epistemic concept.

Like practical

certainty it has no psychological component.

Second,

propositions that are metaphysically certain for a person
need not have any metaphysical content.

Provided that cer-

tain conditions are met, any proposition can be meta-

physically certain.
Feldman then introduces some additional terms of

metaphysical epistemic appraisal.
(

6

)

£ is

a

metaphysical possibility for
-£ is not a metaphysical

at t

certainty for
(

7

)

£ is

a

certainty for

Ibid

at t

metaphysical impossibility

for S at t =

68

S

-p is a metaphysical

_

S

at t

S

>

.
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(8)

£ is

a

at -

=

metaphysical uncertainty for
s
ls
not
a metaphysical cerdf £

tainty for

s at t.

These concepts also fall into the
traditional square of
opposition and definition (6) captures
a concept of epis
temic possibility for Feldman.
There are also certain
connections between the concepts of
practical epistemic
appraisal and those of metaphysical epistemic
appraisal
that Feldman stipulates.
(10)

£ is

metaphysical certainty for S
t
> £ is a practical certainty
for S at t (but not vice versa)
£ is a practical uncertainty for S
a
-

(11)

—

at i
* £ is a metaphysical uncertainty
for S at t.
(

12

)

2 is

a

at t

—

practical possibility for S
£ is a metaphysical possi-

bility for

s

at t.

Feldman then proceeds to explain how, on his account,

Descartes intends for one proposition to cast doubt upon
another.

He suggests:

Descartes holds that a given proposition
does not have to be certain in order to
make another uncertain.
I take this to
mean that even if £ is only a practical
possibility, and not at all a practical
certainty, it can still suffice to make
2 a metaphysical uncertainty. An example
of this sort of case is given, once again,
by the atheistic geometer.
Since he does
not have practical certainty that a
deceptive God does not exist, it is a
practical possibility for him that one

,
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does
Furthermore, if he did have
practrcai certainty of the
existence
a deceptive God, then
his clear
and distinct perception
that the
S ° f a trlangle are
equal to two
r?St angles would be, from
right
an
emic point of view, worthless. episFor
in that case, the practical
certainty
of the proposition that God
is a decei ver wouid "defeat" or
"neutralize"
the evidence for the proposition
that
the angles of a triangle are
equal to
two right angles.
He would no longer
in that case
have practical certainty
of this latter proposition.
Perhaps we can understand this
relation better by reflecting on
the
epistemic effect of adding the
proposition that God is a deceiver to
the
evidence the geometer has for his
belief
in the proposition, r, that the
angles
a triangle are equal to two
right
angles.
There is a set of propositions,
_, that constitutes the evidence uoon
which the geometer bases his belief in
r.
Every member of E is a practical
certainty for him, and their conjunction
is sufficient to justify his belief
in
r, thus making r a practical certainty
for him, too.
But if d, the proposition that God is a deceiver, were added
to E, then the conjunction of d and the
members of E would no longer be sufficient to make r a practical certainty
for the geometer.
This is so because
d says, in effect, that God is able and
willing to make propositions like r
false even when evidence like E is - true.
The more reason one has to believe in
yi,
the less reason he has to believe
,

,

Feldman is now in a position to suggest the following

principle for how a given proposition is made meta-

69
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physically uncertain by another proposition that
is practically possible.
(9)

£ is
t

metaphysical uncertainty for S
if and only if there is a propo-

a

sition, £, such that
tical possibility for

^ were

if

(i)

£ is

S at

t;

a

prac-

and (ii)

practical certainty for S
at t, that would defeat the practical
certainty of p for S at t, thus making

£

a

a

practical uncertainty for

S

at t.

And he stipulates further:
(13)

£ casts metaphysical doubt on £ for S
at t if and only if q is a practical
possibility for S at t, and is such
that if it were a practical certainty
for S at t, that would defeat the

practical certainty of £ for S at t,
thereby making £ a practical uncertainty for S at t.
We are now in a position to determine Feldman's posi-

tion with respect to questions

(1)

through

(5)

Although

Feldman does not specifically discuss the doubt raised in

Meditation

I

,

it is fairly easy to determine his position

given his discussion of the distinctions between the terms
of practical epistemic appraisal and those of metaphysical

epistemic appraisal and the textual evidence he cites in
support of those distinctions.
In his replies to the fifth set of objections where,

on Feldman's view, Descartes is distinguishing practical

.
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certainty from metaphysical
certainty, he asserts,
for this reason that
somewhere 1 announced

"

It was

that no one in
his sound mind seriously
doubted about such matters,
.70
Descartes is referring to the
closing remarks of his
Sffioesis preceding the Meditations.
The indication is that
the entire Me ditations is
concerned, not with
practical
doubt, but with metaphysical
doubt.
.

.

.

m

his replies to the seventh
set of objections Descartes asserts:
I said at the end of
Meditation I
that everything which I had not
yet
comprehended with sufficient clearness
could be doubted by us
But I did
so because there the question
was about
only that supreme kind of doubt
which,
I have insisted, is
metaphysical,
hyperbolical and not to be transferred
to the sphere of the practical
needs
° t life by any means.
71
.

.

.

Given Feldman's distinction between
practical doubt and
metaphysical doubt, and given that the
Meditations is con-

cerned with an "enquiry into truth,"
Feldman is committed
to maintaining that practical doubt
is not what Descartes
is raising in Meditation I.
Thus, Feldman is aligned with
Gewirth and Kenny and in opposition to Frankfurt
with
respect to question (1)

?0

71

HR II, p. 206.
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,
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266
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Turning to question (2), Feldman's
position is that
the coaito is metaphysically
certain for Descartes.
The
only proposition that has the
potential to cast metaphysical doubt on other propositions
which are practically
certain is that 'God is a deceiver'.
Yet, with respect to
the Co gito Descartes explicitly
maintains
,

that even the

practical possibility that God is
defeat the certainty of the Cogito

a

deceiver does not

.

But there is some deceiver or other,
very powerful and very cunning, who"
ever employs his ingenuity in
deceiving me
Then without doubt I
exist also if he deceives me, and let
him deceive me as much as he will, he
can never cause me to be nothing so
long as I think that I am something.
.

^

In Feldman's terminology Descartes is
saying that even if

the proposition that God is a deceiver
were practically

certain for him, it would not defeat the
practical certainty that he exists. According to the
conditions that
Feldman has established for the concepts of
metaphysical

epistemic appraisal, that he exists is not

a

metaphysical

uncertainty for Descartes whenever he entertains the
propo
sition because the proposition that God is

a

deceiver does

not cast metaphysical doubt on the proposition that
he

exists.

Thus, given definition

(8),

metaphysically certain for Descartes.

that he exists is

:
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Similarly, certain other propositions
which, if
perceived at all, must be perceived
clearly and distinctly,
escape metaphysical doubt.
These include, not the
first
principles which many Cartesian
commentators view as
escaping the doubt raised in the
Circle Passage, but propositions which express current mental
acts such as "I am now
thinking."
In this Feldman is in agreement
with
Kenny.

We

may recall that Kenny also maintained
that the propositions
never called into question by Descartes
are those
that

report the contents of the mind or those that
express the
mind s consciousness of its own thoughts and
ideas.

What the Cogito and other such metaphysically
certain

propositions suggest is a rule of evidence for
Descartes,
namely, that whatever he clearly and distinctly
perceives
is true.

But the rule, unlike the Cogito

,

does succumb to

the doubt raised by the deceptive God hypothesis.

Feldman

contends
He [Descartes] is right, I believe, to
say that the proposition that God is a
deceiver casts metaphysical doubt on
many of his clear and distinct perceptions.

Thus, Feldman's response to question

(3)

'3

is that the prin-

ciple of clarity and distinctness does not play

a

role in

getting Descartes to the conclusions that God exists and is

73
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no deceiver.

Feldman's response to question

(4)

is explicit,

Referring to the Circle Passage,
Feldman contends:
As

I

understand him, what Descartes

is suggesting is that prior
to
time at which he comes to know the
of God's
existence and nature, there is
just one
mam reason to doubt his clear and
distinct perceptions.
That is the proposition that God is a deceiver.
in my
terminology, Descartes' point can
be put
by saying that prior to the
time at
which he comes to a satisfactory
understanding of the arguments given in
the

^-hird

and Fourth Meditation the proposition that there is a deceptive God
casts metaphysical doubt for him on
the proposition that two plus
three
equals five, as well as upon other
clearly and distinctly perceived
74
propositions.
,

Why the proposition that God is a
deceiver should cast
doubt on some of Descartes' clear and
distinct perceptions
Feldman explains as follows:
Since Descartes' understanding of
God's nature is, at the time in question, still somewhat rudimentary, he
is not yet certain that God is not
a
deceiver.
Hence, the proposition that
God is a deceiver is then a practical
possibility for Descartes. Furthermore if it were a practical certainty
for Descartes that God is a deceiver,
then it would not be a practical certainty for him that two plus three is
five.
For no matter how clearly and
distinctly one may see this latter proposition to be true, such evidence is
'

74
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surely worthless if he also has
reason to believe that there is qood
an
omnipotent and deceptive God.
75
Thus, according to principle

prior to the demonstra-

(13),

tion that a non-deceiving God exists,
the proposition that
God is a deceiver casts metaphysical
doubt on a number of

propositions that are practically certain
for Descartes.
Given principle (9), each of them is
thereby metaphysically
uncertain for him.
Feldman's response to question

(5)

is,

in part,

this:

once he [Descartes] has given
the Third Meditation argument for the
existence of God, it becomes a practical
certainty for Descartes that God exists.
For, we are assuming, the premises of
the argument are practical certainties
for him, it is a practical certainty
for him that they entail the conclusion, and he infers the conclusion
from the premises.
Hence, according
to principle (5), the conclusion is
then a practical certainty for him also. 76
.

Similarly

,

.

.

the proposition that God is not a deceiver

becomes a practical certainty for Descartes.
are practically certain for him.

The argument's validity

is also a practical certainty for him.

conclusion.

He infers the

Hence, again given principle

(5),

clusion is also a practical certainty for him.

75
76
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The premises

the con-

:

.
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Once this conclusion is a practical
certainty, its
negation, that God is a deceiver, is no longer
a practical

possibility for Descartes.

As such, the latter proposition

no longer casts metaphysical doubt on any of
his clear and

distinct perceptions.
Does this mean that all Descartes' clear and distinct

perceptions are metaphysically certain for him given Feldman's definitions?

Not quite; Feldman goes on to demon-

strate how Descartes can now be metaphysically certain that
all his clear and distinct perceptions are true.

Feldman

contends
He

[Descartes] attempts, on my view, to
deduce this conclusion from a set of
premises every one of which is now metaphysically certain.
if these
premises are now metaphysically certain,
and it is also metaphysically certain
that they entail the conclusion, and
the conclusion is inferred from them,
then, it appears to me, the conclusion
becomes a metaphysical certainty.
Assuming that all this is the case, we
can agree with Descartes when he says
that "in the Fourth Meditation it is
shown that all which we clearly and
distinctly perceive is true.
(HR I,
"
And we can also agree that the
p. 142)
77
argument is non-circular.
.

.

(

)

.

.

Feldman goes on to reconstruct the specific arguments which
Descartes employs to demonstrate that God exists and is no

deceiver and that all his clear and distinct perceptions

77
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are true, but consideration of those
arguments is beyond
the scope of this work.
X have attempted to
present the
overall structure of his argumentation;
it is now necessary
to determine whether Feldman's
account of Descartes' enterprise succeeds where previously considered
accounts failed.

Although

I

find Feldman's account both ingenious
and

plausible, there are certain difficulties which
it encounters.

I

believe

Feldman admits the following:

In thus making practical certainty
purely epistemic concept, I believe
I may be drawing out only one
aspect
of Descartes' concept of certainty.
in
his discussions of certainty he sometimes
suggests that this concept has a psychological component.
For example, he sometimes writes as if a proposition is certain for S only if s is unable to doubt
it.
But surely one may be psychologically
able to doubt a proposition even though
he has adequate evidence for it.
It
appears, then, that the psychological
ability to doubt a proposition has little
bearing on the central question of
whether or not one is warranted in believing it.
Thus, I think Descartes
would have done better if he had more
clearly separated the psychological from
the epistemic aspects of his concept of
certainty.
a

Feldman is correct in saying that one may be psychologically able to doubt

a

proposition even though he has

adequate evidence to warrant believing it.

78
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said further that one may be
psychologically unable to
doubt a proposition even though
he has adequate evidence
to warrant doubting it.
But the former case could
also
indicate why, for Descartes,
adequate evidence is not
strong enough for certainty, at
least the kind that clarity
and distinctness provide.
And the latter case simply
indicates that psychological
indubitability is only a
necessary condition, and not a
sufficient one, for some
type of certainty.
That Descartes would have been
better
served by distinguishing psychological
certainty from
epistemic certainty and employing only
the latter is true
only if Feldman's interpretation
succeeds in avoiding circular reasoning and if no account which
incorporates the
two succeeds.
The point which

I

have just made does not provide

sufficient grounds for rejecting Feldman's
account.
Unfortunately, the following difficulty does.^^
In presenting principle

(9)

Feldman considers and

rejects the following principle:

I am indebted to Peter Markie for pointing
out this
difficulty for Feldman's account to me. His criticism
appears in his doctoral dissertation. The Cartesian
Circle University of Massachusetts (1976) and in "Fred
Feldman and the Cartesian Circle," Philosophical Studies
Vol
31 (1977) pp. 429-432
,

.

.
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(9

)

£ is

metaphysical uncertainty for
S
at t if and only if there is
a proposia

tion, a

such that

(i)

a is a metaphysical possibility for S at t;
and
(ii) if £ were a practical
certainty
,

for

at t, that would defeat the
practical certainty of
a for S at t,
thus making £ a practical uncertainty
for S at t.

Principle

(9)

requires a proposition to be

a

practical

possibility for someone in order for it to cast
metaphysical doubt on another proposition.
(9') requires that
the defeater proposition be only a metaphysical
possibility
Feldman offers three reasons for preferring
(9').

The first is that

(9)

(9)

to

is more in keeping with

Descartes' statements that reasons for doubt must
be powerful and maturely considered

,

^

and that doubt must be based

upon clear and assured reasonings.^

Feldman's contention

is that it seems unlikely that a proposition which
is a

metaphysical possibility but
would count as

a

a

practical impossibility

powerful and maturely considered reason

for doubt or would be construed as a clear and assured

reason for doubt.

80
O I
0i

Cf.HR

I,

p.
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p.

99.
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148 and HR II, p.
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But Descartes also maintains
in various places
that

any proposition which provides
us with even the very
least
grounds for suspecting the
veracity of another
proposition
counts as a reason for metaphysical
doubt.
his replies
to the seventh set of objections
Descartes states:

m

It was of this [metaphysical]
also that I said the very leastdoubt
ground
of suspicion was a sufficient
reason
for causing it.
82

And

m

the Circle Passage Descartes
says:
the reason for doubt which
depends on this opinion alone is very
slight, and so to speak metaphysical.
•

*

•

^

The reason for doubt is, of course,
the hypothesis that a
deceiving God exists.

Now if we interpret "the very least
grounds" and "the
reason.
is very slight" as referring to
metaphysical
possibility rather than practical possibility,
.

.

then there

exists equally strong textual evidence to
support principle
(9')

as there does to support

(9)

as an interpretation of

metaphysical uncertainty for Descartes.
reason for preferring principle

(9)

to

Feldman's first
(9')

is not consis-

tently supported by textual evidence.

Feldman's second reason for preferring
further textual evidence can be derived from
82
83

HR II, p.

HR

I,

p.

266.
159.

(9)

a

is that

passage at

.
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the close of Meditation V in
which Descartes suggests,
according to Feldman, that when
a proposition is no
longer
a practical possibility, it
is no longer able to
cast metaphysical doubt.
But Feldman does not quote
the passage in
question; he merely footnotes it.
if we follow his
reference we find Descartes saying:

But after I have recognized that
there
is a God.
and that He is not a
deceiver,
although I no longer
pay attention to the reasons for
which
I have judged this to be
true, provided
that 1 recollect having clearly and
distinctly perceived it no contrary
reason can be brou ght forward which
could ever cause me to doubt of its
truth and thus I have a true and
84
certain knowledge of it.
.

.

.

.

.

;

Now Feldman could be suggesting that since the
proposition
that God exists and is no deceiver is recognized
or,

in

Feldman's terms, practically certain, then no contrary
reason, i.e., that God is a deceiver, can be brought
for-

ward to cause doubt or, again in Feldman's terms, to
cast
doubt, because the contrary reason is no longer

a

practical

possibility
But if the arguments for the existence of a non-

deceiving God provide Descartes with metaphysical certainty
that God is no deceiver, then that God is a deceiver is no

longer

84

Ibid

a

.

,

metaphysical possibility for him.

p.

185.

(Italics mine)

The passage
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simply does not indicate whether
in recognizing that
there
is a God and that He is
not a deceiver Descartes
is

referring to the practical or
metaphysical certainty of the
proposition in question. Hence,
the passage
can be inter-

preted as providing equally strong
textual support for
principle (9').
In the passage Descartes goes
on to say that this
same

(certain)

knowledge extends to other things
which he
recollects having demonstrated. He
then considers what
could be alleged against such knowledge
claims.

He con-

siders three possibilities:
Will It be said that my nature is such
as to cause me to be frequently
deceived?
Will it be said that I formerly held
many things to be true and certain
which
I have afterwards recognized
to be false?

What further objection can then be raised?
That possibly I am dreaming.
85
.?
.

Now Feldman could be suggesting that since
Descartes has
acknowledged demonstrating that there is a
non-deceiving
God, he is now considering other propositions
to determine
if they cast metaphysical doubt on his
clear and distinct

perceptions.

possibly

I

Each of the propositions, particularly "That

am dreaming," is a practical possibility for

Descartes and he demonstrates by his responses that for

85
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each there is a contrary
proposition which is a
practical
certainty for him and which,
thereby, blocks the ability
of
the three propositions in
question to cast metaphysical
doubt on other propositions.
Thus, Feldman could intend
the passage to indicate that
practical rather than metaphysical possibility is what
Descartes has in mind for one
proposition to cast metaphysical
doubt on another.
But this won't do.
Feldman acknowledges:

Descartes apparently assumes,

prior
t° the proofs of the existence
and verG ° d/ that no proposition
than the proposition that God is other
a
,

deceiver cast metaphysical doubt on
his
clear and distinct perceptions.
86
Furthermore, Feldman maintains that
"it seems to me that
Descartes is not justified in making
this rather large
87
assumption."
Thus, his footnoted reference
notwithstanding, the just quoted passages cannot
be what Feldman
had in mind.
The only remaining comment which
Descartes
has to make at the end of Meditation V
is as follows:

And so I very clearly recognize
that the certainty and truth of all
knowledge depends alone on the knowledge of the true God, in so much that,
before I knew Him, I could not have a
perfect knowledge of any other thing.
And now that I know Him I have the
means of acquiring a perfect knowledge

86

87

Feldman
Ibid.

op.

cit

.

p

.
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of

_

not only

88

But nothing which Descartess
asserts here provides us
With a clear indication that the
practical rather than the

metaphysical impossibility of a proposition
is what Descartes has in mind to block that
proposition s ability to
cast metaphysical doubt on another
proposition.
in fact,
1

if the perfect knowledge being
referred to in the passage
is, in Feldman's terminology,

metaphysical knowledge, then

the passage could also be interpreted
as providing textual

support of principle

(9')

rather than (9).

Feldman has not

succeeded in demonstrating that there is strong
textual
evidence to support his preference for (9).
Feldman's third reason for preferring

(9)

is that

(9')

does not allow Descartes to escape circular
reasoning.
A further reason for framing the
principle in this way is that, by so
doing, we help to provide a conceptual
framework within which a solution to
the problem at hand may be found.
The problem at hand is that of the Cartesian Circle.
see why circularity is not avoided with

88
89

HR

I,

p.

Feldman,

185.
ojd.

cit

.

,

p.

46.
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)

To
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that if it is the metaphysical
possibility that God is a
deceiver which allows the proposition
to cast metaphysical
doubt on other propositions, then
Descartes is forced to
prove that God is no deceiver is a
metaphysical certainty
order for 'God is a deceiver' to
become a metaphysical
impossibility. But then Descartes is
required to achieve
the metaphysical certainty of a particular
proposition
prior to defeating the metaphysical
possibility of the only

m

proposition which casts metaphysical doubt on
other propositions.
Since the only propositions on Feldman's
account
which escape the metaphysical doubt cast by
the proposition
that God is a deceiver are propositions which
express
current mental acts, and since the premises of the
arguments for God's existence and non-deceptive nature
are not
such propositions,

(9’)

puts Descartes squarely back in the

circle
Given the ambiguity of the textual evidence, in the

absence of any reason to specifically reject

(9)

we might

Feldman his principle and simply acknowledge that

Descartes was sometimes confused on the matter.
exists,

I

But there

believe, one very good reason for rejecting

In Meditation

I

(9).

Descartes argues that the proposition

that he is sitting by the fire is uncertain for him.

Feldman's response to question

(1),

Given

the proposition must be

metaphysically uncertain for Descartes.

The proposition

.
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constituting his reason for doubt is
that he is in bed
asleep and dreaming which, given
principle (9), must be
practically possible for him. With
definitions
(1)

and

we obtain that the proposition that
he is not in bed
asleep and dreaming is practically
uncertain for Descartes.
But given Feldman's account of the
notion of practical
(3)

certainty and Descartes' distinction
between the practical
activities of one's life and an enquiry into
truth, it

would appear that, for both, the proposition
that

I

am not

in bed asleep and dreaming is practically
certain for me.

With

(9')

this difficulty does not arise since the
proposi-

tion that

I

am not in bed asleep and dreaming remains

practically certain but metaphysically uncertain for
Descartes
My contention is that Feldman has not provided
us with

sufficient reason to ascribe

(9)

textual evidence in Meditation

I

to Descartes.

In fact,

and Feldman's own account

of the concepts of practical epistemic appraisal in
Des-

cartes' writings point to the ascription of
cartes.

But

(9')

to Des-

(9')

does not allow Descartes to escape the

charge of circular reasoning.
For the reasons

I

have given,

I

find Feldman's inter-

pretation of Descartes' enterprise less than completely
satisfactory.

But

I

find certain distinctions which he

makes useful in understanding Descartes and, as

I

intend to
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demonstrate in the next chapter,
these distinctions
provide
a basis upon which an
interpretation of Descartes'
enterprise can be made which, I
argue, avoids the
problems
raised for accounts discussed
thus far.

CHAPTER
In the preceeding chapter

v

I

discussed two accounts of

Descartes' enterprise which attempt
to get him out of the
Cartesian Circle by distinguishing
between two types of
doubt and, correspondingly, two
types of certainty.
One

account, Kenny’s, defines one type
of doubt and certainty
primarily psychological terms.
in doing so Kenny acknowledges that he is following the lead
of Gewirth, whose
account of Descartes was examined in Chapter

m

III.

The

other account, Feldman's, defines both types
of doubt and
certainty in purely epistemic terms.
in doing so Feldman

explicitly acknowledges that he is ignoring one
aspect of
Descartes explanation of doubt and certainty, the
psychological aspect.

I

have argued that neither account suc-

ceeds in both being consistent with textual evidence
and

getting Descartes out of the circle.
What

I

am about to suggest as a more satisfactory

Cartesian response to the charges of circularity is a distinction embedded in Descartes

1

writings between three

types of doubt and corresponding certainty.

Feldman's lead,

I

Following

shall call the first 'practical doubt'

and 'practical certainty'.
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Following Gewirth's lead,

I
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shall call the second
'intuitional certainty, (and
its
converse I shall term 'intuitional
doubt').
The third
type I shall of course call
'metaphysical doubt' and 'metaphysical certainty'. Again following
Feldman's lead, I
will offer an analysis of practical
doubt and practical
certainty in purely epistemic terms.
D n l ike Gewirth, I
will not attempt to analyze intuitional
certainty (and

intuitional doubt) in primarily
psychological terms.
Rather, I will argue that each has
both a psychological and
an epistemic component and that the
latter component is
logically related to the practical epistemic
concepts
developed by Feldman. Finally, I will draw
upon the

concepts of intuitional doubt and certainty
which

I

develop to explain what Descartes intended
metaphysical
doubt and certainty to mean.

^ stinctions

I

will then use all three

to provide a solution to the problem of the

Cartesian Circle.
Feldman is undeniably correct in noting that Descartes

makes a distinction between the certainty which is satisfactory for day-to-day matters and that which is required
an enquiry into truth.

The passages in which Descartes

makes this distinction are quite explicit.

As we have

already seen, in one such passage Descartes asserts:

205

n ° te thS dist ^ction
emphasized by me in various
passages, between
the practical activities
of our life and
an enquiry into truth.

1

Elsewhere in the Replies Descartes
reminds the reader that;
I said at the end of
Meditation I that
everything
could be doubted
But I did so because there the
Question
was about only that
doubt which
... is metaphysical ... and not to
be transferred to the sphere of
practical ,
needs of life.
2
.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

Finally, in his closing remarks in the
Synopsis to the
M editations Descartes distinguishes between
those things

which never have been doubted by anyone of
sense" but
which "are neither so strong nor so evident"
and those

things which are "most certain and most evident." 3
So there exists a distinction,

for Descartes, between

doubt that attends to practical activities, human
affairs,

matters involving trust in our physical senses, and
the
like, and doubt that involves an enquiry into truth.

Thus,

some propositions are sufficiently certain for Descartes
to

overcome doubt of the first kind.

Following Feldman,

will suggest that

proposition, £, is a practical certainty
for a person, S, at a time, t

a

1

2
3

HR II, p.

206.

Ibid
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.

,

p

.
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IS roughly synonymous
with the following
locutions:

ls

ustlfl ed in believing
that £ at t
- has the e P isteitic right to believe
E ~at
E is either self-evident or adequately
evidenced for s at t.

—

i

t

we may recall that Feldman
makes three points about
practical certainty.
First, it is a purely
epistemic concept with no psychological
component.
Second, the degree
of certainty is no greater
than that required for
knowledge
in the traditional sense.
Third, the use of the term
'practical' does not suggest that a
proposition must have
practical value in order to be a
practical certainty for
someone.
In each of these points I am in
agreement with
Feldman

Again following Feldman's lead,

I

shall suggest the

following definitions:
(1)

is a practical possibility for S
=
a^
is n °t a practical

£

— cif “E
for S at t.

(2)

certainty

£ is

a practical impossibility for S
at t =
-£ is a practical certainty

df
for S at t.

(3)

£ is

a

practical uncertainty for

S

=

at i
is n °t a practical certainty
df P
for S at t.

To say that a proposition is a practical uncertainty for
a

person at a time is to say that the proposition is practi-

cally doubtful for the person at the time.

)

207

I

shall also propose the following
entailments:
(1

E is a practical certainty for S at t
entails that £ is a practical possibility

)

for S at t.
(2')

is a practical impossibility
for S
at t entails that
£ is a practical uncer-

£

tainty for

S at

t.

With the above definitions and entailments certain
concepts
of practical epistemic appraisal fall into the
traditional

square of opposition, i.e., practical certainty and practical impossibility are contraries; practical possibility
and

practical uncertainty are subcontraries; and practical certainty and practical uncertainty are contradictories, as
are practical impossibility and practical possibility.

Finally,

I

shall also propose the following principle

for precisely the same reasons which Feldman does:
(4)

4

practical certainty for S at t,
and the proposition that £ entails q is
If

£ is

a

practical certainty for S at t, and S
infers £ from £ at t, then q is a practical
certainty for S at t.
a

Given the distinction which Descartes makes between
the certainty which is satisfactory for practical matters

and that which is required for an "enquiry into truth," and

presuming that the Meditations are concerned solely with

4

Feldman, op. cit., pp. 42-43.
180-181.

(cf.

Chapter IV, pp.
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the latter, we can conclude
that the doubt raised in
Medi iQn 1 iS ° ther than Poetical.
Gewirth, Kenny and Feldman contend that it is
metaphysical doubt that is raised
from the very start of Descartes'
enterprise. We may
recall, however, that Frankfurt's
position is a notable
exception in this matter.

—

In distinguishing between doubt
about the truth of a

proposition and doubt about the relationship
between a
proposition's indubitability and its truth,
Frankfurt must
demonstrate that the objects of the doubt
raised in Medita-

tion^

can be distinguished from the objects
of the doubt

raised in the Circle Passage in Meditation
III

.

The meta-

physical doubt raised in the Circle Passage is
clearly

directed against propositions that are clearly
and distinctly perceived.
if propositions called into doubt in

Meditation

I

are also being clearly and distinctly per-

ceived, then Frankfurt cannot consistently contend
that
the doubt raised in Meditation

I

is other than metaphysical.

We may recall that Frankfurt offers three reasons to

support his contention that no proposition that is doubted
i-

n

Meditation

I

is clearly and distinctly perceived.

first involves the Haldane and Ross translation.

The

Frankfurt

argues that the phrase 'clear and apparent' which is being

attributed to mathematical propositions in Meditation
misleading.

His contention is that

a

I

is

careful analysis of

.
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both the Latin and French texts
does not indicate that
Descartes was referring to
propositions being clearly and
distinctly perceived. The second
reason involves Descartes remarks in his Conversation
with Burman to the
effect that in Meditation 1 he was
considering someone who
was just beginning to philosophize
and who attends only to
those things with which he is
acquainted, that is, through
the senses.
The third reason involves Descartes’
replies
to the seventh set of objections
in which he
'

states that at

the end of Meditation

I

he has said that everything
could

be doubted that had not been clearly
and distinctly

perceived
We may also recall that Kenny responds
to Frankfurt's

second and third reasons.

With respect to the second

reason Kenny claims that Descartes was referring
to philosophical axioms rather than to simple truths of
arithmetic.
In response to the third reason Kenny claims
that Descartes'

remarks do not refer to the entire First Meditation
to a specific passage within that Meditation

of Kenny's replies proves his point.

.

,

only

But neither

At best each indi-

cates that Frankfurt's second and third reasons are not

sufficient to establish his claim.
Kenny does offer two additional passages and refers to
a

third to support his contention that certain mathematical

propositions being considered in Meditation

I

are clearly

.
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and distinctly perceived.

The first passage is in
Medita-

tion V where Descartes
asserts
atUre ° f mY mind is such
tha t
iouldnn?
could not prevent myself
from holdina
9
them [certain geometric
truths] to be
true so long as I conceive
them clearly;
n
recollect that even when I
was
still strongly attached to
the objects
of sense, I counted as the
most
those truths which I conceived certain
clearlv
as regards figuros, numbers,
and other
matters which pertain to arithmetic
and
geometry, and,
general, to pure and
abstract mathematics.
I

m

-

The second is at the end of the
replies to the sixth set of

objections where Descartes says:
•

*

•

before

had liberated myself from
of the senses, I rightly
two and three make five,
be taken from equals the
equal, and many similar

I

the prejudices
perceived that
that if equals
remainders are
things.
.

6

.

And Kenny argues:
We know from the Second Replies that
some truths are so simple that they
cannot be thought of without being
doubted [sic]
Since these are
so simple that they cannot be thought
of without being clearly and distinctly
perceived.
it follows that they
are perceived clearly and distinctly by
all normal adults.
.

.

5
6

7

HR

I,

p.

.

.

,

180.

HR II, p. 257.
Kenny, Journal of Philosophy

,

p.
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Presumably the passage to which
Kenny is referring is
the
following
there are some [clear
i
perceptions
of
the intellect] so evident
and at the
same time so simple, that in
their case
we never doubt about believing
*

*

them
that
While 1 think
£hat wh;?'„
that
what is once done
cannot be undone
and other similar truths.
For
cannot doubt them unless we think we
of
them; ^but we cannot think of them
without at the same time believing
them to
be true.
Hence we can never doubt
them without at the same time
believing
them to be true; i.e. we can never
doubt
them.
8
!

'

'

.

.

.

.

Now one can interpret each of the three
preceeding
passages from Descartes in a manner consistent
with Kenny's
position.
But an interpretation of each can also
be made
that fails to support his position.
in the quotation from

Meditation V Descartes initially asserts that
the clear
perception of a geometric truth is such that he
cannot

refrain from assenting to its truth.
even when (early in Meditation

I

)

He then asserts that

his basis for beliefs

was grounded in the senses, he noted that certain
propositions were more certain than others.

But from the fact

that such propositions were more certain than others
it

does not follow that they had to be perceived clearly and

distinctly

8

.

One could reasonably contend that Descartes

HR II, p. 42.

.
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meant nothing more than that, even
with sense perception
as one's sole criterion of evidence,
some propositions seem
to be more certain than others.
In the passage from the Sixth
Replies Kenny interprets

Descartes as asserting that if one rightly
perceives that
two and three make five, then one does
so only by perceiving it clearly and distinctly.
And since such a perception
occurred prior to Descartes' liberation from
the
senses,

the perception was clear and distinct in
Meditation
the passage does not explicitly say this.

I

.

But

if on the basis

of evidential criteria other than clarity and
distinctness

Descartes makes a certain judgment and the judgment
is
correct, then clarity and distinctness is not

condition for making

a

correct judgment.

a

necessary

To suggest other-

wise is to confuse truth with certainty.

To make the dis-

tinction clearer, consider the following example.

I

may

come to believe that a certain proposition is true on the

basis of reading tea leaves.

happens to be true,

I

If my belief coincidently

have made a correct judgment even

though the evidence upon which

I

sufficient to justify my belief.
JC

make the judgment is not
Similarly, in Meditation

Descartes may correctly perceive that

a

particular propo-

sition is true even though the basis upon which he makes
his judgment is shown to be inadequate to justify his

judgment
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Finally, in the passage
quoted from the Replies
to
the second set of objections,
Kenny is correct in
attributing to Descartes the position
that some truths are so
simple that they cannot be thought
of without being
believed to be true.
But Kenny moves Descartes
from this
position to one that holds that some
truths are so simple
that they cannot be thought of
without being clearly and
distinctly perceived. And nothing in
the Replies to the
second set of objections warrants the
move that Kenny
makes.
Furthermore, the examples which Descartes
provides
of propositions which cannot be
thought of without being
believed to be true are not the mathematical
propositions
which Kenny is suggesting.
Rather, they are the meta-

physical truths which Kenny admits may never
have been
thought of by a normal adult.
Nor is there any evidence

m
fOi.

the second replies to suggest that Descartes
intended

mathematical truths to have this property.

Since

Kenny does not provide any additional textual
evidence to
support his position, I contend that he has failed
to

demonstrate that Descartes was perceiving mathematical

propositions clearly and distinctly in Meditation

I.

But if Frankfurt is correct in maintaining that the

doubt raised in Meditation

I

is other than metaphysical,

what then is the nature of that doubt?

Feldman recognizes

one aspect of the doubt raised by the evil demon hypothesis

0

,
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in both Meditation

and III.

I

In a footnote he says:

In the Meditations, the
"Evil
Demon Hypothesis" seems to play
a
primarily psychological role. By
reflecting on that hypothesis
Descartes enables himself to Counteract his natural tendency to believe
practical certainties.
9

Unfortunately, the purely epistemic nature
of Feldman's
interpretation makes an expanded account of
the psychologi
cal role in the Cartesian doubt irrelevant
to his purposes
There exists additional textual evidence to
suggest
that the doubt raised in Meditation I is distinct
from
that raised in the Circle Passage in Meditation
III.

Meditation

Descartes asserts:

I

there is nothing in all that I
formerly believed to be true, of which
I cannot in some measure doubt, and
that not merely through want of thought
or through levity; but for reasons
which are very powerf ul and maturely
t
considered
.

.

.

,

.

In his Discourse on the Method Descartes states:

in trying to discover the error
or uncertainty of the propositions
which I examined, not by feeble conjectures, but by clear and assured
.

.

.

reasonings

Feldman, op. cit

^HR

I,

^ Ibid

.

pp.
,

p.

99.

p.

.

147-148

.

.

.

.

54.
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In each instance Descartes
emphasizes the weight of the

reasons brought to bear on the
propositions being considered.
each I contend that Descartes
is referring
specifically to the doubt raised in
Meditation I.

m

In the Circle Passage, however,
Descartes characterizes

his doubt in the following manner:

reason for doubt which depends
upon this opinion alone [that there is
a God who is a deceiver] is very
slight,
2
and so to speak metaphysical.
12
•

•

•

—

'

Note that the weight of the reasons for doubt
in Meditation
111 has been reduced significantly.

-

There is one passage which at first glance
contradicts
my claim that the doubt raised in Meditation
than metaphysical.

I

is other

in his replies to the seventh set of

objections Descartes reminds the reader:
I said at the end of Meditation I
that everything which I had not yet
comprehended with sufficient clearness
could be doubted by us, provided we
did so for 'reasons that were very
powerful and maturely considered.
But I did so because there the question was about only that supreme kind
of doubt which, I have insisted, is
metaphysical, hyperbolical and not to
be transferred to the sphere of the
practical needs of life by any means. 13

These remarks would appear to acknowledge that metaphysical

12

13

Ibid

.

,

p.

159.

HR II, p. 266.

(Italics mine)
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doubt is raised at least at
the end of Meditation
ever, Descartes goes on to
say:

T

How _

.

It was of this doubt also
that I
said the very least ground
of
suspicion was a sufficient reason
for causing it.
14
If we take the comment,

said.

"It was of this doubt that

I

also

to be referring to his
characterization of the

.

doubt raised in Meditation III, we
have Descartes maintaining that, on the one hand metaphysical
doubt requires very
strong reasons, while on the other hand
admitting merely
slight reasons will suffice for such doubt.
It would appear that Descartes is
being inconsistent

at this point.

But if we keep in mind that Descartes
does

not make explicit any distinction between
the doubt raised
in

imitation

I

and that which is raised in Meditation
III

we can resolve the apparent inconsistency.

,

My contention

is that Descartes refers to the doubt in
each Meditation as

metaphysical because he wishes to avoid confusing either
doubt with practical doubt.

If we view the above passage

in light of my contention, we can interpret Descartes'

initial remarks as confirming that the doubt raised in

Meditation

I

Descartes

acknowledgement that the very least grounds of

14

Ibid.

requires solid reasons.

At the same time,
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suspicion serve as a sufficient reason for
causing doubt
can be interpreted as a direct reference
to the doubt
raised in Meditation III
In short, all the textual
evidence can be interpreted as indicating that
the reasons
for doubt in Meditation I must be stronger
than those
.

necessary for doubt in Meditation III

.

One might object at this point that, if the doubt

raised in Meditation

I

requires stronger reasons than does

the metaphysical doubt raised in Meditation III

,

then

the degree of certainty needed to overcome the former must

correspondingly be stronger than that needed to overcome
the latter.

This would suggest that, if intuitional rather

than metaphysical certainty is achieved in Meditation II
it must be stronger,

,

not weaker than the metaphysical

certainty achieved in Meditation III

.

But such an objec-

tion would be based on a misperception of the relationship

between doubt and certainty.
inverse one.

That relationship is an

For example, one needs rather strong evidence

to the contrary to defeat one's practical certainty simply

because practical certainty is fairly easy to achieve (and

hence rather difficult to defeat)

.

In the case of intui-

tional certainty, because it is more difficult to achieve,
less evidence to the contrary is needed to block it.

Finally, metaphysical certainty is the most difficult to
attain, hence the slightest evidence to the contrary will
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suffice to prevent its attainment..

This, then,

why

is

the reasons for doubt in
Medltation_I must be stronger

than those sufficient for doubt
in Meditation ITT
We have, then, two distinct
reasons for suggesting
that the doubt raised in Meditation
I is other than that
raised in Meditation III.
The first is that some textual
evidence exists to support the
contention that no clearly
and distinctly perceived propositions
are doubted in
M editation I and no textual evidence
to suggest otherwise.
The second is that textual evidence
indicates that the
.

reasons for doubt in Meditation

must be much stronger

I

than those for doubt in Meditation III

.

Furthermore, if

we consider Feldman’s point that the evil
demon hypothesis
plays a psychological role in enabling Descartes
to

counteract his natural tendency to believe practical
certainties, and keep in mind that such natural
tendencies

occur in Meditation

I

,

we have a third reason for suggest-

that the doubt in Meditation

I

plays a different role

than that in the Circle Passage.

Beyond this there is no textual evidence to suggest
what the sufficient and necessary conditions are for the
doubt raised in Meditation

I

Thus,

.

it may prove helpful

to examine the certainty achieved in Meditation II

tainty which,

I

shall argue,

doubt raised in Meditation

I.

is

,

a cer-

to be contrasted with the

:

.
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There exists substantial textual
evidence to suggest
that the certainty achieved in
Meditation II by means of
clear and distinct perception is
psychological in nature.
Ih Meditation V Descartes
asserts:
,

I am of such a nature
that as
long as I understand anything very
clearly
and distinctly, I am naturally
impelled , _
to believe it to be true.
15
•

*

•

.

.

In his replies to the seventh set
of objections, Descartes

maintains
So, for example, that as long as we
attend to some truth which we perceive
very clearly, we cannot indeed doubt it. 16

We may recall that Gewirth and Kenny conclude
from

such evidence that the certainty achieved in
Meditation II

with the Cogito and other first principles is
primarily

psychological in nature.

As a result,

suggested the

I

following principles for each.

psychologically certain for s
_t
if and only if S clearly and
distinctly perceives that £ at t.

(a)

£

is

(b)

£

is clearly and distinctly perceived

by

at £ only if £ is indubitable for
S at t (i.e.
£ is unable to refrain
_S

,

from believing that £ at t
(c) £ is psychologically certain for
)

^HR

I,

^HR

II,

p.
p.

183.
266.

(Italics mine)
(Italics mine)

s

:

,
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at t only if
£ is indubitable for
S at t.
I

also suggested the following
principle for Kenny.
(d)

is

£
at

t

psychologically doubtful for S
if and only if
£ i s not clearly

and distinctly perceived by

s

at t.

But we have seen that such principles
do not enable

Gewirth or Kenny to provide an interpretation
of Descartes'
enterprise which succeeds in avoiding
circular reasoning.
Furthermore, there is textual evidence to
suggest that
something more than psychological is being
achieved in

Meditation II.

At one point in that Meditation Descartes

asserts
there is some deceiver or other,
very powerful and very cunning, who
ever employs his ingenuity in deceiving
me.
Then without doubt I exist also if
he deceives me, and let him deceive me as
much as he will he can never cause me to
be nothing so long as I think that I am
something.
So that after hnving reflected
we ^-d and carefully examined all things
we must come to the definite conclusion
that this proposition:
I am, I exist, is
necessarily true each time I pronounce it,-.-,
^
or that I mentally conceive it.
.

.

.

,

Here Descartes talks of having reflected well and carefully

examined all things.

This suggests that the certainty

achieved in Meditation II involves reasons.

17

HR

I,

p.

150.

(Italics mine)
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such certainty must have an
epistemic component as well as
a psychological one.
But what is the nature of
this epistemic component?
If the doubt raised in
Meditation I requires strong reasons,
then the certainty achieved in
Meditation II which overcomes that doubt, should presumably
also require strong
.

reasons, that is, for a proposition
to be what I am
calling an 'intuitional certainty’ for
Descartes, not only
must there be an absence of strong
reasons to justify
doubting that proposition, there must
also exist strong
reasons to warrant believing it.
This is what I take

Descartes to be suggesting when he asserts
that the proposition I exist" must be true "having reflected
well and

carefully examined all things

.

"

He considers all the

evidence in support of the Cogito and discounts
the hypothesis of an evil deceiver since it provides no
strong

reason for believing otherwise.

On the basis of all this

he concludes that he is certain of the Cogito

'

s

truth.

It

is not the case that no reason exists to suspect
otherwise.

In the Circle Passage just such a reason does arise.

But

it is not a sufficiently strong reason to defeat Descartes'

intuitional certainty that the Cogito is true.

The doubt

that the hypothesis of a deceiving deity casts is so slight
that it can only block the metaphysical certainty that

Descartes is attempting to ultimately attain.
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One mighc well ask at
this point why the deceiver
hypothesis does not undermine
the certainty of propositions
such as the C ogito attained
in Meditation II if it does
so
in Me ditation III
My response is that
my vieB chere
exists two very different contexts
within which the
deceiver hypothesis is raised by
Descartes.
In Meditation
II Descartes is searching for
a certainty to overcome
the
doubt supported by strong reasons
raised in Meditation I
His examination of his essential
nature provides him with
certain propositions which possess for
him that sought
after certainty.
No such strong reasons exist to
defeat
that certainty.
He considers the demon hypothesis and
.

,

.

discounts it.

In fact, he even contends that it provides

support for, rather than against, the certainty
of the
C^g^i^to

.

Descartes can maintain this position consistent

with his later position on the demon hypothesis in
the
Circle Passage because at this point in his deliberations
he is not concerned with either metaphysical doubt or

certainty.

Only when the epistemic ante has been raised in

Meditation III does Descartes step back and reconsider the
impact of the demon hypothesis.

The hypothesis has not

gained any credence; it is still only the most remote of
possibilities.

However, the requirements for certainty

have been raised.

Thus,

the hypothesis can now be cited as

a legitimate defeater which blocks the attainment of that
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certainty.

The hypothesis does not
block the certainty of
the Co^ito in Meditation II
simply because
it does not

constitute evidence sufficiently
strong to defeat the
certainty achieved at the time.
In short, the demon hypothesis raised in the Circle Passage
does not defeat the

intuitional certainty of the Cogito
for Descartes.
It
blocks only the metaphysical certainty
of the Cogito for
him.

Intuitional certainty is stronger than
practical certainty.
Thus, the evidential requirements for
intuitional
certainty are more stringent than those for
practical certainty.
But the evidential requirements for
intuitional

certainty are less stringent than those for
metaphysical
certainty since intuitional certainty is weaker
than metaphysical certainty.
To say that a proposition is
a meta-

physical certainty for a person is to say that he
-^y

justified in believing it.

Not even the very

slightest doubt can be found against it.

proposition is

a

is

To say that a

practical certainty for someone is to

say that he is justified in believing it.

To say that a

proposition is an intuitional certainty for someone

is

to

say that he has no strong evidence to doubt it and over-

whelming evidence for believing it to the point where his
conviction, that is, the degree to which he is psychologi-

cally confident in his belief, could not be greater.

This
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is not to suggest that evidence
sufficient for a proposition to be an intuitional certainty
for a person entails

that the proposition is
psychologically indubitable for
the person.
As I pointed out in the
18
preceeding
chapter,

not only may an individual be
psychologically able to
doubt a proposition even though he
has sufficient evidence
to warrant believing it, he may
be psychologically unable
to doubt a proposition even though
he has sufficient evi-

dence to warrant doubting it.
Thus, my contention is that Descartes has
introduced
a concept of certainty in

Meditation II which has both

a

psychological component and an epistemic component.
Gewirth and Kenny are correct in pointing to the
psychological component of that certainty.
case supported by textual evidence.

Each makes a strong

Difficulties with each

account stem in part not from mistakenly attributing

a

psychological component to the certainty achieved in Meditation II

,

but from a failure to recognize that

a

psycho-

logical explication provides only a partial analysis of
that certainty

Throughout Meditation II Descartes empha-

.

sizes the role of reasons in overcoming the doubt raised
i-

n Meditation

I

.

Following the achievement of the Cogito

Descartes immediately commits himself to discovering those

1

o

Cf.

Chapter IV, pp

.

192-193.

q
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aspects of his nature which can be
determined with the
same degree of certainty as was
the Cogito and rejecting
all former opinions which can
be invalidated by reflecting
on the reasons which he brought
forward in establishing
the certainty of the Cogito.
In fact, the primary enterprise in which Descartes engages in
Meditation II is not

merely to convince himself that certain
propositions are
true, but to consider reasons why such
propositions are

certain and reasons why other propositions are
questionable.

The intuitional certainty which Descartes first

achieves with the Cogito is then extended to other
proposi
tions, among them,

sum r^s cogitans

And on the basis of

.

these achievements Descartes develops the principle
of

clarity and distinctness.

He begins:

But what then am I?
which thinks.
.

A thing

.

From this time I begin to know
what I am with a little more clearness and distinction.
.

.

A bit later he remarks:
if the (notion or) perception
of wax has seemed clearer and more
.

.

.

distinct,

19

HR

I,

p.

153.

.

.

.

with how much more

,

,

:
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(evidence) and distinctness must

it be said that I now know
myself

20
.

Finally, Descartes contends:
I am certain that I am a
thing which
thinks; but do I not then likewise
know what is requisite to render me
certain of a truth? Certainly in
this first knowledge there is nothing
that assures me of its truth, excepting the clear and distinct perception ,
0
21
of that which I state ...

And he concludes
and accordingly it seems to me
that already I can establish as a
general rule that all things which I
perceive very clearly and very dis22
tinctly are true.
.

.

.

This last passage suggests that clarity and distinct-

ness is a sufficient condition for the certainty (which

I

am calling intuitional certainty) achieved in Meditation
11

•

Accordingly,
(5)

I

am proposing the following principle:

clearly and distinctly perceived by £ at t only if £ is

£

is

an intuitional certainty for

at

_t.

Given the textual evidence already cited in support of
a

psychological component of intuitional certainty,

want to maintain the following principle:

20
21

22

Ibid

.

Ibid.
Ibid.

pp.
p.

156-157.
158.

I

also

,
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(6)

is clearly and distinctly
perceived by s at t only if
is

£

£

indubitable for S at t (i.e., S
is unable to refrain from
believing
that £ at t )
Now,

if intuitional certainty were a
purely psycho-

logical concept, clarity and distinctness
could serve as a
necessary condition for intuitional certainty
as well.
But
this would mean that any proposition which is
not being

clearly and distinctly perceived at a given time
would not
be an intuitional certainty.
a

My contention is that, once

proposition has been clearly and distinctly perceived by

Descartes, that proposition becomes an intuitional cer-

tainty for him in the sense that it does not become uncertain merely by virtue of no longer being attended to.

Any

doubts which Descartes subsequently has in the Meditations

about that proposition are metaphysical ones.

The follow-

ing principle is an attempt to capture this suggestion:
(7)

£

is an intuitional certainty for S

at t only if S would perceive

£ at

clearly and distinctly if S were
to direct his attention to £ at t.
t

While much more needs to be said about intuitional

certainty and the role that clarity and distinctness plays,
we have reached a point where other concepts related to

intuitional certainty can be introduced.
intuitional uncertainty.

The first is

To say that a proposition is an
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intuitional uncertainty for

a

person at a time is to say

that the proposition is not an
intuitional certainty for
the person at the time.
To say that a proposition is
an

intuitional impossibility for

a

person at

a time is

to say

that its negation is an intuitional
certainty for the person at the time.
To say that a proposition is an intuitional possibility for a person at a time
is to say that
its negation is an intuitional uncertainty
for the person
at the time.
The concept of intuitional certainty, uncer-

tainty, possibility and impossibility fall into
the tradi-

tional square of opposition:

Intuitional certainty entails

intuitional possibility; intuitional impossibility entails

intuitional uncertainty

;

intuitional certainty and intui-

tional impossibility are contraries; intuitional possibility and intuitional uncertainty are subcontraries; and

intuitional certainty and intuitional uncertainty are contradictories, as are intuitional impossibility and

intuitional possibility.
The concepts of clarity and distinctness play an

important role in my explication of intuitional certainty
and related concepts.
I

intend to give here.

gether helpful.

Each deserves a fuller account than
Descartes' comments are not alto-

In passages quoted earlier from Meditation

V and the replies to the seventh set of objections, the

indubitability of clearly and distinctly perceived propo-

.

,
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sitions is articulated.
XLV,

In his Principles of Philosophy

.

Descartes states:
I term that clear which
is present and
apparent to an attentive mind, in the
same way as we assert that we see
objects clearly when, being present to
the regarding eye, they operate
upon it
with sufficient strength.
But the distinct is that which is so precise and
different from all other objects that
it contains within itself nothing
but «
23
what is clear.

And in the following principle (XLVI) he adds:

perception may be clear without
being distinct, and cannot be distinct-,
24
without being also clear.
•

•

•

An epistemic aspect of clarity and distinctness is

suggested by the following comment from the replies to the
second set of objections:
There are other matters that are
indeed perceived very clearly by our
intellect, when we attend sufficiently
closely to the reasons on which our
knowledge of them depends, and hence
we cannot then be in doubt about them. 9S
Descartes' comments on the concepts of clarity, dis-

tinctness, and intuitional certainty do not indicate the

nature of the relationship between these concepts and
reasons or evidence.

23

Ibid.

24

Ibid

25

HR II,

p.

237.

p.

42.
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intuitional certainty and related
concepts will remain
undefined.
However, there are certain logical
relationships which I wish to propose between
intuitional certainty (and related concepts) and
the concepts of practical epistemic appraisal.
They are as follows:
(8)

£ is an intuitional certainty for

S

at t only if £ is a practical
certainty for S at t.
(9)

£ is
at t

practical uncertainty for
only if £ is an intuitional
a

uncertainty for
(10)

£ is
at t

at t.

practical possibility for
only if £ is an intuitional
a

possibility for
(11)

S

S

S

S

at t.

£ is an intuitional impossibility
for S at t only if
£ is a practical
impossibility for S at t.

Having provided an explication both of the concepts of

practical epistemic appraisal and those related to intuitional certainty, and having suggested some logical rela-

tionships which hold between them,

I

am now in a position

to turn to a consideration of the concepts related to meta-

physical doubt and certainty.
To say that a proposition is a metaphysical certainty
for a person, S, at a time, t, is to say that not even the

"very least grounds of suspicion" exist to cast doubt upon
its truth.

this way

I

in characterizing metaphysical certainty in

am following Feldman's lead.

But unlike Feld-
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man,

I

do not wish to maintain that
metaphysical certainty

is a purely epistemic notion.

it

Because

I

m

intend to analyze

terms both of concepts related to
intuitional certainty and concepts of practical
epistemic appraisal, meta
physical certainty and concepts related to
it will have a

psychological component as well as an epistemic
one.
Since on my account thus far one cannot attain

the intui-

tional certainty of a particular proposition
without having
clearly and distinctly perceived it, the
metaphysical cer-

tainty of a proposition (which entails intuitional
cer-

tainty of that proposition) involves not only being
maxi-

mally justified in believing it, but also having unshakeable conviction of its truth whenever entertaining the

proposition.
On the basis of this brief account of metaphysical

certainty,

I

(12)

can now introduce some related concepts:

£

is a

for

metaphysical uncertainty
at

S_

t

£

is not a meta-

physical certainty for
(13)

£ is
for

a
S_

£

is a

for

S_

at

t.

metaphysical possibility
at £

-£ is not a meta-

physical certainty for
(14)

S_

S

at t.

metaphysical impossibility
at £

-£ is a metaphysical

certainty for £ at

_t.

Leaving metaphysical doubt to be defined shortly, these
concepts fall into the traditional square of opposition.

6

.
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Metaphysical certainty entarls
metaphysical possibility.
Metaphysical impossibility entails
metaphysical uncertainty.

Metaphysical certainty is the
contradictory of
metaphysical uncertainty. Metaphysical
impossibility is
tne contradictory of metaphysical
possibility.
Metaphysical certainty and metaphysical
impossibility are

contraries.

And finally, metaphysical possibility
and metaphysical uncertainty are subccntraries

There are also logical relations which hold
between
the concepts related to metaphysical certainty
and those
1

lat 6 (i to intuitional certainty.
'

15

)

£

They arc:

IS a metaphysical certainty tor

S

at

£

is an intuitional uncertainty for

only if £ is an intuitional
certainty for S at t.
(16)

t

only if £ is a metaphysical
uncertainty for S at t.
(17)

S

at

£

is an intuitional

t

possibility for

only if £ is a metaphysical
possibility for S at t.
(18)

S

at

£

is a metaphysical impossibility

for

t

only if £ is an intuitional impossibility for S at t.

Principles
(15)

S

(8)

at

t

through (11), together with principles

through (18), give

us corresponding logical relations

between the concepts related to metaphysical certainty and
those of practical epistemic appraisal.
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Before defining metaphysical doubt,
we must introduce
one additional concept - the concept
of one proposition
casting doubt upon, or defeating the
certainty of, another
proposition.
I have argued earlier that
instances where
Descartes talks of reasons that are 'very
powerful and

maturely considered' or 'valid and well considered'

,

he is

referring to propositions that serve to cast
intuitional
doubt on propositions that are practical certainties
for
him.

In the case of metaphysical doubt he suggests
that

reasons for doubt may be very slight.

He does so in the

Circle Passage and in his replies to the seventh set of

objections when he states:
For we may well enough be compelled
to doubt by arguments that are in
themselves doubtful and not to be
afterwards retained.
.

.

The concept of an epistemic defeater is employed by

Feldman in his explication of metaphysical doubt.

On his

account a proposition has to be a practical possibility in
order to defeat the practical certainty of another proposition.

He specifically rejects the notion that the meta-

physical possibility of a proposition qualifies that

proposition as an epistemic defeater.
contend that we can interpret the textual evidence

I

26
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that describ es reasons for
metaphysical doubt as slight,
hyperbolic and
themselves doubtful as supporting
the
notion that a proposition must
be only an intuitional

m

possibility

m

order for it to cast metaphysical
doubt on
the practical certainty of another
proposition.

In effect,

I

am proposing the following:
(19)

£

is a metaphysical uncertainty

for S at t if and only if (E£)
(£
is an intuitional possibility
for s
at t and if
£ were a practical

certainty for £ at _t then it would
defeat the practical certainty of
£ for £ at _t, thereby making £ a
practical uncertainty for S at t.
Take the case of the atheistic geometer.

On Feldman's

view, the atheist can know, in the sense of obtaining

practical certainty, the proposition

(£)

that the three

angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles.

But

Descartes acknowledges that the atheistic geometer can
also clearly and distinctly perceive that

(£)

This alone

suggests that the degree of certainty is greater than that

provided by practical certainty.
sition

(

£

)

On my account the propo-

is an intuitional certainty for him.

But his

knowledge is not certain and immutable in the sense of
being metaphysically certain, since it is still an intuitional possibility for him that (£) God is a deceiver.

Proposition

(£)

is an intuitional possibility for him
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because its negation,

<- a )

that God is no deceiver,

an intuitional certainty for
him.

Thus,

if

(

a

)

is not

„ er e

a

practical certainty for him, that
would defeat the practical certainty of ( ) for him,
thereby making
£
£ ) a practical uncertainty for him, i.e., his
evidence would no longer
be sufficient to warrant his believing
that
(

(|5

)

Given the interpretation of Descartes
which
suggesting, we are now in
to questions

First,

(1)

a

I

am

position to review my responses

through (5).

in Meditation

I

Descartes is attempting to

determine if any of the propositions which are practical

certainties for him survive the rigors of an 'enquiry into
truth'.

"In the first Meditation

I

set forth the reasons

for which we may, generally speaking, doubt about all
•

is the

The first reason which Descartes considers

•

possibility that he is asleep and dreaming.
At this moment it does indeed seem to
me that it is with eyes awake that I
am looking at this paper; that this
head which I move is not asleep.
.;
what happens in sleep does not appear
so clear nor so distinct as does all
this.
But in thinking over this I
remind myself that on many occasions
I have in sleep been deceived by
similar illusions, and in dwelling
carefully on this reflection I see
so manifestly that there are no certain
.

27

HR

I,

p.

140.
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indications by which we may clearly
distinguish wakefulness from sleep

.

.

This consideration is sufficient to
warrant doubting

beliefs acquired through the senses.
Descartes then considers those propositions
whose

practical certainty is not tainted by the dream
argument.
For whether I am awake or asleep, two
and three together always form five,
and the square can never have more than
four sides, and it does not seem possible
that truths so clear and apparent can
be suspected of any falsity (or uncer29
tainty)
.

These propositions, including mathematical truths, are ones

which Descartes, in his naive philosophical posture, is
not perceiving clearly and distinctly.
I said at the end of Meditation I
that everything which I had not yet
comprehended with sufficient clearness
could be doubted by us, provided we
did so for 'reasons that were very
powerful and maturely considered.
'

In Meditation

I

Descartes is a long way from recognizing

the principle of clarity and distinctness as a rule of

evidence.

He then considers the possibility that an omni-

potent evil genius is deceiving him in all his remaining
beliefs, particularly those which are practical certainties

28
29

30
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for him.

This hypothesis, together with the
dream argument, constitutes the 'very powerful and
maturely
con-

sidered reasons' required to bring about
intuitional doubt.
Thus, all of Descartes' practical certainties
are now

intuitional uncertainties for him.

question

is

(1)

into doubt.

Thus, my response to

that all of Descartes' beliefs are cast

No distinction is made between doubts about

empirical beliefs and doubts about non-empirical ones.
The primary advantage of my account of Descartes'

enterprise as it relates to Meditation

that

is

I

the notion of intuitional doubt for which

,

given

have argued,

1

can consistently maintain that certain propositions such
as

I

am now sitting before the fire and

I

am not in bed,

asleep and dreaming, remain practical certainties for
Descartes.

Such propositions become intuitional uncer-

tainties but their practical epistemic status remains
intact.

The advantage of this to my interpretation of

Descartes will be explained in much more detail shortly.

With respect to question (2), Descartes discovers in

Meditation II that there is at least one proposition, the
Cogito

,

which is an intuitional certainty for him.

He

examines a number of reasons justifying his belief that
he exists and concludes

exist since

I

".

.

.

of a surety

I

myself did

persuaded myself of something (or merely

I

.
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because

I

thought of something). 31
1 ’

He then considers the

strongest reason he can imagine to defeat
his belief.
But there is some deceiver or other,
very powerful and very cunning, who’
ever employs his ingenuity in deceiving
me.
Then without doubt I exist also
32
if he deceives me
.

.

.

Having reflected well and carefully examined
all the
relevant evidence, Descartes concludes, "I am,

necessarily true each time that

mentally conceive it."
^ icient ly

33

I

I

exist, is

pronounce it, or that

I

The weight of the evidence is

strong that Descartes'

conviction is absolute.

Having achieved the intuitional certainty that he exists,
Descartes turns to a consideration of his nature and by

reflecting on the reasons which he brought forward in
establishing the certainty of the Cogito he eventually concludes that sum res cogitans

.

Again, given the weight of

evidence for this belief and the absence of any strong

reasons for its negation, Descartes achieves intuitional
certainty.

Thus, my response to question (2) is that the

Cogito provides the initial intuitional certainty which

Descartes needs to overcome the intuitional doubt raised in
the preceeding Meditation

31

HR

I,

32

Ibid

33
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basis of determining the intuitional certainty of
other

propositions including sum res cogitans

.

But on my view

the Co_gi t o does not attain any special epistemic
status

distinct from that of other first principles.

With respect to question (3), the intuitional certainties achieved in Meditation II provide the basis from

which Descartes develops the principle of clarity and
distinctness.

To reiterate, he begins:

But what then am
which thinks
.

.

A thing

I?

.

From this time I begin to know
what I am with a little more clearness and distinction ...

~

,

A bit later he remarks:
if the (notion or) perception
of wax has seemed to me clearer and
.

.

.

more distinct,
with how much
more (evidence) and distinctness must
it be said that I now know myself
.

.

.

.

.

^5
.

Finally, Descartes contends:
I am certain that I am a thing which
thinks; but do I not then likewise
know what is requisite to render me
certain of a truth? Certainly in
this first knowledge there is nothing
that assures me of its truth, excepting the clear and distinct perception
of that which I state
.

^ Ibid
~^
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Thus, my response to question

is that by the opening

(3)

of Meditation III Descartes arrives
at the conclusion that

clarity and distinctness are conditions
sufficient for
intuitional certainty. And they will play a
vital role in
establishing the intuitional certainty of the
premises and
the conclusions in the arguments for God's existence
and

benevolent nature.
With respect to question (4), in the Circle Passage

Descartes raises the hypothesis of the deceptive deity.

in

the face of the intuitional certainty of his clear and
dis-

tinct perceptions, the proposition that God is

a

deceiver

is only a very slight reason for doubting his clear and

distinct perceptions.
since I have no reason to believe
that there is a God who is a deceiver,
and as I have not yet satisfied myself
that there is a God at all, the reason
for doubt which depends on this opinion
alone is very slight, and so to speak
metaphysical.
But in order to be able
altogether to remove it, I must inquire
whether there is a God
and
I must also inquire whether He may be a
deceiver; for without a knowledge of
these two truths I do not see that I can,
?
ever be certain of anything.
.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

Since Descartes has not yet turned his attention to con-

sidering the existence and nature of God, the proposition
that God exists and is no deceiver is not an intuitional

37
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certainty for him.

Hence, as

I

have argued, the proposi-

tion that God is a deceiver is an
intuitional possibility
for him.
That possibility makes all Descartes'
intuitional

certainties metaphysically uncertain.

Given principle

(

19

),

if the proposition that God is a
deceiver were a practical

certainty for Descartes, that would defeat
the practical
certainty of all his remaining beliefs,
thereby making
them practical uncertainties for him.
Thus, my response to
question (4) is that the doubt raised in the
Circle Passage

is metaphysical doubt and it is quite distinct
from the

intuitional doubt raised in Meditation

I

.

Metaphysical

doubt does not defeat the intuitional certainties
achieved
in Meditation II

,

but the hypothesis of a deceptive God

does prevent Descartes from being metaphysically certain
that all his clear and distinct perceptions are true.

With respect to question

(5)

having raised meta-

physical doubt about his clear and distinct perceptions,

Descartes turns to a consideration of God's existence.

He

follows a line of reasoning, the conclusion of which is
that God exists.

The premises of this argument are not

metaphysically certain for Descartes.
clusion.

But Descartes does perceive the premises clearly

and distinctly.
for him.

Neither is the con-

Hence, they are intuitional certainties

He also clearly and distinctly perceives that

the conclusion follows from the premises and he clearly and

.
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distinctly perceives the conclusion.

Hence, the conclusion

that God exists is an intuitional
certainty for Descartes.
Once the proposition that God exists
is an intuitional

certainty for him, Descartes turns his
attention to considering the nature of that existent God.
He follows a
line of reasoning, the conclusion of which
is that God is
no deceiver.
For,

first of all, I recognize it to be
impossible that He should ever deceive
me; for in all fraud and deception some
imperfection is to be found, and although
it may appear that the power of deception
is a mark of subtilty or power, yet the
desire to deceive without doubt testifies
to malice or feebleness, and accordingly
88
cannot be found in God.

Once again the premises of this argument are not metaphysi-

cally certain for Descartes.

However, he does oerceive

them clearly and distinctly, thereby making them intuitional

certainties.

Inferring the conclusion, that God is no

deceiver, from these premises in

a

continuous and unin-

terrupted thought results in the conclusion being perceived

clearly and distinctly.

Thus, it too is an intuitional cer-

tainty for Descartes.
But if the proposition that God is no deceiver is an

intuitional certainty, then its negation, the proposition
that God is a deceiver, is an intuitional impossibility.

38
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It is,

therefore, no longer an intuitional
possibility.
Hence, it can no longer qualify
as an epistemic def eater.
And since, for Descartes, the
proposition that God is a
deceiver is the only proposition which
can cause metaphysical doubt, all of Descartes'
intuitional certainties
become metaphysical certainties.

Descartes is now in a position to demonstrate
the
metaphysical certainty of all his clear and
distinct perceptions.
In an abbreviated form 39 Descartes’
argument is
roughly the following:
(1)

Every clear and distinct perception
is something.

(2)

Whatever is something is caused by God.
Whatever is caused by God is true.
Therefore, every clear and distinct perception is true.

(3)
(4)

Each of the premises, and therefore the conclusion, is per-

ceived clearly and distinctly by Descartes.
fore, an intuitional certainty.

Each is, there-

But since there is no

longer any proposition that is an intuitional possibility
for Descartes and that casts metaphysical doubt on proposi-

tions which are intuitional certainties for him, each of
the premises, and therefore the conclusion, is a metaphysi-

cal certainty for him.

Thus, Descartes has succeeded in

This form of the argument is to be found in Feldman, op
cit
52
p
.

,

.

.
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demonstrating the metaphysical certainty
that all his
clear and distinct perceptions are
true.
The interpretation of Descartes'
enterprise that I
have just presented leaves a number
of questions unanswered.
One involves how the epistemic
component of intuitional

certainty and intuitional doubt is to be
explicated.

other

than suggesting certain logical relationships
between
each and between the concepts of practical
epistemic

appraisal,

I

have refrained from suggesting any
sufficient

or necessary epistemic conditions.

And

I

do not have any

clear intuitions on how this question might be
answered.
A second question concerns how clarity and
distinct-

ness are to be fully explicated.
not altogether helpful; and

I

Descartes' comments are

have refrained from anything

more than suggesting a few logical relationships between

d^^ity and distinctness and intuitional certainty.
A third question concerns the arguments for God's

existence and non— deceiving nature and for the veracity
of clear and distinct perceptions.

I

have refrained from

developing adequate accounts of these three arguments.
Each obviously requires more attention than

I

have devoted

to it in my thesis.

Finally, there is the question of whether my account
is,

in fact, what Descartes had in mind.

I

confess that in

developing three types of doubt and certainty, the resulting

245

complexity flies in the face of Ockham's
razor.
My response is that there exists some
textual evidence to support
my thesis.
I have found none either
inconsistent with it
or that cannot be interpreted in
a manner consistent with
it.
And more importantly, my interpretation
allows an
escape from the Cartesian Circle.
There are two additional advantages which

interpretation provides.
raised in Meditation

I

.

I

contend my

The first concerns the doubt

Those who contend both that meta-

physical doubt is raised from the very start of
Descartes'

enterprise and that the evil demon/deceiving God hypothesis
is the only proposition which casts such metaphysical
doubt,

provide no satisfactory explanation of how the dream argu-

ment functions.

It clearly functions for Descartes in

causing doubt about beliefs based on sense perception.
Yet,

it doesn't qualify as a cause for metaphysical doubt.

On my account, no such problem occurs.

causes intuitional doubt only.

The dream hypothesis

The evil demon/deceiving

God initially causes intuitional doubt and later causes

metaphysical doubt.
Second, among the interpretations which maintain what
I

have characterized as the non-autonomy of reason thesis,

only Feldman's is clearly non-circular.

However,

I

have

argued that among other things it encounters textual
difficulties, particularly in Meditation

I

.

More specif i-

.
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cally,

have suggested that the proposition
that he is
sitting by the fire is uncertain for
Descartes.
The
proposition constituting his reason for doubt
is that he
I

is in bed asleep and dreaming.

But given Feldman's expli-

cation of the concepts of practical epistemic
appraisal,
the proposition that he is not in bed asleep
and dreaming
is a practical uncertainty for Descartes.

man

But both Feld-

explication and Descartes' distinction between the

s

practical activities of life and an 'enquiry into truth'
indicate that the proposition that

I

am not in bed asleep

and dreaming is a practical certainty for Descartes.

Feldman's only alternative would be to redefine metaphysical doubt in such a way that

a

proposition which is

only a metaphysical possibility (rather than

a

possibility) would qualify to cast such doubt.

practical
Unfortun-

ately, this alternative would put Descartes back into the

circle
The account

I

have presented overcomes this difficulty.

The proposition that
a

I

am not in bed asleep and dreaming is

practical certainty for Descartes, as is the proposition

that

I

am sitting by the fire.

The proposition that

I

am

in bed asleep and dreaming is, on my account, only an

intuitional possibility.

It can function as a reason for

intuitional doubt without affecting either its practical

epistemic status or that of its contradiction.

Thus, the

.
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account

have presented can provide
an explanation of
metaphysical doubt without encountering
the difficulties
which I have suggested for Feldman's
account.
For the reasons I have just
given, I believe that the
interpretation of Descartes' enterprise
which I have provided,
spite of its unavoidable complexity,
points to
a satisfactory solution to the
problems of the Cartesian
Circle
I

m

.

.

,
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